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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Fatah Forces Buildup in South Lebanon Reported

90AE0072A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 May 90 p 1b

[Article by Ze'ev Shiff]

[Text] A strange cease-fire has developed in southern Lebanon between Israel and Fatah under the leadership of 'Arafat. It is a silent agreement achieved without negotiations and without mediation between the two sides. The reality has created it. Fatah, the largest and most pivotal organization in the PLO, is not attacking Israel from the Lebanese border and has been kept from sending units there. Israel, on its part, is not attacking Fatah targets in Lebanon. IDF [Israel Defense Forces] raids and attacks from the air are directed at other targets of Palestinians and Lebanese organizations attacking Israel. All the groups that tried to penetrate the security zone belong to those organizations, among them PLO organizations such as the Democratic Front and the Popular Front.

Even though the cease-fire applies only to part of the PLO (PLO-'Arafat), it is a positive thing. Behind the scenes, however, a dangerous phenomenon is developing. Fatah is taking advantage of the fact that the IDF is not attacking it in southern Lebanon and is again establishing, intensively and rapidly, near the border with Israel, a large military base. This base has grown especially in recent weeks and stands out in two regions -near Tyre and in Iqlim al-Tuffah, the area between Sidon and Jazzin.

In the Tyre and al-Rashidiyah region, which is closer to the Israeli border, Fatah has amassed a force like the one it had before the Lebanon War. The force already amounts to 1400 men organized in militia style.

From one of the SLA [Army of South Lebanon] outposts, near Ra's Bayda', I looked out across the area that is known to us in detail from the period of the war. The commander of the western unit of SLA 'Aqil Hashim, explained that the PLO division has been established once again in honor of Yusuf Najjar. The lookouts say that they can see with their big binoculars a Fatah force training. Its units are carrying out armed exercises.

Hashim, who was an officer in the Lebanese army, says that although Fatah artillery is further north near Sidon, closer to Tyre and al-Rashidiyah, some 107 millimeter and 122 millimeter katyushas have already been spotted. Here and there are forts which were built by the Palestinians.

It is clear that there is a distinct division between Fatah and the other organizations with regard to the rules in this area. It is easy to see this from the observation posts. Included in the other organizations operating in the region are Abu-Nidal's and Abu-Musa's groups.

From this perspective also, the cease-fire is strange. Fatah is not trying to penetrate Israel, but it is cooperating in the region with those who send hit units into the security zone and into Israel.

The second region where a military base is being built for Fatah is further north between Sidon and Jazzin. This is where battles between Amal and Hizballah and between Amal and members of SLA who were based in Jazzin took place. The area was emptied of residents, and many villages were abandoned.

Members of Fatah are invading this empty expanse, but this time the Palestinians have learned thier lesson and are choosing to establish their strongholds with the agreement of the residents. They also know that staying in an abandoned village will make it easier for the IDF to attack. Therefore, with the use of financial aid, they are persuading local residents to return to their homes.

This activity is being carried out with the partial approval of Amal. Amal rules in northern Lebanon, but he has been weakened recently. There are places like al-Rashidiyah and Tyre, where he is weaker. His power stems from his control over the axes of power. He conducts a dual policy with regard to Israel.

On the one hand, he does not agree to firing katyushas without control from the area. He is afraid that Israel will retaliate against the Shiite villages. But he does not care if the Palestinian groups cross the area to get to the security zone and from there to Israel. One of the groups that was recently destroyed by SLA was brought to the security zone by a guide who had a permit from UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon].

The Americans are satisfied, and rightly so, with 'Arafat's efforts to keep his promise not to carry out terrorist operations (even though he has not given up the armed struggle).

Along with this, they need to understand that there is dangerous potential in the new military base which 'Arafat is establishing in southern Lebanon.

In addition to his renewed military involvement in Lebanon, he is establishing a hostile base on Israel's border. Today's cease-fire can be canceled tomorrow, either because the peace process comes to a halt or because the PLO changes its position or because 'Arafat is no longer there.

Weapons Availability in Territories Examined 90AE0104A Tel Aviv HA'IR in Hebrew 1 Jun 90 p 15

[Article by Nadav Ha'etzni]

[Text] Are there live weapons in the territories, and, if so, how many and in whose hands; that is the question that has troubled the security system in recent weeks, against a background of threatening messages being sent by PLO spokesmen and, of course, since the murder in Rishon Letzion. People within the system scoff at the idea that

this gun really has ammunition, and, wonder if it would even be worthwhile to fire it.

It is perfectly clear to those who handle these matters that there are a lot of weapons in the territories, which. thus far, have not been used against Israeli targets. What is in dispute is the nature of the weaponry and its availability for use by terrorist organizations. It is in the nature of things that even among the various Palestinian groups there is more than one theory. It is doubtful if anyone, including the terrorists themselves, has an overall picture of the supply of weapons and ammunition. The problem is that it is hard to appraise the amount of weapons that have been gathered over the course of dozens of years by several generations of peasants for purposes of defense and honor. These weapons were never registered in the Interior Ministry's records or held in regular armories. One thing is clear: Most of the weapons are not held by the organizations' first line activists.

In terms of the peasant view of things, the weapon is the twin brother of his moustache, and the two of them are the essence of his virility. Weapons popular among the peasantry are, generally, old weapons: Karl Gustavs, sten guns, non-automatic rifles and pistols. Most are hidden in a layer of thick grease deep in the earth of the vineyard, in the basement or in a nearby cave. According to the estimates, in Mount Hebron alone, there are thousands of weapons. One Arab source claimed this week that there are weapons in almost every house in the villages and towns around Hebron. But, in his estimation, most of them would never be turned against Israel. "Take, for example, the village of Yattah," he says. "If a controversy were to break out between the village clans, you would hear shots from almost every home, but even if a thousand Israeli soldiers were to come to Yattah, almost no one would turn to those weapons."

The estimate as to the nature and quantity of weapons is also accepted by most of the security bodies. The dispute centers around the question of whether they would use those weapons against Israel. Those who hold the weapons have a problem with ammunition. Some of the weapons are antiques, and, in fact, it is hard to get ammunition even for the newer weapons used by the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces], and certainly for weapons like a Kalachnikov. In addition to the peasants' weapons, there are also automatic rifles and submachine guns in the territories, but the quantities are much smaller. We found fresh proof of their existence again from the Hebron area.

Only two weeks ago a reservist was hit by shots from an M-16 or Galil (the ammunition is the same) near Qiryat 'Arba'. The murderers of the soldiers in Gaza, a year ago, apparently used a Kalachnikov (and have still not been caught). About a month ago a bus driver on the 160 line to Qiryat 'Arba' was hit by shots from a nine mm pistol. But all of these events still do not point to a serious quantity of weapons and certainly not of ammunition.

In principle we can divide the weapons in the territory into three categories: house weapons, weapons that have been smuggled in from outside since 1967 and weapons that were stolen or acquired from criminal groups. A considerable portion of the weapons seized in the last few years had come from Israeli hands. For example, the M-16 rifle used by the members of the 'Idna gang, that killed a soldier and wounded people from a reserve battalion about a year and a half ago. The rifle had been previously stolen from an IDF base in the north and was used in several attacks. Security sources believe that the quantity of weapons of that sort is relatively low, even though there must be at least several dozen.

On the other hand, within the security system there is general agreement that the amount of weapons brought in from outside is scant. They note that in recent years significant accomplishments have been racked up in the area known in military parlance as "interdiction;" i.e., the prevention of smuggling. Attempts to pass weapons, ammunition and terrorist materials are made all the time and along all the borders, especially by sea and across the Egyptian border. But intelligence work and regular patrols have thus far led to successful catches.

The rather hermetic sealing of the borders finds expression in the nature of the terrorist charges that are discovered before or after they explode. Almost all of those charges are jerry-rigged, mostly pipe bombs, like the one that exploded this week in Mahane Yehuda. Charges of this sort prove that the activists have almost no regular foreign devices at their disposal, so they are forced to improvise. A pipe, match heads, an alarm clock, a little explosive. Sometimes it works, sometimes not, and sometimes it happens, as on Independence Day in Hebron, that the whole thing explodes in their hands. Nevertheless there are weapons, and more than a few. There may not be enough for real guerrilla warfare, but if they were to be used extensively, the whole situation in the area would change.

Beyond the question of supply and availability is the question of preparedness, and it is perhaps the most important. Following the riots last week, newspaper headlines reported from a senior defense source about an instruction given, as it were, to PLO activists to begin using live weapons. The Tunis stalwarts, among them, close advisors of Yasir 'Arafat, were quick to deny it. One of them even claimed: "We are not so crazy as to take up live weapons and thus give Israel the pretext to apply genocide and expulsion against the Palestinians." After the explosion of the terrorist charge in Mahane Yehuda, one might have had the impression that here was proof of what had been leaked by that senior defense source.

In fact, the explosion in Mahane Yehuda constituted no such proof. Both sides—both the senior defense source and the Tunis stalwarts—lie. The controversy surrounding the use of live weapons has already become part of the war of disinformation, the goal of which is to score points in the international arena. The truth is a bit

more complicated than the official declarations and leaks. The PLO and its various factions have never stopped using live weapons, despite their declarations. On the other hand, a significant portion of the murders committed over the last few years were carried out with no direction from abroad and without the knowledge of the PLO strike teams.

The propaganda battle over live weapons is rather transparent. The disinformation spread by the Palestinian top brass, especially Fatah, follows from an international propaganda line adopted by it since the beginning of the intifadah and updated after December, 1988. From the moment the intifadah broke out, its leaders have been trying to present it as a broad-based popular uprising and distinguish it from terrorist activity. For this purpose they even adopted new linguistic coinage, the "white revolution." A white revolution, as opposed to a red revolution, constitutes a part of the myth of armed struggle of the Palestinian charter.

The theory of white revolution plays well in the international community. It also serves the claim that 'Arafat gave instructions in December, 1988 to cease the use of live weapons, at the request of the U.S. As we well know, the U.S. government conditioned its dialogue with the PLO on the cessation of terrorist acts. The claim that the residents of the territories don't use live weapons is also important as a means of pressuring Israel (by way of the U.S. and international public opinion) not to use the full strength at her disposal to suppress the intifadah. Leaders like Faysal Husayni have boasted more than once that their great success has been in bringing Israel down to a battlefield of stone throwers.

Israel is trying to prove in various international fora that the PLO, including Fatah, in fact has not stopped its terrorist acts nor use of live weapons for even a single day. The PLO, with the assistance of the U.S. administration, denies it. The truth is that the heads of Fatah have preferred since the beginning of the intifadah not to attempt to use the few weapons the activists possess and have almost entirely suspended their international strikes. The Fatah organization has limited and camouflaged the actions of certain terrorist groups, but has not stopped giving directions to gangs of all sorts.

If we concentrate only on 'Arafat's Fatah organization and ignore other organizations federated with the PLO for example, the Popular Democratic Front-the data show the following: Since December, 1988 there have been at least two penetration attempts by armed bands. Only last December five terrorists were foiled, who had penetrated the Egyptian border and were sent by Fatah to carry out a murder mission at one of the southern settlements. Beyond that, during 1989 there were at least 13 strikes within the borders of the Green Line that were carried out by Fatah activists directed from abroad. For example, the gang members from the Jenin area who threw a hand grenade and Molotov cocktails in the Nazareth area. They were caught in April, 1989 and confessed that they were sent into action by Force 17.

Another gang sent into action by that body from the Tul Karim area was exposed in June, 1989 after placing explosives in the Beilinson Hospital on Hakovshim St. in Tel Aviv and elsewhere.

What the precise guidelines are that have been given to activists in the area regarding the use of live weapons is not clear. But what is certain is that Fatah is very comfortable in suspending a portion of its terrorist activity because, since the liquidation of Abu Jihad, the strike groups have been in disarray. No one has yet taken Abu Jihad's place as director and coordinator, and it is unclear if the PLO top brass have any central control at all over the various branches of the military apparatus.

The strike in the Mahane Yehuda market was proof that the live strikes have never really ceased. In recent months, especially in the last few weeks, there has been significant escalation in the territories. According to IDF official data, which are not necessarily comprehensive, over the last 20 days there have been three incidents of gunfire in Judea and Samaria; five explosive charges, a hand grenade and 34 Molotov cocktails were discovered. The situation is especially serious in the Judea area, particularly on Mount Hebron. Updated statistics from the area point to three incidents of gunfire near Qiryat 'Arba', in Hebron and near Gush 'Etzion; terrorist activity in the Gush 'Etzion area; terrorist activity in Hebron itself; and five Molotov cocktails in Hebron.

Tracking the number of gunfire incidents and explosives last summer proves that at that time there was rather widespread activity, no less than that of recent months. Despite this, it turns out that in the first year of the intifadah, of all things, between April and September, 1988, almost no such incidents were registered.

Within the security system the guess is that the use of live weapons will increase on both sides of the Green Line, with or without explicit instructions from Tunis. It is customary to suppose that 'Arafat's threat to draw the big sword of live weapons that has been sheathed since 1988 has no teeth to it. 'Arafat has no sword, at best he has a dagger, and it is not certain he will find it worthwhile to draw.

EGYPT

Political Legitimacy of Islam Said Key To Facing Israel

90AA0200B Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 20 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by Hazim Ahmad]

[Text] After the statement by the Israeli chief of staff that Israel is preparing for a new war that will not stop at the Suez Canal in relation to Egypt, it is not enough for the country's rulers to issue a statement rejecting the threat and calling upon international society to oppose it.

Our rulers, and all Arab rulers, should know that Israel does not take into account international society. Our government

would do better by resorting to the people and all political forces, especially the Islamic forces, whose unique abilities to oppose the Israeli enemy are well known to the latter. It is more worthwhile for the government to call on these forces to rally around it for the greater jihad in preparation for the lesser jihad, i.e. war.

The presidency, especially, must reexamine its positions that are opposed to the Islamic current, which it announced clearly in past weeks by denying [the Islamic current] permission to form a party, and in past years, through prison sentences, arrests, legal prosecutions, and even physical liquidation.

A Political Expert's Advice

Dr. 'Abd-al-Khabir 'Ata, assistant professor of political science at Asyut University, states that the government must realize its military errors regarding the removal of religious persons from the Army or not permitting the recruitment of members of the Islamic movement who are university graduates. The government must not listen to the Americans' advice to remove fervent elements from the leadership of defense factories, the most recent being the Sagr Factory.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Khabir added that the government must reconcile with the Islamic movement politically, permit it full freedom, and allow free, fair elections in which the people choose the truthful, honorable, and pure to represent it, and to monitor the government based on faith, not narrow self-interests.

The government must open the way for Islamic youth to reclaim desert land on which to produce food for the people, so that the Americans will not humble us by supplying us with food that we eat but do not own.

The government must turn to people of renown among the God-fearing ulema who do not put on the appearance of a ruler out of a desire for glory, power, or fame. There are many such members of the ulema in Egypt's professional unions and universities. (In this regard, we mention, for example, the seminars held by the late Dr. Nabil Hashim at the Alexandria University Faculty Club, in which he dealt with numerous problems facing Egypt and offered scientific solutions to them.)

Dr. 'Abd-al-Khabir adds:

The president's experts, such as Dr. Asamah al-Baz and Dr. Mustafa al-Fiqi, must stress to the president that the country's present situation requires the ruling system to reconcile with domestic national and Islamic forces.

These two must stress to the president that statements made by Western circles, especially American circles, to the effect that the Islamic current poses a danger to the government and to Egypt, aim to split the ranks of Egyptians and create enmity between the government and the people. The Islamic current desires the unity of this country more than any other political force, because

it prays to its lord to protect the country and the Copts of Egypt, toward whom God has commanded friendly and kind treatment.

Because the Islamic current reads in the Koran, "Obey God, obey the prophet and those in charge among you," it is zealous towards the country's leaders and rulers, insofar as Islamicists in this country, and throughout the countries of the Islamic nation, want their rulers to rule them according to Islam. Islam is justice, freedom, and equality.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Khabir continues his remarks, saying:

Our "brother" rulers can be viewed by our "people" as agents, as long as our rulers do not rise to the level of this dangerous phase in which Israel threatens everyone.

Our "brother" leaders sometimes gather around themselves people who cut them off from direct meetings with the leaders of the Islamic movement. Why have we not heard about the president receiving Hamid Abu-al-Nasr or Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, or the late Salah Abu-Isma'il, whose repeated requests to meet with the president went unanswered? Are these leaders, around whom hundreds of thousands of Egypt's best youth gather, less important than the members of Egypt's soccer team?

It is a greater distinction for our rulers to be remembered by history for "dying as martyrs" in the service of their religion and nation, instead of "being assassinated" because they were lax in serving their religion and nation. In this connection, let us mention the Americans' assassination of King Faysal and Dayya' al-Haqq, may God have mercy on them.

Government's Economic Policy Criticized, NPUG's Offered

90AA0200A Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 30 May 90 p 7

[Article by Hazim Munir]

[Text] Khalid Muhyi-al-Din declared that the government's attempts to achieve economic reform will fail if they are not accompanied by political reform.

He stressed that the world declaration of human rights, which Egypt ratified, grants workers the right to peaceful refrainment from work to improve working conditions and maintain wages. He also stated that the organization of strikes is considered a symbol of civilization and progress, not chaos and backwardness.

He made these remarks in a conference held by the NPUG [National Progressive Unionist Grouping] Party in the city of al-Mahallah al-Kubra during the party's celebrations of the Workers' Holiday. The conference was addressed by Abu-al-'Izz al-Hariri, a member of the party's general secretariat and a former People's Assembly member, and by Shaykh Mustafa 'Asi, the secretary of the party's religious affairs committee and a member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs.

In his remarks, Khalid pointed to the position of the NPUG, which has warned repeatedly of the results of the economic policies pursued by the state since the 1970s. These policies have led to an enormous increase in prices, which will increase further in the near future.

He stated that the government's policies since the 1970s have been biased in favor of high-income earners, investors, and businessmen. This is clearly evident in the duties and tax exemptions granted to them, which are valued at close to 5,000 million Egyptian pounds per year. It also evident in the state's neglect of the development of Egyptian industry, and of replacement and refurbishment operations that could permit an increase in production to meet the people's growing needs for basic goods.

He stated that the clear imbalance between wages and prices from which we are suffering is a natural outcome of these policies.

He indicated that the solution to the economic crisis requires people to bear the burdens of the crisis according to their different abilities and incomes. He mentioned that the latest World Bank statistics indicate that the 20 percent at the top of the social scale obtain 48.5 percent of the national income, 60 percent obtain 45 percent, and the 20 percent at the bottom of the social scale obtain only five percent.

He stated that this confirms the absence of social justice concepts in the government's policies, which are biased toward business persons and the conditions of the International Monetary Fund, which place the burdens of the crisis on the workers and the impoverished by eliminating subsidies for basic goods, raising the prices of such goods, and moving toward reducing goods obtained with ration cards in preparation for eliminating the card system. Alternatives policies would be to raise the tax brackets of high-income earners, cancelling all of the previously mentioned exemptions, or limiting them to investments needed by the state, and exploiting the financial resources that could be saved if the subsidization of basic goods is eliminated.

He stressed that all calls to increase production cannot achieve positive results as long as fair wages and minimum subsistence needs are not provided; these can only be provided on the basis of policies that favor the hardworking majority of the people.

He added that the NPUG has put forth numerous ideas that explain the causes of the economic crisis, as well as proposals dealing with methods for emerging from the crisis.

Such methods include raising the minimum wage to 100 Egyptian pounds. This measure could be financed by bearing down heavily on the exemptions granted to investors, raising the tax brackets of high-income earners and the able, developing domestic production, protecting domestic protection from foreign industries, and continuing to subsidize basic goods. Regarding the elimination of subsidies, the state offers the excuse that subsidies are not going to those entitled to them, while it nonetheless

grants exemptions and privileges to those who invest Egypt's capital and resources abroad.

In his remarks, he dealt with the development of production. He stated that society cannot flourish in the absence of democracy, and that parties that obtain power under the Emergencies and Protection of Authority Law cannot remedy the crises blocking their way or be concerned with maintaining the people's confidence.

He emphasized that political reform requires affirmation of the right to peaceful, organized strikes. The United Nations established this right to promote freedom of expression and the achievement of social interests. He attacked claims to the effect that strikes lead to chaos and the suspension of production, saying that productivity always increases when workers receive their true wages.

At the conclusion of his remarks, Khalid called on citizens to exercise and defend their rights, participate in public action, forcefully oppose falsification in elections to achieve political reform, and to impose the people's will on the ruler by supporting those with programs favoring the popular masses' interests.

In his address, Abu-'Izz al-Hariri warned against the pranks of rightist parties that advocate alignment with the people's interests, but use their information means to pass American policies and achieve capitalist interests hostile to the workers' interests.

He said that the nation and the workers face an imminent danger stemming from the policies of the government and its rightist opposition supporters, policies that are aimed at selling the private sector. He warned against workers being subjected to dismissals and homelessness in the light of conditions established by business persons for the purchase of public sector projects.

Shaykh Mustafa 'Asi stressed that the absence of democracy and social justice creates sectarian strife, which threatens Egypt and its security. He called on everyone to stand together in confronting this danger and returning to the principles of the Islamic religion regarding tolerance, friendship, and fighting oppression, instead of the people of the same nation fighting among themselves.

Interior Ministry Funds Request Opposed, Amount Given

90AA0216A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 23 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Sana' Mustafa: "Government Complains to Government of Rising Prices; Increased Budget To Counter Rising Prices; Ministry of Interior Requests 60 Million Pounds; Dr. 'Alawi Hafiz: I Demand Abolition of Central Security Because It Costs Government Millions; Dr. Ibrahim Abazah: Streamlined Expenditure and Reduced Security Forces Will Eliminate Deficit Faced by Interior Ministry"]

[Text] The ghost of inflation that is growing more ferocious by the day no longer digs its fiery nails just into

the crushed citizen with the limited income and no longer casts its gloomy shadow just on families, rendering mothers incapable of managing their family affairs and family heads incapable of providing their families' needs. The ugly bogey of inflation has begun to assault the government itself. But the government pays it no attention and gives it no weight or consideration. The Ministry of Interior has applied to its colleague the Ministry of Finance requesting that its budget for the coming year be increased by 60.7 million pounds, justifying the request by the rising prices, especially of food, medical care, and clothing. The sums requested for these items successively are: 32.3 million for food, 6 million for medical care, 21.2 million for clothing, and 1.2 million to counter the rising soap prices! If this is the Ministry of Interior's condition, then to what degree can ordinary citizens tighten their belts? Besides, are these requests compatible with the "streamlined spending" slogan which the government reiterates untiringly?

Wafdist Deputy 'Alawi Hafiz believes that extravagance is an inflammatory phenomenon that has permeated the government agencies and has become so grave that it warns of an imminent danger. The funds requested by the Ministry of Interior to counter inflation are incompatible with the austerity policy advocated by the government. If the Ministry of Interior outwardly declares that it will use the requested increase to spend on medical care, food, and other similar items, the increase will in fact and in reality be used for the special guard provided to government officials, especially when they inaugurate and inspect projects and when they make visits to production sites and other places. On such occasions when security measures extend to nearby places and subsidiary roads, it is required that large numbers of officers and troops be lined up alongside roads for long hours. This saddles the state budget with exorbitant costs.

Demanding that the central security forces be abolished or that their numbers be reduced, 'Alawi Hafiz has said:

What is surprising is that the entire world, excluding Egypt, is inclined to reduce military spending. Egypt spends on two armies: One is indispensable and irreplaceable and is designated to secure and protect the country. The other is the central security army which constitutes in itself a constitutional deviation from the police mission, considering that the police are a civilian authority that may not be turned into armed forces.

As for the treatment of officers and troops at the police hospitals, there has been a deluge of complaints to the Ministry of Interior proving that these hospitals are not serious in performing their task, whether in terms of standard of care or of meagerness of resources.

Confidential Expenditures

Continuing to present his viewpoint, 'Alawi Hafiz added:

There are other items that can be omitted from the Ministry of Interior's budget, such as the item called "confidential expenditures." Nobody, not even the People's Assembly itself, can control the expenditures under this item. The monies are spent in political areas to protect high-ranking officials.

'Alawi Hafiz has urged that expenditures on building clubs, summer, and winter resorts, and on the life of "luxury" which most officials live be reduced instead of requesting an increased budget and of saddling the simple citizen with the burden of this increase.

Inflation Is Government Industry

Dr. Ibrahim al-Dasuqi Abazah, the Economic Committee rapporteur and member of al-Wafd Higher Committee, believes that the inflation that is raising prices daily is the work of the government. At the same time, we find that the government does not reduce its expenditures to counter this inflation but rather adopts the policy of "deception" and of streamlined spending in trivial areas. Before it asks the people to tighten their belts and to observe austerity, the government must streamline its extravagance, whether embodied in the purchase of sleek cars or in other forms. A most outstanding example demonstrating the excessiveness of government spending is the Interior Ministry's expenditures on central security which amounts to millions annually.

Dr. Abazah has demanded that the Ministry of Interior reduce its expenditures and that it curtail the manifestations of extravagance so that it may reduce its expenditures to less than one-fourth [their current level] and may save 700 million pounds in order to provide the money needed to advance the police agency and its workers. The ministry should do this instead of asking the cabinet to allocate 60 million pounds in the ministry's new budget to counter the rising prices of leather, textiles, and soap.

Dr. Abazah has stressed that even though the number of the central security troops has risen to 350,000 soldiers, plus 10,000 officers and NCO's, experience has proven that this force is incapable of providing security protection and that these numbers pose a threat to the government itself, as evidenced by the central security incidents of February 1986.

Luxury Spending

Dr. Hilmi Murad has presented his viewpoint, saying:

We are not opposed to the Interior Ministry's request that its budget be increased. But in light of the current economic crisis, we ask the ministry to reduce its expenditures on rallies, celebrations, receptions, on the gifts that are given on various occasions, and on the construction of administrative and recreational facilities with which one can dispense at the present time. This should be done in order to keep pace with and balance the required and inevitable increases in some fundamental and indispensable items, such as food and clothing for the troops.

Dr. Hilmi Murad has stressed that the Interior Ministry's request that its budget be increased will encourage

the other ministries to adopt the same policy and demand in a few days that their budgets for the coming year be increased!

Testimony From Official Reports

Counselor al-Damardash al-'Uqali, a National Party deputy, has asserted that upon reviewing the 1987-88 state budget, the Central Accounting Agency noted the presence of excessive fiscal violations. The agency found out that there were spending violations and that spending was at rates that exceeded the government's actual commitments. This violation created a true burden which had its impact on the value of the Egyptian pound. The sum allocated for the 1987-88 state budget was 14 billion pounds whereas the sum spent amounted to 72 billion pounds, i.e. nearly twofold the amount [figures as published]. As for the Interior Ministry's request that its budget be increased, this request reflects serious indications that have their economic and fiscal ramifications to the security situation. Security in Egypt has now reached a poor state. Yet, the Interior Ministry demands an increase in its expenditures? What does this mean and where does these funds go? Are these monies spent on rigging elections?

Political Security and Citizen's Security

In an interview with a prominent security source that has declined to let his name be revealed, the source wondered:

Why this increase? It will do the police agency no noteworthy good. The police agencies continue to suffer from the lack of resources and from lagging behind the police developments achieved by the majority of the world's police agencies. Even though there are agreements between Egypt and a number of countries to send missions to be trained on the latest and most sophisticated means of crime detection, these agreements have not been implemented to date because the provisions allocated for such missions are spent on the central security forces and on secret expenditures to expose political organizations now that the concept of public security police has changed and that the police, with all its agencies, has come to focus on political security and has disregarded its fundamental task of protecting the citizen's security.

Individual Ticket System Favored for Next Election

Public Surveyed

90AA0199A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 1 Jun 90 pp 22-25

[Article by Faruq Abazah, Samir 'Abd-al-Majid, Nabil Rashwan, and 'Iman Raslan: "The Next Elections: Individual or Proportional?"]

[Excerpts] The political situation is still going through a period of watching, waiting, and guessing about what

actions will be taken, following the Supreme Constitutional Court's decision regarding the invalidity of the People's Assembly. During the coming summer months, this issue will continue to stir up debate withing the corridors of Parliament, in private salons, and among individuals of the same family, increasing the number of those who form opinions and predict what will happen.

Because this national issue, aimed at stabilizing our constitutional life, does not concern Cairo alone, AL-MUSAWWAR was anxious to take the pulse of many segments of the public, not just inside the capital, but in the other governorates as well. These segments represent politicians, college deans, and professors, intellectuals, farmers, and women.

It is strange that the opposition parties—which were unceasingly critical of the contested law—today prefer elections by the proportional slate system, which this law provided for, while many legislators, university professors, men in the street, and housewives call for the need to return to the individual election system.

This is a live picture of the masses' views as they await the decision, which will be the first step on the road to constitutional stability, and may even afford us the opportunity to form a parliament that will be unchallengeable as to validity and legality.

What do the masses, who have the true rights in any legislation, say about the future of constitutional life and the fate of our Assembly, following that court decision? AL-MUSAWWAR ascertained the views of the citizens, from intellectuals and university professors to the man in the street and housewives. We met with Dr. 'Atif Rajab, professor of Islamic philosophy and former head of the Philosophy Department in Cairo College of Arts, who said: I believe that the future of constitutional life in Egypt is going through a very critical time. When we look back at the deep-rooted, democratic traditions that have prevailed during our parliamentary history, and we discover that the People's Assembly is considered an illegal parliament, that should confirm to us the degree of danger that exists.

The current electoral law must be radically changed, and it would be preferrable for the election laws to be those laws that were valid prior to 1952, and the individual election system applied. No one has said that there was a parliament formed before that date whose legality was challenged. In light of the current electoral law, we must expect an illegal assembly...I repeat that the requisite solution is to go back to the old law, out of respect for our integrity and status as an old, respected nation.

The Way Out

Dr. Bayumi Saqr, vice-dean of the Commercial College, University of al-Minufiyah, said: The constitutional convulsions, which have occurred in recent years, and the blows that have been dealt to a most important law, the law pertaining to the exercise of the Egyptian citizen's political rights, have caused me to prefer a return to the individual election system. This is the correct way to get out of the constant circle of challenges. As regards the slate system, its failure has been established for many reasons. I would bet that no one read the platforms of the political parties behind these lists. Those who chose the names, which these lists include, did not divest themselves of personal motives. When the candidate sees his name on the slate, he owes his loyalty to those who chose the name, not to the masses. This has been reflected in the performance of deputies in the People's Assembly; the voter has completely lost confidence in his representatives, because of this stinging criticism to which the People's Assembly exposes him.

Riyal Muhammad, housewife, stated: The link between the people and their representatives, before the judgement was issued, had been completely severed. With regard to members of the People's Assembly, it is assumed that they would endorse the issues of the public and, for example, face up to the problem of prices and salaries. But I have not heard of any of the female members of the Assembly who stopped to explain the housewives' concerns regarding the flare-up of prices and merchants' exploitation...The solution is to return to the individual election system, so that no one can hide behind the slate. We should let the masses choose those whom they believe are qualified to represent them, in order to put an end to the meddling of party chiefs and other quarters.

Munir 'Atiyah, who is a farmer from the Abu-Hamad District, al-Sharqiyah Governorate: No one in our town has read the programs of these parties; most of us don't even know their names. Why do they make us compare slates whose nominees' names we don't even know? The solution is to give us the opportunity to compare only one candidate with another...Return to the individual election system and, at the same time, abolish the 50 percent ratio of workers and fellahin. Our children today have been educated, and not only fellahin wear the skullcap and galabiyah [long shirt-like garment].

What Do the Lawyers Say?

Dr. Nu'man Jum'ah, dean of the law school, Cairo University, said: The current People's Assembly must be dissolved at once because, after the recent judgement of the Supreme Constitutional Court, it is considered non-existent. Therefore, I think that there is no necessity, obligation, or even legislative proviso, to request a referendum, because—legally—what if the masses said no to dissolving the People's Assembly? What would we do in that case, with regard to the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court? This is where the issue becomes very dangerous.

What about the new electoral law? Dr. Nu'man Jum'ah replies: We must to back to the individual election system, because by actual practice, it has been proven that the individual ticket is better because it expands the scope of the exercise of democracy. Moreover, it allows the best, most qualified people to enter the People's

Assembly. With regard to a new elections law, we must also amend the 50-percent ratio of workers and fellahin.

Dr. Fathi 'Abd al-Subur, former chief of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and a member of the Advisory Council, is of a different opinion with regard to the position of the current People's Assembly:

We must hold a public referendum, especially since the dissolution of the People's Assembly has become inevitable. However, that must be done in accordance with the constitution, and here the Egyptian constitution stipulates the need to hold a referendum to approve dissolution. This is an important constitutional issue, which we must concern ourselves with, so that we can avoid the challenge of unconstitutionality some other time. I believe that there is no harm in holding the referendum. At this point, with regard to the new law, I would like to say that I believe it would be preferrable to return to the individual election system. This has in fact been done with respect to elections for the Advisory Council, because individual elections highlight the most competent and qualified people to enter the Council, apart from the fact that those elections depend on trust between the voter and the candidate. [passage omitted]

Dr. al-Shaf'i Muhammad Bashir, head of the Department of International Law in the University of al-Mansurah Law School, stated:

To be very brief, the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court invalidating the People's Assembly since its formation, is a decisive, constitutional criterion which, ultimately, is unanswerable. The Assembly's fate has been decided; it must go, and go immediately. The Constitutional Court's decision brings a new element into the Egyptian arena, occurring for the first time in Egypt, and that is the invalidity of the People's Assembly's formation, i.e., the illegality of its existence originally. The question is a question of existence or not, because the judgement must be carried out by all authorities. Therefore, one cannot conceive of applying the regulation of referendum, which carries the sense of the people accepting or rejecting the Assembly's dissolution. The question would be, consequently, a referendum on a decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and that would be improbable and inconceivable.

Dr. al-Shaf'i Muhammad Bashir adds: We would say that the proportional slate electoral system is not appropriate for our Egyptian situation, and its application has had bad results in past elections. In the old days, they said...Those who violate the past are lost. We used to use the individual election system; let's go back to it, because it is understandable to the Egyptian citizens, easy to apply, has confirmed results, is best for the candidates, and is the system most capable of exposing the most qualified candidate over the unqualified.

We hope that we are concerned about free elections, and that they are conducted honestly, uncorrupted by the spurious practises that brought into the People's Assembly a group of drug merchants, professional looters of the people's wealth, half-illiterates, and hypocrites.

Dr. Muhammad Raf'at 'Abd-al-Wahhab, professor of constitutional law in the Alexandria University Law School:

We believe that a careful study of the constitutional situation and political circumstances during recent years would require us to reject completely the proportional slate system, and would demonstrate the need to return to the individual election system. This opinion, which we hold, is not only based on the defects of the party list system, most importantly the imposition of specific names in the lists on the masses of voters, but rather, and above that and more importantly, we believe that the party slate system is in and of itself an unconstitutional system, because it violates the provisions of the constitution. The 1971 Constitution—in Article 62—stipulates that: The citizen shall have the rights of election and nomination. These two rights are, therefore, established for the citizen in his individual capacity, and not as political parties. By the nature of things, the parties will play a principal role, in terms of the process of guiding and assisting individuals in the exercise of these rights but, from a constitutional standpoint, the 1971 Constitution requires that the election system be based on the individual for these two rights of the citizen, in his capacity as a citizen and an individual. Consequently, we have no room for constitutional interpretation in this regard; the constitution imposes the individual election system.

Dr. Muhammad Abazah, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Alexandria University Faculty Club:

The Supreme Constitutional Court decision with regard to the illegality of the People's Assembly is tantamount to a mark of glory on Egyptian jurisprudence, in fulfilling its obligations without prejudice or bias. Perhaps the most important facet of this is the reaction of both the People's Assembly itself and the government vis-a-vis this judgement.

With regard to how to conduct the next elections, we suggest to the president that he expedite forming a supreme commission, which should include representatives of all orientations and political organizations in Egypt, as well as lawyers and constitutional specialists, to draft rules and guarantees, in order to conduct the electoral process in complete honesty. The commission should compare the unlimited slate, proportional slate, and individual election systems, as to which is most appropriate for the current Egyptian circumstances, and to guarantee complete equality among all candidates, no matter what their orientation, under the total supervision of the judiciary.

Based on the experiences that occurred during previous election campaigns for the People's Assembly and the Advisory Council, and the need to fill all the gaps in previous practices, I personally believe that the proportional slate system might suit us better than other systems, in order to put an end to the meddling of the ruling party, guarantee neutrality of elections, and achieve the principle of mutual responsibility and opportunity between the individual candidate and the proportional slate.

I also think that the 50 percent ratio of workers and fellahin has become inappropriate for the present circumstances in Egypt, because it is nore harmful than beneficial. This matter should be reconsidered.

Party Slate System Does Not Suit Us

Dr. Mughawri Shahatah, chairman of the Faculty Club, University of al-Minufiyah, stressed that the slate system has proved to be incompatible with the political parties currently on the Egyptian scene, and that that system's application requires a political awareness by the masses that is belied by the high rate of illiteracy among the population. Choosing the slate, in which more than one quarter has a hand, might cause persons in villages and towns to have parliamentary representation without equality and, consequently, the slate election system cannot be considered a true expression of the will of the masses. It usually includes individuals who do not represent real segments of the masses and, therefore, the best condition in which to hold proper elections is by dividing the republic into precincts, as was the case when the individual election system was in use. This would be in line with the needs of the Egyptian people, and their situation and history, and would achieve a majority within the People's Assembly that would express the wishes of the masses. Although this system would impact on tribal solidarity, especially in rural areas, it is to be hoped, however, that the people's choices in the next election will express public interests, not the aspirations of the individual, and promote the highest interests of the nation over all other considerations. Despite the provision for the 50-percent ratio of workers and fellahin, the constitution stipulates that that would require reconsideration, even if that condition remained. It is not in the best interests that this ratio continue as is.

Regulating the Election Process

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, leader of the Labor Party, stated: Firm and clear guarantees must be drawn up to regulate the electoral process. This should be done before discussing ways of conducting elections. There is a need for the judiciary to supervise election campaigns in all their aspects, such as voting equipment and making sure that each voter signs, or makes a mark, beside his name.

Ibrahim Shukri added that the best way to hold elections is the unconditional proportional slate system, in which everyone can submit lists that reflect programs. This is the proper and natural way for political parties to get into parliaments. Each party has a platform, responsibility, and legitimacy, and can carry out its platform,

after winning seats. The leader of the opposition emphasized that the consideration is not that elections be by the individual ticket, proportional slate or unrestricted, but that the consideration is for guarantees of neutrality in elections, so that they can be an expression of the people's voices. We must be assured of that and of the arrangments, both as regards nomination and election results.

Yasin Sarraj al-Din, representative of the Wafd Party's parliamentary bloc, thinks that the best electoral system is the proportional slate system: Because it achieves a representation closer to democracy, from the people's standpoint, than any other electoral system, either individual or unlimited. This is because the proportional slate system represents the various political trends, and gives each of the existing legal political parties an opportunity for representation in the People's Assembly. The slate does not waste votes; if they differ in viewpoint with other viewpoints, all of them are represented in parliament.

Yasin Sarraj al-Din went on to stress the need for elections in any form to be under the supervision—from top to bottom—of neutral authorities, such as the judiciary: If the response to this is that the number of judges is insufficient, then elections must be conducted over several days: two days for Upper Egypt, for example; two more for Lower Egypt; and one day for Greater Cairo. This is done in other countries.

I asked Yasin Sarraj al-Din about his demand that the elections be by the proportional slate system and, so that there would not be another challenge, would he request a constitutional amendment? The Wafdist deputy replied that: this is a request to amend the elections article in the constitution. It is very easy, not difficult, to amend some constitutional articles.

I interrupted him to ask whether he thought the time now was appropriate to amend the constitution? He answered simply: We can now close down the parliamentary session at its appointed time, and parliamentary members can take leave. All the oppposition and majority parties can meet for consultation, and arrive at the best decisions and solutions, so that the electoral system can continue, and so that we can avoid more challenges and satisfy everyone with one system.

Immediate Dissolution and Hold Elections

Dr. Raf'at al-Sa'id, the secretary general of the Grouping Party's Central Committee: I see a need for immediate dissolution of the current Assembly, because it is not proper for such a decision to be issued while the Assembly is waiting. On the contrary, establishing the public balance and equality for next year should be discussed. The pretext that the court's judgement has not been published in the official gazette is something like a person who is convicted but puts off serving the sentence for a week. The conviction follows him every time; postponing implementation will not remove the invalidity from the People's Assembly. The question here is

moral not legal. How can the deputies allow themselves to do their jobs as legislators, while they know in their hearts that everything they do is invalid. Consequently, we are for immediate dissolution of the Assembly, and for holding elections at once. The question that arises here is, what law will govern the next elections? It should not be up to one quarter alone to singlehandedly draft the new law, because that would be a continuation of the same mistake they made before. Therefore, we suggest that President Mubarak invite the opposition parties to discuss the shape of the next elections, both with regard to the law and the guarantees for the law's implementation, because the form of the guarantees carries as much importance as the law. We would also request that these guarantees themselves be incorporated into the law itself, especially since one cannot—and we see what goes on in the world around us—ignore public opinion in Egypt, nor the demands for honest elections, because the public climate now in Egypt has lost confidence in the electoral process. Why don't we offer a remedy, reform, and change the belief, and draw up complete guarantees and rights in the law, so that we can shut the door on expedience and suspicions.

Muslim Brotherhood's View

90AA0199B Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 1 Jun 90 p 24

[Article by Majid 'Atiyah: "Proportional Preferrable, Provided It Is Purged of Defects"]

[Text] Counselor Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, the Muslim Brotherhood representative in the People's Assembly: There must be guarantees and protections with regard to the neutrality of elections in the forthcoming election law.

These guarantees with regard to the situation in our country are represented in a proposal that the judicial authority itself, and no one else from judicial bodies, be tasked with administering all phases of the elections and with actual supervision over them, beginning with confirming the validity of the voter registration lists, to announcing the final results. The family or personal identity card, or an official document, is the way to confirm the voter's identity. Moreover, it should be made a crime to tamper with the smooth progress of the elections in any way, and deterrent penalties should be imposed, so as to make the people aware that this matter is not considered a minor violation, but a serious crime.

Furthermore, judges must chair all electoral committees, either principal or subcommittees, even if that results in causing the elections to be held in two geographical stages. For example, there could be one election day in Lower Egypt and Cairo, and another in the governorates of Upper Egypt and the rest of the governorates.

The Emergency Law must also be suspended during the election period in all its phases. Public meetings, election parades, and the printing and issuing of programs and propaganda materials should be permitted.

The political parties will take their slates of candidates throughout the republic. What will the Muslim Brotherhood do?

Each candidate necessarily will declare his identity, and the voter will learn his ideas, beliefs, and affiliation. The electoral campaign will be conducted on an ideological basis.

As regards his views about preferring the slate or individual election system, he believes that, in light of our countries' circumstances, party slate elections—if free of certain defects—are the most feasible with regard to resisting the possibilities of administrative interference or the occurrence of fraud: However, the slate system also has dangers, the most prominent being its impact on the deputy's persona, which causes him to be subservient to his party and which affects his personal being.

Accordingly, we currently prefer the individual election system, provided that the precincts are limited as much as possible, and not large precincts, as has come to our attention.

Concerning the method of drafting the election law by the government, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi thinks that, for the purpose of avoiding the possibilities of a challenge of unconstitutionality, after the actions to dissolve the current Assembly are completed, the new election law should be issued by decree of the president of the republic: However, before that, we hope that a committee will be formed, in which all present political forces are represented, without the exception or exclusion of any political or ideological trend. This committee can submit its proposals, and then a select group of neutral lawyers, with the participation of the legislative section of the Council of State, can prepare the final form of the law.

Party List Criticized

90AA0199C Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 1 Jun 90 p 25

[Article by Major General Hasan Abu-Basha: "I Want Individual Elections"]

[Excerpts] We have had the proportional slate system in parliamentary elections for the People's Assembly since 1984; this method was used twice during that period. [passage omitted]

In a quick review to assess the proportional slate system and its results, we uncovered a number of facts that add weight to the negative side of this system, which can be summarized as follows:

• Those who support the use of this system have twice subjected Parliament to dissolution before the statuatory term could be completed. Aside from the instability this caused to the legislative authority, it forced us to hold new elections every two or three years at most. Everyone is aware of the difficulties, concerns, and obligations that both the political and executive authorities bear before, during, and after the election campaigns, and all of this occurs at a time when the country requires full concentration, so that we can counter the enormous challenges to which the country is exposed, a country that needs more and more work and productivity.

The a priori meaning of the slate system is that the voter votes for a party, and not for a candidate, because the slate itself included him. Perhaps that was one of the most important goals of adopting the slate election system. One of the requirements of this method is that the elections be based on comparison between party platforms, whichever agrees with the voter's ideas and choice. We have questions at this point: has the majority of our voters reached the degree of political awareness that they can compare party platforms? Do we still have that high percentage of illiteracy? Does a right to distinguish between party platforms make this comparison possible? I think the answer to this question is no.

Expansion of the election precincts, according to the slate system, which led to incorporating an entire governorate into one or two precencts, automatically resulted in weakening the link between the voter and the representatives of his district in the People's Assembly. In addition, Egyptian rural areas, which constitute the majority base in elections, are still governed by their traditions and customs, which play an important role in the mutual influence between voter and candidate. All of that is reflected in the effectiveness of parliamentary repesentation, or rather, on the effectiveness of the party movement itself.

 Expansion of the candidates' base in the individual election system, either those who are party nominees or those who are independent candidates, gives wider opportunities for the voters to compare them, in order to select the best people, especially in the limited precinct in the individual election system. The party list system does not give this advantage so easily.

The arrangement of candidates' names on the lists has become like a nightmare hanging over the heads of the candidates of all parties. This is because of the competition to be placed at the top of the lists. This phenomenon then has reflections on the candidates and supporters at the low end of the lists. The majority, as a result of this frustration and lack of confidence, coming in the [lack of] success of those whom they supported, are turned off of participation in the electoral process. The accumulated negative aspects of these repeated abstentions in all districts are reflected in the percentage of public participation in the electoral process.

The electoral slate system has led to certain elements, which do not have legal existence, resorting to trickery and fraud with regard to the votes of their people and supporters, in order to get into the legislative body, under banners that are not their banners, jumping over the law, the shari'ah [Islamic law] and the constitution.

This impacts directly on the soundness of the democratic political process in its entirety.

In my opinion, these considerations collectively weigh heavily on the side of using the individual election system. Apart from its simplicity, and the fact that the Egyptian voter is accustomed to it, it does not carry within itself the negative aspects that the electoral slate system does, to which we have referred.

AL-MUSAWWAR: Major General Hasan Abu-Basha was formerly interior minister of Egypt from January 4, 1982 to 27 July 1984, when he became minister for local government. During his tenure, the Ministry of Interior conducted the April 1984 elections, using the electoral slate system.

SLP Leaders Call for Speedy Resolution of Party Rift

90AA0218A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 25 Jun 90 p 3

[Article: "Egyptian Labor Party's Affairs and Concerns"]

[Text] Cairo—The Egyptian Political Parties Committee headed by Dr. Mustafa Kamal Hilmi has asserted that the conflict within the opposition Labor Party is an internal conflict and that the two sides to the conflict must reach a final solution between themselves and without any outside intervention.

An official source of the Parties Committee has told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the parties law currently in force contains no provision that makes it possible to settle internal conflicts within the parties.

The source added that the committee will not reopen the dossier of the conflict within the Labor Party anew.

Meanwhile, the conflict within the opposition SLP [Socialist Labor Party] has reached a new phase prior to the new parliamentary elections. Elements within the party urge the need to achieve prompt reconciliation with dissidents from the party before preparing for the new elections.

Within this context, some party leaderships loyal to Engineer Ibrahim Shukri have called for holding urgent negotiations with Ahmad Mujahid, the dissidents' party chairman, so as to exploit the opportunity of 'Adil Wali's departure from this group and his forming a new party, namely the Egyptian Socialist Party.

During joint meetings held at the party headquarters between the Higher Committee and the Executive Committee, these leaderships urged that a team of negotiators be formed promptly to negotiate with the dissidents led by Ahmad Mujahid and to agree on a complete reconciliation charter that ensures Ahmad Mujahid's return to his position as the Labor Party deputy chairman, as well as the return of Mamduh Qinawi, currently a member of

the Consultative Assembly, and revocation of the resolutions expelling the 13 dissidents who include nine of the party's deputies in the current parliament.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that Dr. Salah 'Abdallah, the party deputy at the parliament, is expected to resume his role of shuttle mediator between the two sides, but on new bases that assure him of success in this phase.

Informed sources have said that the negotiation team will ask for the conclusion of a reconciliation charter that provides for the legitimate party's restoration of its offices which the dissidents seized nearly four months ago and for agreement to drop the overdue subscription fees owed by the dissidents, provided that they be paid from the party treasury.

An official source of the Labor Party has said that Counselor Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, the Muslim Brother-hood's most prominent deputy, is expected to make fully impartial efforts for a reconciliation, considering the brotherhood's official position toward this conflict.

The source found it unlikely that the legitimate Labor Party will agree to one of the dissidents' main demands, namely hold an emergency conference of the party's Constituent Assembly during which new elections will be held to fill the main positions in the party and in the Higher and Executive Committees and to exclude all the Muslim Brotherhood elements from the party's main formations.

Division Erupts Among Ranks of Liberal Party 90AA0218B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 5 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by 'Amr 'Abd-al-Hamid: "With Renewed Disputes Within Egyptian Party, Liberal Threatens To Break Away and To Depart From Alliance With Labor and Brotherhood"]

[Text] Cairo—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that new disputes have erupted between two rival wings within the ranks of the opposition Liberal Party. One wing is loyal to the party chairman and the other is led by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi whose party membership is suspended and who rejects continuation of the alliance with other parties.

At a time when the members loyal to Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, who had held the position of party chairman before the party convened its latest congress, have threatened to submit mass resignations if the party persists in its alliance with the alliance's two other partners (Labor and Muslim Brotherhood) and when they have warned that the party will not gain a single seat in the coming elections if they are held on the basis of individual candidate election, Mustafa Kamil Murad, the party chairman, has asserted that the party will remain within the framework of the alliance.

Kamil has also said that the alliance is not so much a partisan maneuver to wage the elections or to succeed in them as it is an endeavor to create a strong and complete entity that represents the opposition forces and that reflects their viewpoint versus the ruling majority party.

In a related development, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, who suspended his activity nearly three months ago and who has threatened to resign, has threatened to convene a special congress for the leaderships and members of the secretariats and of the main structures to evaluate the alliance period which started in 1987 and to assess the benefits achieved by the party during this period. 'Abd-al-Shafi has said that the Liberal Party has not benefited from the alliance and that the success achieved by 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Shurbaji, the current party deputy chairman and the only party candidate to win a parliamentary seat in the previous parliamentary elections, was due to al-Shurbaji's position at the top of a list.

Meanwhile, party sources have noted that an impartial team of party members is making efforts to contain the crisis and to bring the two sides' viewpoints closer to each other, especially since the party's disputes threaten this time the eruption of divisions within the party ranks, and since they come at a critical time in which the main leaderships are preparing to coordinate on the coming elections with the alliance's two other partners (Labor and Muslim Brotherhood).

Study Lists Deficit Figures for Public Sector Accounts

90AA0196A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 15 Jun 90 p 6

[Article by Asamah Saraya: "Actual Facts About Public Sector Companies; Financial and Economic Analysis of Final Balances Reveals: 202 Companies Had Deficits of 1.5 Billion Egyptian Pounds, 163 Companies Had Profits of 1 Billion 499 Million Egyptian Pounds"]

[Text] In the dialogue going which concerns the public sector and how it can be developed, the figures and the actual facts inside these companies are concealed from us, and these figures must stimulate widespread talk and concern among economists.

How is it that the return on investment in these companies came up negative? Financial and economic analysis of the final balances of 365 companies revealed that there are 202 companies that have realized a deficit in principal activity amounting to 1516.3 million Egyptian pounds, while 163 companies have made a profit of 1469.4 million Egyptian pounds. This means that the public sector companies have realized in total a deficit in 1988/89 of about 46.9 million Egyptian pounds.

A real and comprehensive scientific study of the public sector was made by economic expert Dr. Husni Hafiz 'Abd-al-Rahman, first deputy minister at the national investment bank. In it he explains by practical analysis the meaning of the unreal profit created and distributable which comes as a result of nonproductive activity, such as the devaluation of the Egyptian pound when exports in Egyptian pounds are arranged, or there is a large sale by the companies of fixed assets. The study defines this clearly:

There are grave and important matters which must be clarified, and they are typified by the real value of net assets and consequently the value of money invested which is now equal to ten times the net book value of economic units in the public sector and agricultural units in the agricultural development companies.

Likewise it is sufficient in this connection to evaluate the worth of the acreage on which the Marriott Hotel in al-Zamalik stands (approximately 14 feddans), the book value of which is 700,000 Egyptian pounds at a time when the real current value exceeds 300,000,000 Egyptian pounds, that is equal to about 430 times what it was in book. It is the same with various other assets—equipment, buildings, etc.

Making a distributable profit on the level of the total activity of the economic unit does not mean that it has high efficiency, because if this profit is not made as a result of the principal activity of the company (ongoing operations), which is called the first stage, it becomes misleading. This is because making a distributable profit as a result of the second stage (trading and capital gains and increased yield of conversion revenues from designated conversion expenditures) does not indicate the strength of the financial and economic center of the company.

Attention must be paid when evaluating economic units, whether from the financial or economic standpoint, to the rising burdens of servicing short and long-term loans, as well as the rising interest costs and the expenditures connected with them. All of this burdens the companies and basically weakens their various financing structures further so that they cannot meet these loans on their due dates. Consequently the overdraft balance rises very quickly, since the overdraft of the public sector companies has reached about 4 billion Egyptian pounds.

This means that the biggest part of the result of the activity of these units and the return of the efforts of the workers therein is eaten up by the overdraft debit interest.

The magnitude of the untapped power also becomes clear upon evaluation of the public sector companies.

Sound scientific planning demands using the profits of the productive units to finance and develop services and public utilities. In reality, most of the economic units have realized a deficit in their final accounts, especially in the principal activity of these companies.

It became clear from financial and economic analysis of the final balances and accounts of the 365 public sector companies that the number of companies which realized a deficit in principal activity (the first stage) was 202, (not including the insurance companies, the banking system, and the development and agricultural credit banks in the provinces, which number 31 units.)

These companies have realized a deficit of about 1516.3 million Egyptian pounds, while the rest of the companies, which number 163, have made a profit in the first stage of about 1469.4 million Egyptian pounds. This means that the public sector companies realized in all a deficit of about 46.9 million Egyptian pounds in the stage of their principal activity (current operations) for the year 1988/89.

[What Are] The Deficient Sectors?

The deficit and profit realized in the first stage in 1988/89 on the level of all activity can be listed in the following manner:

The number of economic units in agriculture, irrigation, and land reclamation activity amounts to 35 companies. Of these, 26 realized a deficit amounting to about 130.6 million Egyptian pounds and nine made a profit of about 50.8 million Egyptian pounds. This means that the net deficit in the principal activity of the companies of this activity amounts to about 79.8 million Egyptian pounds. The number of economic units in transportation and communications activity are 38 companies, of which 21 have realized a deficit amounting to about 77.5 million Egyptian pounds and 17 have made a profit of about 67.5 million Egyptian pounds. Thereby the net deficit amounts to about 10 million Egyptian pounds in this activity, with most of the companies which made a profit limited to the maritime transport companies.

As for provisioning and domestic trade activity, it includes 43 companies of which 16 have realized a deficit amounting to approximately 75.6 million Egyptian pounds, and the remaining 27 companies have made a profit of about 153.5 million Egyptian pounds, which means that the net profit in this activity is about 77.9 million Egyptian pounds.

The number of losing companies in the first stage in foreign trade activity was only one, and its deficit was about 1.9 million Egyptian pounds, while 12 companies made a profit in the same stage of about 134.7 million Egyptian pounds. That goes back to the nature of the activity of most of these companies, which are limited to trade activity, whether it be importing or exporting.

Of the 12 cotton companies, nine realized a deficit amounting to about 13 million Egyptian pounds, and the profit which was made in the three remaining companies was about 5.9 million Egyptian pounds. This means that the net deficit is about 7.1 million Egyptian pounds.

The deficit distinctly increases in housing activity (the new Egyptian company for housing and renovation and the Nile public engineering company), construction (27 companies), building materials (13 companies), and renovation (six companies) to reach about 407.1 million

Egyptian pounds. This results from 36 losing companies in the first stage of the 48 companies engaged in this activity. The remaining 12 companies made a profit of not over 15.4 million Egyptian pounds in the same stage. Thereby the net deficit is about 391.7 million Egyptian pounds.

Medicinal activity encompasses 11 companies of which seven realized a deficit in principal activity of about 37.3 million Egyptian pounds while the profit of the four remaining companies was about 12.6 million Egyptian pounds, for a net deficit of about 24.7 million Egyptian pounds.

In contrast to that, tourism activity, whose companies number five, realized a deficit of about 1.1 million Egyptian pounds [in two companies] against a profit of 6.1 million Egyptian pounds in the three remaining companies for a net profit in the first stage of about 5 million Egyptian pounds.

The same is true of the state of the economic units in cultural activity, because one of the three companies in this activity realized a deficit of 1.1 million Egyptian pounds while the profit in the other two companies was 4.8 million Egyptian pounds, for a net profit of about 3.7 million Egyptian pounds. As for media activity, made up of one company, its deficit amounted to 1.8 million Egyptian pounds.

The number of companies in spinning and textiles and clothing activity is 31, of which 18 realized a deficit in the stage of principal activity of about 127.8 million Egyptian pounds. The profit of the remaining 13 companies was about 124 million Egyptian pounds, for a net deficit of about 3.8 million Egyptian pounds on the level of activity.

The number of losing companies in the first stage in food industries activity was six, and their deficit amounted to about 68.2 million Egyptian pounds. The rest of the companies, which number 13, made a profit of 292.2 million Egyptian pounds for a net profit of about 224 million Egyptian pounds. In contrast, there are nine losing companies in the first stage in chemical industries activity. Their deficit amounted to about 146.3 million Egyptian pounds, and the profit of the remaining 18 companies of this activity did not exceed 71.1 million Egyptian pounds for a net deficit of about 75.2 million Egyptian pounds.

As for the activity of the engineering industries, which includes 19 companies, 14 realized a deficit of about 82.1 million Egyptian pounds against the five remaining companies' profit of about 66.2 million Egyptian pounds, for a net deficit of about 15.9 million Egyptian pounds. The opposite of that, five companies in metal industries activity realized a deficit of about 126.1 million Egyptian pounds and the profit of the four remaining companies was 244.1 million Egyptian pounds for a net profit of about 118 million Egyptian pounds. Seven companies realized a deficit of about 35.7 million Egyptian pounds in the first stage in mining

activity. The profit in the two remaining companies was about 3.1 million Egyptian pounds for a net deficit of about 32.6 million Egyptian pounds.

After that comes petroleum activity, which consists of 12 companies, of which two realized a deficit of about 33.3 million Egyptian pounds. The profit in the 10 remaining companies was about 138 million Egyptian pounds for a net profit of about 104.7 million Egyptian pounds.

Electricity activity also includes 12 companies, and, as opposed to the foregoing activity, 10 companies realized a deficit amounting to about 5.5 million Egyptian pounds for a net deficit of about 65.4 million Egyptian pounds. Finally comes military production activity, which includes 18 companies, of which 13 lost in the first stage to the tune of about 78.9 million Egyptian pounds. The five remaining companies made a profit of about 16.8 million Egyptian pounds for a net deficit of about 62.1 million Egyptian pounds.

From the preceding it is clear that there is a distinct economic imbalance in most of the companies of the public sector and that the rate of return on investment in this stage has come up negative.

We must speak of the second stage and the distributable profit before taxes, most of which is attributable to the declining value of the Egyptian pound vis-s-vis the foreign currencies, especially when evaluating exports in Egyptian pounds. This is in addition to much selling by the companies of fixed assets and realizing capital gains. In addition to that, some of the companies have not put most of the profits of their autonomous financing into the national investment bank in accordance with the law setting it up. But they are putting them in the commercial banks to accrue interest from them in contravention of the laws. In summary, as we said previously, the distributable profit before taxes, most of it realized in the second stage, is attributable primarily to increased yield from conversion revenues from designated conversion expenditures. Based on the foregoing, 314 companies have made a distributable profit before taxes in the second stage (not resulting from the principal activity of the company) amounting to about 2478.9 million Egyptian pounds. The deficit in the second stage which 51 companies realized is about 256.2 million Egyptian pounds, which means that the net value of the distributable profit before taxes did not exceed 2222.7 million Egyptian pounds in 1988/89. If the real value of the capital invested in these companies were taken into account, the rate of investment did not execeed one percent.

It is worth pointing out that the value of executant services in 1988/89 in the public sector companies previously mentioned amounted to about 3407.4 million Egyptian pounds. This is in addition to more than 30 billion Egyptian pounds of executant investment services in the period 1980/81-1987/88, and this confirms that the public sector has not been and will not be able to rely on financing its investment services. The effect of

that was reflected in the incresased reliance on foreign loans in financing a great part of the plan's investments, which led in turn to bearing the burden of servicing the foreign and domestic debt, all of which had an obvious effect on increasing the deficit in the balance of payments which the first plan aimed to balance.

Hasan Hafiz offers some suggestions for developing and freeing the public sector which are limited to:

- Identifying the vital and strategic companies which must remain at the present time and for coming years in the public sector.
- Setting up a central system to supervise the public sector so that it is totally separate from the government apparatus.
- · Abolishing the public sector committees.
- Setting up holding companies to take the place of the committees.

IRAO

Iraq Proposes Exchange of Oil for Copper

34000769X Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 14 Jun 90 p 1

[Text] Iraqi trade minister Mr Mohammed Saleh told President Kaunda yesterday his country had proposed a five-year economic cooperation programme involving the exchange of copper and oil between Zambia and Iraq.

Mr Saleh who is leading a delegation to the Zambia/Iraq joint permanent commission said when he called on Cde Kaunda at State House that his country was considering the possibility of increasing its purchases of copper from Zambia and was prepared to pay in oil or hard cash.

The Iraqi trade minister speaking in the presence of ministers for Commerce and Industry and Mines, Cde Rabbison Chongo and Cde Mulondwe Muzungu respectively, said negotiations for the economic cooperation package were going on with the relevant agencies.

Earlier Cde Kaunda asked the people of Iraq and Zambia to continue building on the bilateral relations established.—Times Reporter/Zana.

Official Discusses Gas Production Capabilities

90AE0141B Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 30 May 90 p 2

[Article by Sabah Y. Yunan]

[Text] Karkuk, 29 May—The gas plants which belong to the Northern Gas Processing Department in the north of Iraq are currently operated at only 78 percent of their total capacities.

Speaking to a number of local reporters the Director General of the Department Mr Kamil Turki said that the amount of gas produced by the Department plants is determined by domestic demand as well as the amounts planned for export.

"This means we are capable of producing more of various types of processed gas including liquified and heavy gas as well as natural gasoline and sulphur," Mr Turki said.

Because of their complexity, the gas processing operations are inter-related with the whole oil production and degassing operations. All the gas produced in Iraq is associated gas which is a by-product of oil operations. "Hence, if you want to obtain more gas you have to drill more oil than the amounts actually decided." he said.

Mr Turki said that there are certain oil fields which are still not exploited for producing gas. If gas production started in these areas the huge gas plants of the Northern Gas Processing Department will be operated in their full capacity and "probably we will have to establish a new processing line to cope with the anticipated increase."

The new gas complex in the northern city of Karkuk was inaugurated in 1983 and was mainly operated by young graduates of oil training institutes who had only moderate experience. In a short time, foreign experts were no longer working in the complex.

Before the setting up of the complex, most of the associated gas was flared and very little quantities were actually exploited in and old gas processing unit which had limited capacity.

The main product of the department's plants is heavy gas, which makes almost three quarters of the production. It is mainly used as fuel for power generating stations as well as textiles and 'Akashat fertilizers plants.

It is also used as a raw material in chemical fertilizers factories.

At present the heavy gas is not exported to other countries because of unavailability of pipelines and other means of exporting it, Mr Turki said.

The most important product as far as the public is concerned is the liquified gas known as the LPG. Part of this type of gas is consumed as fuel for home cookers and for heating while the rest is exported by road tankers.

Since the ceasefire and the opening of Iraq's Gulf ports, gas has been exported in sea tankers.

As for the sulphur produced in the complex, all of it is now exported abroad, while in the past it was used as raw material in 'Akashat fertilizers.

Ministry Water Project, Resource Report Described

90AE0141A Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 30 May 90 p 2

[Text] Baghdad, 29 May—Al-Rashid Contracting Company, an affiliate to the Ministry of Housing and Construction, is pressing ahead to finish al-Rashidiyah water project in Khalis district, Diyala province, at a cost of 6,668,000 Iraqi dinars.

A source at the Company said that the project which al-Rashid started to execute in 1988 on an area of 57,000 square metres includes a number of units.

"These are low pressure suction stations which comprise six pumps, each with a capacity of 780 cubic metres per hour, and high pressure suction station which comprises five pumps each with a capacity of 800 cubic metres per hour.

"The high pressure pumping station pumps water to a boosting station," said the source adding, "together with these, there are two pumps, one of them which works at a capacity of 150 cubic metres per hour pumps water to the main high tanker built in Arakinah village."

There are two additional pumps. One of them pumps water at a capacity of 450 cubic metres per hour to a tower tanker built in al-Rashidiyah old project, he explained.

"However, the rate of execution in al-Rashidiyah water project reached 64 per cent," said the source. "There are five large pipes, the length of each is more than 40 kilometres to supply the project with the needed water. There is also a 7-kilometre pipe with 900 millimetres diameter, and another one which starts from the project to the water reservoir in al-Rashidiyah with a diametre of 950 millimetres and a length of 11 kilometres. There is a third pipe with a diametre of 250 millimetres and a length of 10 kilometres. It links the project with the water reservoir in al-Arakinah; a fourth pipe links the boosting stations with the water reservoir No 1; a fifth pipe with a diametre of 300 millimetres and a length of 12 kilometres links the boosting station with the reservoir No 2 in al-Dabarghiyah village."

The source added that the project comprises three sedimentation pools, each with a diametre of 38 metres and a depth of 4 metres. There are 16 filters, each with a capacity of 40 cubic metres.

The capacity of the ground tanker is 6,000 cubic metres. Another boosting ground tanker has a capacity of 3,000 cubic metres.

The project, whose capacity is 14 million gallons per day, likewise, included a number of buildings. These are the high pressure station building, chemical and administrative buildings and service buildings.

Meanwhile, specialized bodies at the Ministry of Planning completed a research paper on water needs in Iraq until the year 2005, a source at the Ministry said.

The source told a local newspaper that the paper contained three chapters.

"The first chapter is on demography, and future evaluation on rates of development both in urban and rural areas all over Iraq," the source said.

He added that the second chapter dealt with the expected quantities of drinking water needed by the individual. This section of the paper depended on the changes likely to take place in the future such as the expansion of cities, the expected development in cultural and social aspects, spread of industrial and trade centres and future environmental changes.

The paper explained that these factors have their own impacts on increasing or decreasing the amount of water used by the individual.

"The third and last chapter discussed water projects distribution in Iraqi cities," said the source.

He elaborated that the Construction, Housing and Public Service Department at the Ministry of Planning used to conduct every five years a comprehensive survey of the existing water projects all over the country so as to suggest the quantities needed of water.

The paper concluded that water projects set for the next five-year plan must be executed and their capacities be shown both in the urban and rural areas because it is expected that some cities would suffer from water shortages during the years 2000-2005.

ISRAEL

Less Dependence on US Recommended 90AE0090A Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 23 May 90 p 17

[Article by Uri Urbach]

[Text] The fine that the United States wants to impose on Israel for the financing of the purchase of "the disputed house" in the Christian quarter was greeted with shouts of joy by many characters on the Israeli left. Many leftists simply find it difficult to understand why the Americans are so hesitant. They want the United States to strike immediately at the aid. In their opinion, that will force the government to cut its expenditures, which would harm the weaker strata and the Likudnik rabble, and would result in the last of the ignoramuses and the pickle sellers coming to understand that their woes stem from the settlements in the territories. Professor Ze'ev Sternhell already looks forward to the moment when the Americans will begin to deal with us. (HADASHOT, 18 May 90): "It is indeed for our benefit, the time has come for them to begin to speak to us in the only language that is well understood here: the language of force and open threats. Not sophisticated hints, but blows on the head...."

This is a characteristic mode of thinking for the superior beings on the left. They are convinced that the reasons for the support for the entire land of Israel are emotional and impulsive, some kind of passing caprice of primitive children, and nothing more. A blow to the pocketbook, to their taste, would be a convincing argument and a factor that would subdue the impulses of the rabble. In the universities, there are those who believe that the Likud voter has no viable ideology. He will go out to demonstrate only when he is hit in the pocketbook, but not when his principles and his faith are trampled on. The average Likudnik (who, we know, has a stall in the market, a Hai chain around his neck, and a sagging paunch) would very quickly become a Peace Nownik, wearing spectacles with round lenses, if his mortgage soared, or the price of gasoline for his Subaru skyrocketed, then he wouldn't even have the money to pay for a video rental.

This is, of course, absolute idiocy. No link has yet been established between the erosion of the economic situation and support for the idea of withdrawal from the territories. Perhaps the opposite is true: a decline in the standard of living will speed the rightward turn of many, who regard the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza as a factor that harms their livelihoods and a cheap and competing labor force on unequal terms. In the situation of an economic blow, there will be enough persons who, despite everything, and perhaps precisely because of it, will establish settlements and persist in their nationalistic opinions. There are also enough geniuses in the government who understand that these people still have some spirit, and that it is not only the difficulties of economic existence which affect voters's opinions.

But it suits the leftists to give advice to the Americans. Sternhell and others of his ilk have considered themselves for the past 13 years as exiles in their own land. They feel that this is not their state, but rather the state of the Likud, and the people belong to the Likud, so the Americans must teach the masses a lesson, so that the last of the Kahanaists repents and ceases his nationalistic ideas. "Let heavier work be laid upon the men; let them keep at it and not pay attention to deceitful promises," said the Egyptian Pharaoh once before he sent the Jews to their suffering.

Israel, with no connection to the advice of good souls on the left, must on its own initiative take various measures in order to reduce American assistance. A gradual and controlled reduction of the need for assistance is an important condition for political and economic independence. In any event, the Americans are beginning to attach instructions for the use of the checks that they are sending. Today they do not allow the investment of monies in the settlement of immigrants in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, tomorrow they will not allow support for a university in which Professor Sternhell is a

lecturer, and the day after tomorrow they will demand that we use the money only to support the villages in the Triangle.

The worse it gets—the better it will be, they assert on the left, and they send advice to the Americans. Don't pity us, plead our sado-masochists—you must save us from ourselves.

I am beginning to suspect that they are really getting quite a kick from losing to the right in every election.

Sensitivity to External Economic Pressures Growing

90AE0089B Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 18 May 90 p 8

[Article by Zev Sternhall]

[Text] The composition of the government to be formed in the coming days need not trouble us further. A homogeneous right-wing religious government will not carry out policies fundamentally different from those conducted by the joint Labor-Likud government or, conversely, those of a government of Peres-Moda'i-Shamir. The true differences are more a matter of style than substance. The reason for that is simple. For an entire generation, no Israeli government, whatever its make-up, has been capable of genuine initiative, of a truly historic process. Since Levi Eshkol was brought down by RAFI [Israel Labor List] and the Unity of Labor Party acting together, we have reacted only to pressures. Since the end of the Six Day War, not a single government has been able to advance beyond the status quo. Nothing has come of all the meetings with [King] Husayn and the trips to Morocco and the other secret journeys, because the ability to deliver has never backed up the words. The sole achievement for which we can congratulate ourselves, the peace with Egypt, was not the fruit of an initiative of our own. Today, too, there is not one chance in a hundred that Peres. Rabin or Shamir will move forward. It is easy to say that Shamir does not want to, that Peres wants to but cannot, while Rabin stands somewhere in the middle. The reality is much more complicated and difficult.

The reality is that Israeli society has dug itself into the territories captured in 1967. It is itself a captive of the spurious myths it created, and is unable to extricate itself from the morass. The delusion is to think that it is possible to make peace by the crossing of two defectors from one camp to the other, or even by victory in the elections which, in the most favorable turn of events, would amount to a shift of one or two seats. The reality is that society is split not only into these two camps, but that the Labor Party also is torn and paralyzed from within. We are not speaking here of Rabin's hatred for Peres nor of the struggle for seats. The Labor Party, for the most part, has not reconciled itself to the idea of withdrawing from Judaea and Samaria, a withdrawal that necessarily will be followed by the establishment of a Palestinian state. There are many in it, and not just

among the settlement movements, who still cling to the thought of annexing the Jordan Valley. Rabin still turns red as a beet whenever others suggest that he speak with the PLO; the spirit of [Yisra'el] Galili has still not faded away. On the other hand, for the Histadrut and kibbutz cadres, Kupat Holim [the labor public health service] and Koor Industries' factories are more important than all the peace plans rolled up together. Just as the role of the rabbis of Agudat Yisra'el is to see first of all to the needs of the yeshivas and not the borders, so the functionaries of Hevrat 'Ovdim [Histadrut holding company] are worried above all else about the fate of their factories. What's more, one has yet to see [Histadrut chairman Yisra'ell Oevsar and the employees of TAKAM [United Kibbutz Movement], and ministers Bamil Katzele and Yangele Tzur, at the forefront of those fighting for peace. Likud would do itself a favor if it remembered that. These are people who understand the matter; it is a real pleasure to do business with them.

In this sense, the situation has never been worse; paradoxically, however, a more opportune moment to break the deadlock has not existed in quite some time. Israel is totally paralyzed from within but has never been more sensitive to pressure. More than ever before, Israel depends today on the good will of the American government. Without foreign aid, immigrants will not be absorbed and genuine security needs will not be met. This is not a matter of quiet on the roads of the West Bank but of the state's strategic ability to withstand the Arab world. That much even Aria Sharon understands. Israel cannot allow itself a significant cut in the defense budget, while diverting internal resources to absorb the waves of immigration which would require a drastic reduction in the standard of living. The Likud leadership has never displayed an inclination for suicide, and it will not harm most of the population. Thus, the rich uncle across the sea has never had a better opportunity to back us up against the wall and say, "your choice is between immigration and defense on one side and the territories on the other. From this day on, it will no longer be possible to take in immigrants and to assure an optimum degree of security, while at the same time holding the territories, and living as though you were in California. Anyone who wants to dance in Elgana, to buy houses in the Christian quarter and to found indigenous settlements on the West Bank, in other words, anyone who has chosen to pursue a direction contrary to the historical trend of the world, will first have to prove that he can make it through the month."

Indeed, certainly not for our good, the time has come when they will begin to speak to us in the only language we really understand: the language of force and naked threats. No subtle hints; rather, hard knocks on the head. There are signs that this moment is approaching: a rise in the interest paid, on which the American Congress decided, and the exercise in the United Nations Security Council. Given that, of what concern is the question of who will or will not be in the government? So David Levi does not fall flat at a word from Arens. His past as a

construction worker and transit camp resident only speaks to his credit. Aside from that, Arens, whose mother tongue more or less is English, has never understood the diplomatic nuances of language as it is spoken in Washington. By contrast, everyone would easily understand a cut of 15-20 percent in the American aid budget. From Israel's point of view, it is worthwhile for the United States to understand our vulnerability to economic pressures before the Arab world comes to the conclusion that no choice remains but to plunge us into the pressures on the eve before war. The atmosphere of a battlefield is not particularly nice for bringing in the sort of Jews now beating at our gates. These Jews will yet raise the howl of cattle led to slaughter and succeed in squeezing out several hundred thousand visas for America. After all, what are another quarter-million people in the western United States? A similar number of Mexicans slips across the border into Texas each year.

There is another consideration in favor of economic pressure: war games are liable to develop into a real war. In the event of a frontal collision on the eastern border, the most conservative estimates speak of casualties in the order of three or four times that of the Yom Kippur War. The crisis that will grip Israeli society after such an unnecessary war will constitute a blow from which we will find it very difficult to recover. It is not certain that the Israeli leadership understands that; we must hope that Israel's friends, led by the Jews of the United States, will be less obtuse.

Effort To Improve Judicial System in Territories 90AE0090B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 May 90 p 3b

[Article by Yizhar Be'er]

[Text] The information center for human rights in the territories, Betzelem, completed this week a monitoring report on the military judicial system in the territories. A comprehensive report on the subject published one and a half years ago pointed to two central negative tendencies that until then had characterized the Israeli judicial system in the territories. One was a tendency to slovenliness, confusion, and neglect, which led to the postponement of sentences and the incarceration of thousands of accused persons in detention cells for many months. [This was the result of] the army having failed to bring them on time to court, as well as problems in bringing prosecution witnesses and the non-presentation of evidence. The other negative tendency involved military procedures that were contradictory to the law, such as not giving the families of a detainee notification of the arrest and place of detention, violation of the rights of detainees to meet with their lawyers, and impairment of the principle of openness in the courts.

Efforts have been made over the last six months to improve the military judicial system. In order to process files more quickly and to reduce the pressure on the system, two new courts were opened, in Hebron and in Janin, and broader use was made of "speedy trials." The monitoring report prepared by Betzelem shows that the opening of the additional courts relieved the pressure on the military system, but this led to other violations in terms of the rights of the accused.

In Israel, for example, the accused has the right to be tried in a court near his place of residence, or near the scene of the crime. But, for example, accused persons detained in prisons near Janin, such as the Megiddo prison, are brought to court in Janin, instead of residents of Jenin or those who [allegedly] committed a crime in that district. The distribution between prisons is made according to security considerations, not [according to the] place of residence.

As was testified by Col. Uri Shoham, responsible for the courts in the West Bank, the opening of the new courts was intended to ease the pressure on the army's transport system and to shorten the distance between the prison and the court house. Those who suffer from this are mainly the families of the detainees and the lawyers, who are forced to trek to distance places.

The speedy trials are intended to aid in shortening the proceedings and the period of detention until the completion of the proceedings, and to put the accused on trial while the prosecution witnesses (generally reservists) are still in the area.

The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] spokesman stated that in January 1990, 97.7 percent of the accused were brought to trial according to an "accelerated procedure," and that 61.49 percent of the witnesses called actually came. According to assertions of members of Betzelem, and on the basis of their observations, it appears that a considerable proportion of the accused persons brought to trial, following an accelerated procedure, do not have time to obtain counsel, and sometimes not even enough time to notify their families of their arrest. Also, prosecutors do not have time to examine the evidence before the trial, and the proceedings are conducted mainly by the judge, who questions the accused during the trial.

The feeling is that the success of a court is judged on the basis of output, and that judges frequently make it clear that they want to "finish the day." "The increased efficiency of the system has more than once been obtained at the cost of compromising proper legal procedures. The product of the judicial system is not meant to be completed cases, but rather reasoned judicial decisions, based upon evidence, legal arguments, and fixed schedules," the organization argues.

So what has not changed? The comprehensive report published six months ago discussed the issue of the legality of the procedure for requesting release on bail in the Ramallah court, and noted that the court limits the right of argument, which is a basic right, insomuch as it limits the possibility for lawyers to appear in court to request release on bail, and requires them to make their application in writing. Now, it also appears that the moment a date has been set for a hearing, the requests of

the lawyers for release on bail are rejected, and the judges make it clear that the request for release can be heard only in the framework of the hearing of the case, even though the dates for the hearing can be scheduled several weeks following the date of the arrest.

Regarding another matter, the IDF drew a connection between the great pressure on the military judicial system in the West Bank and the "policy of denying guilt on the part of defendants for disturbing the peace.' According to the IDF spokesman, since October 1988 "the defendants and their attorneys began to deny guilt on a wholesale basis." The members of Betzelem argue that although such a phenomenon had taken place on a limited scale in the Megiddo prison, observations during the past year show that the assertion is without foundation. Betzelem asserts that 95 percent of those accused attempt to plead guilty and to arrive at a plea bargain. in an attempt to end the lengthy incarceration until the end of the proceedings. As was the case six months ago, say the members of Betzelem, today also their observations show pressure from the judges to conclude the case. One of the judges even complained in the courtroom about the delays and proposed to the attorneys: "Come to court only with decisions" (according to the report of a Betzelem investigator on the basis of an observation in the Ramallah military court on 22 April 1990). Recent observations in the courts also indicate that the accused who sought to deny their guilt were warned that this could "cost them dearly."

This phenomenon could illuminate the following incident: On 7 March 1989 10 women were arrested in Ramallah and charged with having participated in an illegal demonstration. The evidence against them was heard about nine months later. The sole prosecution witness was the soldier who had arrested them. As had been customary in the last two years, the soldier filled out on the day of the arrest a "field arrest form," containing one sentence that described the event. This form is sufficient evidence in a military court. According to Israeli practice, the police must obtain detailed testimony from witnesses and place the material at the disposal of the defense for review, a reasonable amount of time before the beginning of the trial. The cross examination of the soldier, the prosecution witness, has slim chances of success, due to the procedure of the testimony form that applies in the territories. And, indeed, nine of those who were arrested arrived at a plea bargain, as do most of those in the territories who are charged with an offense.

Only one of the nine denied her guilt, and her attorney demanded that the soldier write down his testimony and that he be given the time to examine it. The judge agreed. Two days later, the soldier telephoned the defense and the prosecution, and informed them that after examination he had found that the demonstration he had described had actually taken place on another day in another city. The court instructed that the file be closed

and found the defendant not guilty. As was noted, the other nine defendants had been convicted following plea bargains.

A resident of the Bayt Sirah village in the Ramallah district, Yusuf 'Inkawi, 19 years old, has been under arrest already for two years and three months on suspicion of having stoned Israelis near his village. He is one of four Palestinians who have been under arrest for more than two years without having been proven guilty.

Three months after he was arrested, his family paid NIS 1,000 to free him on bail, but he was taken for interrogation by the SHABAK [General Security Service], charged with additional offenses, and since then has been awaiting trial. Despite repeated appeals by the family, the attorneys, and MK [Member of Knesset] Dedi Tzuqer, his trial has not yet begun.

In Israel, only the judges of the Supreme Court have the authority to extend a person's arrest for more than one year, and they use it rarely. Military law allows the detention of the residents of the territories until the end of the proceedings without any limitation.

However, recent observations show an improvement in physical conditions in the last half year. The courtrooms have been cleaner. In Ramallah, a sidewalk was built for those who wait outside the courthouse, and a room was provided for the use of attorneys. But Betzelem does not spare its criticism in this sphere, as well: "The sidewalk shows, perhaps, some improvement, but is it reasonable that thousands of persons should wait many hours (sometimes 8 to 10 hours) on the sidewalk? And the room provided for the use of the attorneys is the same room with narrow window slits, warm and without ventilation, nor furniture where prisoners had been kept."

Some of the monitoring visits in the courthouse took place during the severe heat wave at the end of April.

The members of Betzelem learned again what every Palestinian who comes to visit an arrested relative at the courthouse knows well. Dozens of people who wait outside the military camp, where the courthouse is located, are exposed for hours to the burning sun. They have no way of finding out what trials are to take place, who has come forward, and whose trial has been deferred. There are still no clear procedures for entering the area of the courthouse.

Throughout the Ramallah military government grounds, where the military courthouse is located, there is no faucet for drinking water and no possibility of purchasing food or drink. There is no xerox machine for the use of the attorneys. The attorneys do not have enough room to sit at the defense table in the courtroom. Some of them stand for many hours throughout the proceedings, others sit on the floor of the courtroom.

It is precisely the few improvements that have been made in the physical conditions that show that it is

possible to change things. Although the introduction of greater efficiency in the judicial system, and the improvement in the condition of the defendants, their families, and their attorneys, involves effort and increased expenditure, they remain very important. It is difficult to accept the IDF's assertions about budget and manpower restrictions, argues Betzelem. "The external aspect of the courtrooms, the filth, the disorder, the failure to start proceedings on time, the humiliating treatment of the attorneys, all this is also indicative of the judicial process within the courtrooms."

[Boxed item]

The IDF Spokesman's Response

In his response, the IDF spokesman does not refute the Betzelem report, but blames the difficulties of the system on the problems that have confronted the courts since the beginning of the uprising. The IDF spokesman specifies the measures that the army has taken in confronting the problems, and the improvements that were made since the completion of the previous report in November 1989. The main points of the response are given below.

The main problem is the tremendous increase in the number of indictments. In 1987, there were approximately 1,300 indictments for disturbing the peace in Judaea and Samaria and in Gaza. Between December 9. 1987 and December 9, 1989, 13, 089 indictments for disturbing the peace were submitted to the military courts (17,851 defendants). This is an increase of hundreds of percent during a period in which there was no decrease in court files for hostile terrorist activity and external files. Due to the load, it was necessary to build courtrooms and to open new courthouses. An additional courtroom was constructed in Ramallah, and two courtrooms were opened in Janin; an independent court was established in that district, and a courtroom was opened for regular legal activity in Hebron. There are now eight regular judges in the military courts (in addition to the reservist judges), and this has shown results both by the rapid pace in hearing cases and by the quality of the judgements.

The defendants are dispersed among 23 prison installations of the IDF and the Prisons Service. As a result of the increase in the number of trials, we witnessed in the past the serious phenomenon of defendants not being brought to court. The problem was created mainly due to the lack of central control in calling the defendants to trial, and the appearance of this or that defendant was sometimes merely a matter of chance. This subject was discussed at the highest levels of the IDF. The starting point was that the failure to bring a defendant to trial is contempt of court, and it involves a serious injury to the status of the institution.

There has been a real revolution on this subject due to the establishment of a control center in the Central Command, as well as the involvement of the Southern Command, and also due to the fact that arrested persons from Judaea and Samaria are no longer detained until the conclusion of proceedings in the Qetzi'ot installation. In January 1990, an average of 87 percent of the defendants called to the military courts appeared. In the courts in Nabulus and Hebron, the rate of appearance exceeded 90 percent.

Because of the non-appearance of witnesses, various types of witnesses were called, due to the need to hold many hearings: soldiers on regular and reserve duty who had arrested persons disturbing the peace either in the act or soon afterwards, police and IDF investigators who had heard testimony from the defendants or who had participated in their interrogations, and incriminating witnesses who had participated in the offense or who were defendants in other cases.

In most of the cases, those who were brought went back without the witnesses having appeared in court. When one or another witness appeared, it was found in most cases that the defendant had not been brought, and the whole thing started over.

For reasons that can be understood, the prosecution witnesses are not eager to come to courts in the territories to give testimony. Travel on the roads is not secure, and the witnesses are afraid of losing work days. Therefore, it was decided that reservists would be called on one-day call-up orders throughout the administration of the [regional] command, in addition to the issuing of orders by the secretariat of the courts. Rental vehicles, a driver, and a guard were allocated in order to transport the witnesses after they had been gathered from an assembly point.

Officers of the courts were instructed to get in touch by telephone with the witness in order to ensure his appearance. In serious cases, when witnesses refused demonstratively to appear in court, orders of habeas corpus were issued against them.

The percentage in terms of the appearance of prosecution witnesses went up considerably. In January 1990, for example, the average was 55 percent. It is understandable that the courts's intention is to ensure the full appearance of all the witnesses who are called. However, considering the special circumstances of the courts in the territories during the period of the uprising, the achievements that have been made up to now can be noted with great satisfaction.

Intifadah After 30 Months Assessed

90AE0089A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 18 May 90 p 7, 26

[Article by Ron Ben-Yishay]

[Text] The bottle shattered on the front windshield grille. A foul red liquid oozed over the glass and hood. "A bottle of acid," says Avihay, a soldier from the NAHAL [pioneer fighting youth] battalion stationed nearby. An

acrid stench fills the jeep. "No, it's bloody shit," says Dudi, looking back. I see his finger inching towards the trigger. On the roof of one of the houses, three boys give us the finger.

"That is their new tactic. Lately, they have been collecting shit and blood, apparently from the sick; they keep it for a week or two, then throw it at us in plastic sacks and bottles. I guess they want to infect us with something." The Nahal soldiers hold their noses. "When we get back to the battalion, we'll need to scrub it with soap and lysol."

At the forward post, Avi, the battalion commander, scribbles something in his notebook. This primitive, biological form of warfare, Gaza-style, is no longer new to him. "That was a deliberate ambush," he says, "but there is no reason to chase them now. I'll remember the house. We'll pay them a visit tonight."

In the 31st month of the intifadah, the hard core on each side is still as highly motivated as ever. Like the regular forces of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and Border Guard, the Palestinian activists show no signs of cracking. But each side has learned to recognize its weaknesses and quickly spot the weak points of the enemy; each side strives to concentrate its efforts where it has a relative advantage and to avoid confrontation wherever it is at a disadvantage.

This mutual process of learning has produced a dynamic standoff in the territories. The situations and the means change from time to time, but neither side can chalk up a breakthrough. The IDF suppresses the intifadah and reduces the level of violence but cannot eliminate it. It accepts a certain number of violent outbreaks in the territories, which echo around the world, to preserve its political achievements.

The Palestinians are failing to rise up a notch. Despite their efforts and the PLO leadership, which cajoles and bullies them, they are still treading in a lonely stone age. They are not making the transition to the stage of a civilian revolt which would involve severing their ties to the Israeli civil administration.

The intifadah has become institutionalized, a war of attrition with an agenda and its own rules of the game. In the early hours of the day, lines of Mercedes and Peugeots carrying local residents to work in Israel, labor over the roads of Gaza. At the Erez roadblock, they are passed by the Israelis: policemen, employees of the civil administration and soldiers in automobiles manufactured by Transit and Subaru.

The Israeli drivers stop for a minute or two, remove transparent sheets of plexiglass from the cargo section and attach them with sponge cushions and special straps to the front windshield. "Eyeglasses," they call these contraptions, which ward off stones and without which no Israeli vehicle can drive through Gaza. The side windows have already been replaced with unbreakable

plexiglass. Auto body shops in nearby Ashqelon are flourishing with protection work.

Not every vehicle in the Jewish settlements in Gaza has been properly protected. Sometimes, out of carelessness or ignorance, they end up in dangerous situations. Every IDF and police vehicle has been protected with plexiglass sheets. Even a heavy block thrown from a roof, or sharpened bars of iron cannot penetrate them.

In the morning hours, however, the air is still calm. Stores are opening. Shopkeepers are taking their wares outside and students in identical uniforms are streaming to school. The intifadah activists are trying hard to give the population half a day of "business as usual."

The view from the roof of the IDF outpost in the Shati refugee camp reveals a crowd beside the mosque. When I visited here eight months ago, it was still just a high building with coils of barbed wire to separate it from the adjoining homes. Today, mounds of dirt surround the post, while a special vehicle, with strange equipment for dispersing crowds, is parked in the yard. A tired soldier in an undershirt stumbles to the garbage dump with an empty white box. A scene from the forts at the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition.

A patrol on Nasir Street reports that it has been stoned. Avi, on the roof of the outpost, raises field glasses to his eyes. "That is the market," he explains. "People gather there every day before noon. We try not to go near if it isn't necessary. The mosque is another sensitive point where we try to avoid confrontations. They flee into it and their religious sensibilities are inflamed when we chase them there.

"It's now close to noon. That is a bad time. The first shift of students is leaving school while the second is entering for classes. Thousands of boys and girls are present in the streets. They throw stones at you so you will run into the lanes and yards and use force.

"From their point of view, it is best when we fire and hit innocent bystanders. The intifadah activists work hard to keep up motivation among the people, who are tired, and want us to do the job for them. They want us to kill and stir up the territories. But we aren't suckers...."

The stores lock up in the afternoon. A foot patrol gives Nasir Street a try. Tense silence. The NAHAL men believe that the rules for opening fire are too tough and restrictive. They would prefer greater freedom to use plastic or rubber ammunition. "Within limitations, of course," they hasten to add. Nearly all of them say that, if their lives were not in danger, they probably would refuse to obey an order, should they receive one, to fire live ammunition into a crowd.

At that very hour in the IDF headquarters building in Gaza, General Matan Vilna'i is holding the weekly briefing for the commanders of his forces. On the wall is a diagram of the last incident, in which a resident of the city was killed by shots fired by members of a reserve

unit. The unit commander describes the event as those present analyze the mistakes.

The IDF's conduct in Gaza today is dictated primarily by the clear signs of fatigue among the people who do not take part in the fighting. The most visible expression of that weariness is the rapidity with which the strip clams up after the mass disturbances.

Three weeks ago, after three Palestinians were killed and more than a hundred injured during an attack on the IDF outpost in the Jibalya camp, the IDF prepared for the worst. The proclamations and inflamed spirits did not bode well. What actually happened astounded everyone. The strip quieted down as quickly as it had flared up.

This week has brought additional proof of the phenomenon. The march of thousands to the Jordanian side of the Allenby Bridge in support of the Palestinian right of return, and the clash between Palestinians and Husayn's army, found almost no echo in the territories. Even the day marking the declaration of a state passed almost without event, aside from the murder of three collaborators in Judaea and Samaria.

Many Gazans have lost their jobs in Israel. Thousands of young wage-earners languish behind the wire fences of the various "Ansar" camps, and the funds that the PLO and other organizations channel to the territories as compensation are not sufficient. Many families are down to their last crumb.

As if the restrictions the civil administration places on the residents were not enough, the Palestinian organizations impose still further burdens upon them. Because of the enmity and differences of opinion between Fatah and Hamas, for example, each organization arranges its own Sabbath. It announces strikes and memorial days, and its masked members maintain separate lists of those to be eliminated.

The feeling that the political process is bogged down, and the fear that a hawkish-nationalist government will be formed in Israel, also have an effect. The relatively high rate of rotation among units on-the-job minimizes the decline in morale and the frustration that this insoluble situation causes IDF soldiers. The intifadah activists relieve their frustration with indiscriminate murders of collaborators.

For all these reasons, the population's willingness to take an active part in the intifadah has sagged. All signs indicate that there has been no decline in the masses' identification with the goals of the rebellion, but incidents showing people disregarding the leaflets of the unified leadership are increasing.

Even during strike days, it is possible to see winding lines of dozens of Gazans waiting to receive work permits in Israel. "I am ashamed to tell you," one Gazan reporter close to Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] told me, "that there are many of us hoping to make money in the

building boom for new immigrants from Russia. Few of them talk about it, but I know from their families that they are in a dilemma. They are afraid that Israel will bring in construction workers from abroad while they stay at home."

The IDF has high hopes riding on this fatigue. The assumption is that, if IDF forces leave the people alone and do not provoke them with killings and injuries, the violence will recede still further. The IDF is also trying hard to find positive inducements, such as reopening the universities. The goal is to create a situation in which the people have something to lose if they take to the streets as the activists demand. At the same time, the IDF is doing everything it can to make pinpoint strikes against members of the popular committees, the shock units and the masked rioters.

It is not difficult to see the logic in this strategy, but the high hopes placed on it would seem to be somewhat exaggerated. Despite their weariness, the Palestinians in the territories still live with a sense of great achievement. They credit themselves with bringing down the Israeli government and the leadership crises it is suffering from, which they see as an encouraging sign. They know in the territories that a Palestinian state is not waiting in the wings, but they believe that patient effort and a willingness to sacrifice are steadily bringing them closer to it.

Among those in the Israeli security services, there are many who argue that it is precisely the fatigue and the frustration from a lack of results that will cause many of the youth, primarily supporters of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, to take up arms. These experts warn of a rising tide of terrorist attacks in the not too distant future. Nonetheless, even the pessimists do not recommend taking a heavier hand with the population. "We have a lot more to lose than they do."

The contradictory assessments of the situation are a reflection of the fact that the Israeli security services are still limited in their ability to foresee activities in the territories. The IDF today is learning to develop tactics and fighting techniques for the challenges the intifadah activists present it with. In addition, intelligence for countering the day-to-day issues has improved. The murder of collaborators continues, however, and the thoughts that motivate the people are still a puzzle for the security service and the civil administration. There may be some consolation in the fact that the intifadah activists and the PLO leadership in Tunis are still surprised and disappointed from time to time by this same problem.

During the afternoon hours at the Border Guard's base camp in the center of the strip, the men prepare their jeeps for the daily encounter with the stone throwers in the Al-Burayj and al-Nusayrat camps. The battalion's deputy commander gives orders to the men in the green berets. He repeats, almost word for word, what he heard from the general a little while earlier.

Every afternoon, the patrols of the IDF and the Border Guard become a vehicle for showing their presence in the cities and the refugee camps. It is sort of a routine ceremony. "If we don't go to them in the camps, they will come out to us on the main roads," explains one patrol commander. "The youth want to show activity and we must demonstrate our presence and control. It's better that the confrontation occur at a place and time of our choosing."

The IDF is making an effort this year to lighten the load of the intifadah on the backs of the regular service and front line reserve units. In their place, the IDF is now sending veteran reserve units to deal with the young stone throwers. The men of these units and their commanders are not exactly bold, fleet-footed warriors. They train for some days and then go to the strip even though they cannot change the clips in their rifles as quickly as soldiers should. They pay the price when they arrive, in accidents unrelated to the execution of their assignments such as an incident in which a grenade exploded in the hands of an officer who was slow in throwing it.

The Palestinians usually give an "entrance exam" to each new unit arriving in one of the territories, particularly when they realize that the unit is one of reservists. The psychological component of the test includes provocations of various sorts, but not of the primitive nature that once was popular. The youngsters of the al-Nusayrat refugee camp, for example, know that giving the finger and calling out, "I had my way with your sister" make no impression on the soldiers. As a result, they prefer to shout to the reserve soldiers, in clear Hebrew, "without the Border Guard, you are nothing. You can do nothing."

That actually works. It has happened more than once that inexperienced unit commanders, thrust into a confusing situation, have refrained from calling in reinforcements from the Border Patrol or regular army troops. The honor of the unit was upheld, but the reservists were compelled to shoot and the casualties caused an uproar on the spot. The instigators achieved their goal, receiving hours of replay in the media.

The practical examination is usually an organized mob of dozens or even hundreds of residents, who start to march toward the patrol in the camp or to the outpost. Inside and around this "phalanx" run children throwing stones and waving PLO flags. Others on the roofs wait for the right moment to hurl down blocks. More often than not, a quick sally toward the mob by a combined force of troops on foot and in vehicles is sufficient to send the demonstrators scattering in all directions.

But the terrifying sight of a fired-up mob heading towards fewer than 20 reservists who have just unpacked their gear in the post has sometimes induced an uncertain reaction, or worse than that, a rash, poorly executed action. What happens next is all too familiar: shots fired, deaths, funeral processions, passions aroused, more

shots, more reports of dozens or sometimes hundreds of wounded, a curfew, and a headline on the front page of the "New York Times."

Border Patrol soldiers leave the camp before evening. The police fill out arrest reports. Parents will receive custody of their minor children following a deposit of 500 to 1,500 sheqels with the civil administration. If the child does not get into trouble again during the following year, his father will get his money back. Detainees over the age of 16 are transferred to one of the Ansar camps for investigation. They will remain there until trial. On the roads of the strip, the Peugeots and Mercedes are lining up again as they return from work in Israel. A truce holds until dark.

Meetings of a different nature take place at night. Their faces cloaked, men knock on the doors of those suspected of collaborating and settle accounts with members of rival organizations. IDF soldiers wait for them in ambush. New graffiti appears on walls on which it was erased during the day, and members of the Nahal battalion go out with intelligence officers to arrest suspects.

In another few hours, if a strike has not been declared in the meantime, the convoys will line up again on the roads of the strip on their way to work in Israel. And night will return.

Shomron's Curbs on Military Force Criticized 90AE0089C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 22 May 90 p 7

[Article by Alon Pinqas]

[Text] Dan Shomron, the Chief of Staff, has been the subject of considerable criticism since he was appointed to his post, and especially since the intifadah broke out. Some of the critics contend that he has failed to live up to the expectations placed on him in all matters related to building up the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] strength, and for pulling it out of the doldrums into which it sank under Moshe Levi. In addition to and alongside this criticism, Shomron has begun to take political heat, which is increasing as the intifadah continues.

Shomron is accused of failing to eliminate the "terrorist violence" and of treating the rioters with kid gloves. Shomron has generally kept silent, offering no reply to most of the accusations. After all, it is not the function of the Chief of Staff to answer to every charge politicians may level. This policy also reflects the injustice of many of the accusations. It is not that there is no room for criticism but that an accusation must hit the correct target.

During the first two years of the intifadah, Shomron devoted most of his time and the efforts of the army to meeting the challenge of this new and unfamiliar phenomenon. Even in the beginning, Shomron determined that it was a popular uprising based on the ever-growing hatred of the occupation. He defined the army's goals as bringing down the level of violence to the point that

ordinary civic life in the territories was made possible, and developing maneuvering room for the political branch, room that was not captive to the pressure of events in the uprising.

Shomron has succeeded in the two tasks he set for himself. Reducing the level of violence in and of itself depended upon the cooperation of the population, which was not always forthcoming. But the IDF enjoyed greater success with the second task. He has provided the political branch room in which to maneuver and won enough time for it. The energy and talent the politicians have demonstrated is well-known, but that is another story.

Despite the successes he has enjoyed, Shomron suffers from a mediocre public image. Two factors account for that image -vicious condemnation from the right, which attributes to the Chief of Staff that which his political insight has failed to grasp, and the policy of the Minister of Defense.

The savage criticism from the right reached a peak when Knesset member Yehoshu'a Sagi' -a quiet sort, who chose to remain silent during the preparations for the war in Lebanon and the establishment of the historic alliance with our brothers the Maronites, and to speak of much more important events such as the elections for the Bat Yam town council- determined that Dan Shomron would forever be remembered as the intifadah Chief of Staff. In other words, in the world according to Yehoshu'a Sagi' and his companions, it is not the occupation, nor the refugee camps, nor the poverty, nor the oppression and the trampling of human rights, nor national aspirations that are the causes of the continuation of the intifadah. The cause is Dan Shomron, who was able (if only he had heeded the wisdom of the settlers and the later lessons of General Bar-Kokhba) to put down, to stamp out, to liquidate the intifadah.

The second cause is, as noted, the policy of the Minister of Defense to whom Dan Shomron was subordinate from December, 1987, until April, 1990. It was easy for the minister to hide behind the Chief of Staff and the IDF. Between the bitter reality known as the intifadah and the political branch, in which he stood at the top, the Defense Minister raised the army. The company commander will break limbs, the battalion commander will not report it, the division commander will not remember, and the general of the command will prominently hoist black flags. All of them do the Chief of Staff's bidding and all will stew in their own juices. The political branch will blow the wind of orders into the sails of the operational branch. Wind is not something one can grab, and, certainly it cannot to be translated into ink on paper.

And so, a huge gap was created over two and a half years between the popularity (and, apparently, the efficiency) of Defense Minister Rabin and the popularity of the Chief of Staff. The Defense Minister was bursting with energy and full of solutions, while the Chief of Staff was not so successful at executing them. And not just that, but he had the nerve to rise up and say that the solution was political, not military. There is no other way, at least none that aligns itself with the ethical and moral standards Israeli society has adopted.

In the wake of the slaughter in Rish'on Letziyon, the Chief of Staff appeared on television last night and said things for which the time has come that they be spoken by someone who, holding a senior and central position, nevertheless, is not suspected of any political entanglements. To the question of what the IDF is preparing to do in response to the violence that has broken out, Shomron replied that he would not permit it to take to the streets. It is necessary, however, Shomron added, to remember, and this is the important point, that "anyone who thinks it is possible to stamp out and eradicate the intifadah does not understand the sort of action that would entail."

How strange that it is the high command of the army that must remind us at times of the limits of power. We have no lack of examples of general staffs in the armies of the world inclined to caution and conservatism in anything involving the use of military force. Still, the situation has been the opposite in most of the incidents of modern history. For that very reason, and because of the army's role as a central institution in Israeli society, the Chief of Staff deserves praise for his remarks.

Economics Advisor Discusses Defense Expenditures

90AE0087A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement) in Hebrew 12 Jun 90 pp 12-14

[Article by Uri Ginossar]

[Text] Omri Tov sits in a boring office in the main building of the defense establishment in the Qirya [government compound] in Tel Aviv, and must give beneficial economic advice to the establishment. Tov is economic advisor to the establishment, a kind of corps commander over all of the economists who work for defense.

During a period when a cut in the defense budget has become standard fare, the advisor comes out with an unequivocal contrary statement: "We must provide security to the State of Israel. Security is the goal, economics is only one of the inputs. It is not a goal in itself. The establishment must be given a supplementary budget for research and development, as well as for factories in the development towns, and we shouldn't fear a supplementary budget. In opposition to the opinion commonly held by economists, I argue that if I increase the procurement budget of the defense industries, I will spur future growth."

In a period in which the defense establishment is strangling under the constraints of the economic policy-makers in Jerusalem, someone who worked for years in the Bank of Israel is coming out against the heads of the

central bank: "It is a system that is entirely unacquainted with the defense establishment, and the other decision-makers in Jerusalem also are not sufficiently acquainted with the establishment. It is impossible to demand that the defense budget be cut immediately, it must be given time, because the factories and the development towns are the ones which are hurt."

Omri Toy has been serving as the economic advisor to the Ministry of Defense for a little more than two years, and he defines it as one of the central economic positions in the country. Tov is 50 years old, and he was born in Rehovot, a fact that in itself could be considered not a bad reason for getting the job. Professor Pinhas Susman. who founded the position at the beginning of the 1970's. comes from Rehovot, and Nehemya Hasid and Tzvi Trop, who served after him, also come from the city. All of them, by the way, have not made out badly at all since then. Hasid is a financial officer in the Nilit company, Tzvi Trop is the Assistant Director-General for Finance in the Tin Can company, Ya'aqov Lifschitz, who also served in this position, is Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, and David Kohav, who served as advisor before him, works in the World Bank.

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The duties of the economic advisor are defined officially in three main spheres; general involvement in the economic affairs of the entire defense establishment, participation in current policy-making, and regular monitoring of the defense industries. Having come from the research ivory towers of the Bank of Israel, Omri Tov explains that for him this is a unit that contributes in real time to the decision-making apparatus, and it must constantly evaluate the situation. The unit, which includes 12 economists and a female administrative assistant, is engaged in mobilizing resources for the defense establishment, in export arrangements, and in the uses of the financial resources of the system, such as how to best procure what the Chief of Staff wants to buy. "I do not get involved in the question of whether to buy a cannon, or a tank, I determine when it will be bought and how it will be purchased, what will be the rules of the game. When there is a cut in the budget, I analyze the overall significance for the budget and its impact on the game as a whole."

The defense establishment finds itself today pondering expenditures. Tadiran Communications has already been burned by not getting an order after army officers had hinted to it that they would, as it were, purchase equipment that it manufactures. Soltam was also burned when the army did not buy its new cannon. In both cases, said the heads of the Ministry of Defense, those in "civvies," and not the officers in the field, had the last word. "The defense establishment does business with the local market in the amount of IS three billion a year, and the business is conducted according to procedures and instructions for which the economic advisor is responsible," says Omri Tov.

Another arena in which they step on others's toes is the slash in shekel purchases from Israeli companies. Kitan Dimona was the first to raise the flag of protest, after it had received a warning that the army would cease procurement from its uniforms factories, and would prefer to purchase uniforms in the U.S.A. for dollars. Other current subjects are in the areas of canned food, plywoods, tires, and batteries (Tadiran, again). "The American assistance budget," the advisors spells out. "has already for some years come to \$1.8 billion, which are divided into \$1.4 billion for procurement in the U.S.A. and another approximately \$430 million that are converted into shekels in Israel. This scope of aid has not changed since 1985, and it is being eroded gradually. All in all, I am progressively shrinking," he says, "and I can buy fewer things each year. If I procure here more smart equipment and R&D, the state of the economy will be better than if I purchase simple products. But there is a problem when some of the manufacturers of the simple products are located in rural settlements and in development towns, and these settlements are part of the defense concept. One must simply decide what is better from the viewpoint of the economy as a whole. In the long run, we must go with sophisticated industry, but it is not good to harm the basic industry without warning. My estimate is that, for example, Kitan Dimona will not be hurt in 1991, and that the army will continue to procure uniforms from it. Security is more than numbers of soldiers, technology, and the conduct of battles, and if Kiryat Shemona is emptied of its inhabitants due to problems with its factories, that, too, impairs security.'

Omri Tov. The name "Omri" is taken from the book of Nehemiah in the Bible, "Tov" is the name that was given to his father in Poland by his grandfather, according to the practice by which the Jews would give each of their sons a different surname, so that they could not be drafted into the army. He looks younger than his 50 years, he is second-in-command of a reserve infantry brigade, married and the father of two daughters, and one of the youngest grandfathers around. He met his wife when they were in third grade, and married her at the age of 21, and his eldest daughter married at the age of 20. He was already a grandfather at the age of 42, and he likes to talk about that sometimes.

Tov grew up in Rehovot, and after the army he went to Jerusalem to study economics. At the same time, he began to work in the Economic Planning Authority, where they like to take in beginning economists. After five years in the Authority, he moved over to the Bank of Israel, and he was "stuck" there for nearly 20 years. He was an assistant and advisor to Governors Arnon Gafni and Moshe Sanbar, and afterwards was assistant director of the credit department. Nothing exciting that would make the headlines. A rather grey life even to an observer.

At the beginning of 1988, he decided to go outside, and even before he took the first steps as a self-employed person, Ministry of Defense Director-General David 'Ivri offered him the job. It is doubtful whether the job of

economic advisor to the defense establishment is a job that gives you exposure and makes up for years of anonymity in the cellars of the Bank of Israel, but Tov says that he is satisfied. [He says] that it is an important position, and he speaks about the sums of money that are decided upon, about the importance of the defense establishment, about dealing with American assistance. about budget problems, about setting prices for factories, and about approval of export deals. "I have been in the job already two years, and it still attracts me," he says, and he complains mainly about the lack of academic background in economics in defense policy-making. "From the viewpoint of the economy, an army officer should spend more time studying economics and administration", the advisor asserts, thus responding to the well-known tendency that most officers prefer to combine academic studies with advanced army courses and likewise political science and history.

The economic advisor to the defense establishment believes that the age of reserve service should be lowered. This idea is based also on personal experience—Tov is still in the reserves. According to him, reserve duty hinders the economy, and those aged 40 to 50 who are required to continue to serve in the reserves are already of little benefit to the army in contrast with their experience in the civilian economy and their contribution there. Tov finds justification for his proposed foregoing of the older reservists in the older age bracket expected in coming years among the draftees.

Hundreds of Persons Must Be Dismissed From RAFAEL

One of the duties of the economic advisor to the defense establishment is also coordination between industries. "We have non-defense industries that produce for the establishment, such as Soltam, Tadiran, Elbit, and Rada, and we need them. There is a smaller group for which the Minister of Defense is directly responsible, such as Israel Aircraft Industries, RAFA'EL, TA'AS, SHEQEM, and Gafim. In their case, we are the indicator when the unit cannot fulfill its undertakings, we audit the operating plans, and handle the current financial information," explains the advisor.

He notes that TA'AS is encountering difficulties in making the transition to a commercial firm, even though the process had been planned already at the beginning of the year, and there are various problems in the area of pensions and wages. RAFA'EL is a completely different ball game. It is an autonomous unit for R&D that became a manufacturing organization. RAFA'EL does not pay for itself today. The wages are not controlled by management, because all the sectors are linked to national unions and to collective agreements, and the number of employees also is not controlled by management, because dismissal is difficult. "From our viewpoint, it is unequivocally clear that 500 to 800 workers must be dismissed from there. Either it will increase its exports, or it will sell more civilian products, or it will lower wages, and that is what we are fighting over. For the problem to be solved, a political decision is required in terms of how much they are willing to change conditions there."

The Lavi project is a subject still mentioned in the defense corridors. "The cancellation of the project," says Tov, "is not the sole reason for the changes in defense industries. The freezing of the exchange rate, the fact that budgets shrank, and that the world is moving towards peace also had an impact—the factories must undergo processes of rehabilitation."

The advisor's boring office, almost bare of any decoration and furnished to a minimum is, perhaps, an expression of the faded glory of the defense establishment seen as the largest provider of employment in the economy.

In the final analysis, one must hew to the budget. In its elaboration, the Planning Branch, the Assistant Chief of Staff, and several other office-holders participate. Afterwards, the Ministry of Defense oversees things in order to ensure that there is no deviation from the budget. After the budget has been determined the process of channeling it daily to bring about implementation begins. Tov and his staff call themselves pilots.

JORDAN

Reestablishment of PLO Infrastructure Noted

90AE0050A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Apr 90 p 10B

[Article by Shafi Gabay]

[Text] "I supported the plan to attack Israeli tourists on the Ismailia-Cairo road," Shaykh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi admitted for the first time in an interview he gave to the Arab daily, AL-HAYAH, which is published in Egypt. The Shaykh was the Mufti of Hebron until he was deported in 1980 after the murder of the yeshiva students near Beyt Hadassa.

Al-Tamimi, in his sixties, tall and bearded, stirred up those who were listening to his preachings against Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. After his deportation, he settled in Jordan and established a religious group of terrorists calling itself the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Bayt al-Maqdis. Al-Tamimi was supported by PLO Military Chief of Staff Khalil al-Wazir (Abu-Jihad) who was shot to death in his home in Tunis over two years ago.

Shaykh al-Tamimi was interviewed this week in his home in Jabal al-Husayn, the prestigious neighborhood of Amman, as if to emphasize the fact that he is operating freely without any interference from Jordanian authorities. He said to his interviewer, "I will not interfere with Jordanian authority and carry out military operations against Israel from Jordanian territory because the Zionist entity is trying to find a way to heat up the border with Jordan, and I am not interested in complicating things for our hosts."

Until 1988, Jordanian security forces had arrested him from time to time and even thrown him in prison after finding out that he had visited Iran several times. In Teheran, he was involved in establishing a Jordanian group of Hizballah to operate alongside the Lebanese-Palestinian group, the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. It is now clear that Shaykh al-Tamimi went back to 'Arafat's Fatah and received financial support for his command in Amman. "I am now free to operate as I wish and go anywhere. No limits have been placed on me by Jordanian authorities," he told the AL-HAYAH correspondent.

Al-Tamimi's Islamic Jihad is not the only group based in Amman. Fatah and other radical groups of terrorists are also based in Jordan without any interference from the authorities. Four years after the king got rid of Fatah commands along with some of the outstanding personalities in the PLO leadership, they are returning to Amman. According to the pro-Jordanian weekly, AL-MUHARRIR, published in Paris, prominent Palestinian personalities, not the least being Abu-al-Tayyib, who served as personal bodyguard to Yasir 'Arafat and is now the commander of a group of 17, have based themselves there.

Intelligence Chief of Fatah, Ha'il 'Abd-al-Hamid, called Abu-al-Hul, has settled in Amman. Abu-al-Tayyib and Abu-al-Hul are also involved with the group in the western sector which plans attacks in Israel and the territories. The Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Bayt al-Maqdis is also involved in supervising this group. The other PLO institutions which operate currently in Amman include the institution for assisting the families of those killed or injured in the intifadah, headed by Intisar al-Wazir, the widow of Abu-Jihad, and offices of the Palestinian National Council which is the PLO parliament in exile.

Last month, a further shift took place in Jordan's attitude toward the radical elements in the PLO. For the first time since September 1970, Jordan allowed senior delegations of members of George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and members of Nayif Hawatimah's Democratic Front to enter Amman. They met with the head of the government, Mudar Badran, and made contact with people in the refugee camps. Habash and Hawatimah are even planning to establish their own Palestinian parties in Jordan as an extension of the democratic process which King Husayn proclaimed.

Arab newspapers, quoting sources close to the palace, have been writing that the king is not worried at this time about opening the gates to Palestinian groups. He allowed Mahmud 'Abbas, called Abu-al-'Abbas, head of the Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the one who hijacked the Italian ship Achille Lauro to enter the kingdom. He believes that he can keep track of the activities of the various groups by means of his security forces. The same sources argue that the king is dismissing the argument that the entry of terrorists into the

kingdom is akin to letting in a Trojan horse similar to what happened before Black September. Husayn knows that the kingdom is not stable. The economic crisis has worsened, the Palestinian sector which represents the majority of the population is growing more powerful and there is a very worrisome process of deterioration of discipline and loyalty among the Bedouin.

Under these circumstances, the king is trying to achieve an "artificial quiet" in the Palestinian segment of his country. He has demanded of all the Palestinian groups based in the kingdom that they calm down the agitated elements among the Palestinians living in his land and has warned about any kind of interference in affairs of the kingdom. He has not forgotten to emphasize that it is forbidden to carry out any terrorist acts against Israel from within Jordan. The leaders of the PLO and the other factions have expressed willingness to conscientiously accept all of the king's conditions. They proved this in the recent elections to the parliament when they did not interfere in the election process. The PLO leadership even responded positively to the transfer of its "financial department" (the Palestine National Fund) to Amman in order to help in the reconstruction of the shaky economy.

Experts in Jordanian affairs say that within the framework of cat and mouse games between Jordan and the PLO, a congruence of interests has developed between the two sides. According to them, the king is walking a tightrope because past experience has proven that the terrorists do not always keep their word.

Shubaylat Lectures on Islamic Action Priorities

90AE0133A Amman AL-LIWA' in Arabic 6 Jun 90 pp 4, 20

["Text" of lecture by Parliamentary Deputy Layth Shubaylat at al-Bayraq Institute, Amman: "Priorities for Islamic Action"; first paragraph is AL-LIWA' introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] In the context of the intellectual meetings of Amman's al-Bayraq Institute, Parliamentary Deputy Layth Shubaylat delivered a lecture entitled, "Priorities for Islamic Action." In it, he reviewed the state of the Islamic movement and what is required for it to achieve all its goals. In view of the importance of the lecture and the subject, AL-LIWA' here publishes the full text of the lecture:

Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds! Blessing and peace be upon Our Master Muhammad, the trustworthy prophet, and upon his family and all his companions! I thank al-Bayraq Institute for inviting me to meet with you this evening to discuss an important subject that the organizer of this meeting—may God reward him—chose: "Priorities for Islamic Action in Jordan." Before entering into the actual subject, an introduction is needed to try to understand the present condition of Jordan and Islam and the state of Islamic action in

Jordan. As one of the unfortunate products of Sykes-Picot, Jordan is a country that was intentionally separated from a Syrian whole, itself separated from an Islamic whole, in less than a decade of time at the beginning of the century. Had the land of the Arabs, the entire territory of Syria, been what was separated from the Islamic state, the matter would have been much less serious than our present condition, since it would only have been necessary to wait for peace and reform before the part would have arisen seeking its great mother. However, the partition that befell the Arab world was the greatest tragedy in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The detached part was given no chance to establish itself as a unified country with all the requirements of a country-natural, geographic, and human resources and a strategic position. Instead, it was divided into ministates. The least fortunate and least likely to survive of these was Jordan. Poor in resources, geographically small, and with the longest borders with a hostile ministate in process of formation, it was to be the next morsel to be swallowed up in expansion, after that other state was provided with all the resources of Western crusader support so that it might always be connected to the West by an unfailing and unsevered umbilical cord.

Stages of the Plot

The imperialist plot took place in various stages. Imperialist enemies participated in it from abroad; rulers and the westernized class of imperialists participated in it from within-those who enjoyed having their hearts colonized and who unconsciously contented themselves with having part of their feelings and tongues remain hostile to the imperialists. So we suffered the geographic, social, and political disasters that we experienced. By the end of the century, we became peoples or generations for whom the borders of the fatherland had shrunk to be the borders of the country in which they lived. Whereas for three decades when any person, body, institution, or company was given the adjective "national," people interpreted the meaning with reference to the great [Arab] homeland, today when the same word is used to describe an institution or project, the general meaning that people understand and are meant to understand is that the entity thus qualified belongs to the individual

Entire generations grew up deprived of the opportunity to tour the Arab countries. Indeed, when the younger generation tours outside the country, it goes only to the countries of alienation to seek knowledge, rest, or relaxation. It is not and has not become acquainted, is not and has not developed any social relations with its fellow generations in brother countries or the so-called brother homelands.

Three Alienations

Three alienations have befallen the Arabs like three shadows. There was the alienation of the foreign physical presence in the Holy Land and heart of the Islamic nation. There was the internal, cultural alienation of the

person. Finally, there was the external alienation of persons cut off from their brethren in brother countries. And it seems that a fourth alienation is at the gates—the alienation of excessive philosophical regionalism by holders of degrees, an alienation that makes honest men sigh for the days of innocent illiteracy close to unspoiled human nature. God bless the Prophet, who was illiterate, and his family and companions, and grant them peace!

Unifying Force Absent

These three alienations or shadows came to pass only because the only genuine unifying force, Islam, was absent—Islam, in which faith kinship takes precedence over familial kinship. This is a subject I have covered on many previous occasions and requires specialized lectures and discussions on which I will not embark today. Instead, based on the conclusions we have already reached, I will move into today's subject, which is a serious starting point for a view of the future. We shall seek an example of faith and ethics for our guidance in the pious first generations of Muslims and shall begin with a realistic analysis of our situation.

Islam and the Muslims

I will allow myself to disagree with many people who have not given full attention to distinguishing between the timeless, eternal truth that "Islam is the solution," a truth at the heart of the prophetic missions, and the actual state of Muslims-namely, that today's Muslims are not necessarily the solution. Yes, it is a very great triumph, one we would never have dreamed of had it not been for the prevenient grace of God the Compassionate and Beneficent, that our people are again professing that the solution lies in Islam. Although we cannot be thankful enough for this great achievement and blessing bestowed by God, yet if we busy ourselves with talking about it, we shall be like someone who resolves to make the pilgrimage a thousand times before the season. but when the season approaches and he is about to depart, discovers that unforeseen obstacles remain, so that he must postpone his trip. As for being thankful for the blessing we have mentioned, God taught us how this should take place, when he said: "Work, O House of David, in thankfulness" [Koran 34:13]; otherwise....

Return and Its Causes

I will also allow myself to disagree with all those who think that the existence today of huge numbers expressing their desire for Islam is proof that workers in the Islamic field are ready to shoulder the task. Let us look at these crowds to examine the nature of their return to religion. Although the return is blessed and praiseworthy—thank God for it!—this does not prevent us from putting it under the microscope to examine its freedom from any malignant disease—God forbid! To understand the great risk to Islamic action, we need only realize that the return of the masses and even that of many who are in the ranks of the leadership today was a return from outside the official educational, cultural,

and informational institutions. This is because the ordinary, prevalent official channels of information serve westernizing education. I would go so far as to include in this even the Islamic law faculties of the westernizing universities in our country—and all our modern universities are westernizing. Although the channels of knowledge in them are Islamic, the general atmosphere of learning is a westernizing one. The Imam al-Shafi'i—may God be pleased with him!—spoke correctly when he said: "Learning is a spirit that is imparted, not books that are copied."

Unorganized Return

Today's return of the generations to religion has not taken place through the nation's planned educational and informational programs, but through auxiliary channels of information flowing counter to the prevailing current and used in one's extra time. Whether we like it or not, the original time is still occupied by the affairs and thoughts of secular material life. If only we lost sleep over the best of that! But we go past it to the worst!

Dividing Factors

It is very important that we acknowledge this, so that we do not build our skyscraper on ground unsuitable for building from the beginning. Nothing is more telling about the present state of Muslims-or call them "Islamists"—than the fact that they are united only by the word "Islam" and by their proclamation of loyalty to it. Afterwards, they disagree on almost all particulars. I will not cite a political example of this, because the important thing is unity of belief about the fundamentals, while tolerating disagreement on subsidiary issues. But such toleration is utterly nonexistent even within a single group. You would think they would be united in these matters of Islamic law, but their hearts are scattered. Even if they unite politically, a unity based on divided hearts that have treated controversial issues as if they were fundamentals is a superficial unity that soon falls apart. Even if it does not fall apart, it cannot shoulder the burdens that such a collective unity is asked to support.

Islamic Ethics Absent

The other indication is the almost complete absence of Islamic ethics in dealings, especially on the part of those who are regarded as models because of their leadership positions. Many of our leadership models have not realized that a leadership position is a great worldly temptation, almost greater that of money-indeed, many wealthy people strive for leadership because they feel inferior without it. Then a person behaves like an infallible authority, no matter how much lip service he gives to the word "humility." Add to this a lack of love in God, but rather mutual hatred and envy, a readiness to engage in slander, and a facility at lying and spreading bad reports, whether fabricated or true, and concealing good ones. We have thoroughly defined our position regarding our excellent theoretical call. The problem is not in Islam-Islam is the solution-but in the fact that

this great giant idea needs great giants to carry it. The first priority that none of them must forget is that God has forbidden for them anything other than the ethics of Muhammad, which God sent his beloved Prophet to spread. It is better that thousands of men suffer the fate of Imam al-Banna, the martyr 'Umar al-Mukhtar, or the martyr 'Izz-al-Din al-Qassam—may God have mercy on them and be pleased with them—than that there be a thousand men who say what they do not do to a single man. The place on which the light of Muhammad's inheritance ought to shine is the heart. When it strikes the heart, it illuminates the entire being, so that it becomes a being that never causes distress to its companion.

It is truly wonderful that many sincere thinkers believe that concentration on the call [to Islam] has strongly dominated the other focuses of the method of Islamic thought and educational, political, and economic programs in past decades. Although this proposition is true to a great degree, it is truly saddening that we are not seeing the desired results at the level of the call. The call does not stop with calling people to observe the external forms of obedience [to God]. It goes on from this first stage to stage after stage via behavior. Education raises the Muslim from materialistic, secular ethics to the ethics of Muhammad.

Preachers, Not Judges

Unfortunately, another indication of general failure even in the way of the call is the transformation of many workers in the Islamic field from humble preachers who seek closeness to their Master by saving their brethren from the fire of hell into haughty judges interested in classifying people and in stipulating new conditions for brotherhood in God and in Islam. They do this despite the fact that the Messenger of God accepted people's verbal profession of monotheism and testimony to his prophethood in granting them his full prophecy and brotherhood with his companions. He devoted his time and energy to dealing equitably among them according to their needs and not according to their ranks in the eyes of God. We find that workers in the Islamic field are generally characterized by pride and a sense of superiority toward those deprived of what God has bestowed upon them. They are interested in classifying people and defaming them. They do not accept people's repentance. when they repent, and they do other things as well in violation of the Sunnah of Muhammad and the principle that man exists as a viceroy on earth who summons to God with insight.

So as not to speak too long, and so that we can finish with our three alienations, the first test for Islamists lies in not falling into the fourth alienation that is advancing upon us—the alienation of regionalism. If our preachers and their many followers prove correct, this alienation will not harm us and our country, because we certainly appear to be a majority. But are we really a majority when it comes to the test?

First Priority

The first priority in Islamic action in Jordan at this stage, when God has opened before us the means of progress, consists of our not rushing into moving ahead. Instead, we should now concentrate the bulk of our strength sincerely on criticism of ourselves and our movements, after having spent years and years in criticizing the rule of westernization and the dependency that distracted us from ourselves and from remembering the saying of the Beloved Prophet: "May God curse the Banu Qurayzah, for they have distracted us from the afternoon prayer." The situation now comes to this: "When you are secure, perform the prayer," [Koran 4:103]. Establish religion, and establish the rule of Islam within yourselves; then it will arise in your land. Pressing on to forward movement before this is fatal.

Islam Is the Whole

The second priority is that we again realize that Islam is the whole. It is not satisfied with being a part on this earth. The whole is not a whole that narrows the horizon by banishing others; the whole is a whole by the tolerance of the Master of the call, who always needs people who are summoned and who realizes that he was sent only to call people, not to banish them or persecute them by inspecting their hearts. Islam is the whole in all the Islamic lands. It is religion and state. It is a religion to those who are pleased to follow it without compulsion. It is a religion for the state on its territory. It is a state that comprehends all citizens in equality and justice-each according to his choice, provided that he does not chose loyalty to a culture and civilization other than this Islamic civilization. All must realize by good example, not by compulsion, that their welfare, their security, and their hopes lie with us, the people who are Islamists. Love of us, hatred of us, and our feelings do not deprive them of their rights in our sight; for Islam in our state, i.e., in our world, is a blessing for everyone—committed, uncommitted, and non-Muslims who do not show enmity. Islam is a treasure for our entire world. For believers it is a means to the hereafter. We hope and desire and pray to God that all our brethren among mankind will accept it. Perhaps God, who is praised, will save them by it from punishment in the hereafter. Islam is the mother: a mother gathers to unity, rather than dividing. How can any of us stand before God and dispute with Him concerning a person who has once said, "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God," and has died in this belief? Are we perchance on firmer footing with God than the Caliph Umar? The latter asked about who had assassinated him, saying, "Who was my slayer?" They said to him, "The slave lad of al-Mughirah Ibn-Shu'bah" [i.e., a non-Muslim]. He said, "Praise be to God, who did not cause my death to be at the hand of someone who will be able to confute me [sc., my demand that he be punished] by saying 'There is no god but God' on the Day of Resurrection."

Acceptance of Pluralism

The third priority is that Islamists should accept the reality of pluralism. The acceptance should not be a hypocritical tactic, but a strategic one deriving from the principle of "No compulsion in religion." More importantly, they should accept pluralism among themselves. No one group of them should believe that it is the saved group and that it is the community of Muslims.

The fourth priority is that Islamists should use Jordan as a training ground, nothing else. Their cause cannot be fully realized here, as long as this does not coincide with a corresponding revival in the regions around Jordan. Otherwise, overextending one's neck makes it easy to be cut off! If they continue to enrich their experience with deliberateness and skill, it will make this frontline country a place from which tested, developed, and improved thought can be exported.

I hope what I have said will not be taken to mean that I think these priorities cannot be enriched, expanded, or amended. I hope what I have said will be taken merely as thinking aloud—my contribution to a subject on which it is important for us all to speak a great deal before we decide on the priorities for Islamic action in Jordan's future.

Columnist Examines King Husayn's Survivability

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[Article by 'Amos Gilbo'a]

[Text] Professor Uri'el Dan published a book recently on "King Husayn and the Challenges of Arab Radicalism from 1955-1967." Those were stormy years in the Middle East, years of raging Nasirism, upheavals, and days of a young Jordanian king when every day people would ask, "When will he fall? When will he be murdered?" No one was prepared to bet on him. Neither Israeli intelligence, nor Uri'el Dan in those days. They were all proven wrong. Why? In a retrospective interview today, Professor Uri'el Dan pointed to three central reasons for this.

First, Husayn had a single goal which was to survive. He knew the sources of his strength in advance and how to navigate them in order to attain this goal. Second, although his biggest enemy, 'Abd-al-Nasir had the wherewithal to topple him, 'Abd-al-Nasir did not consider toppling Husayn his top priority. On the other hand, those groups (such as the Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan) whose major goal was to bring about Husayn's downfall, lacked the means to accomplish it. The ones who could have done so, did not want to enough, and the ones who really wanted to could not.

Third, luck was in favor of Husayn. Can something be learned from this about the Husayn of our times, about Jordan and its king after over 20 years? "There is

nothing to learn," says Uri'el Dan, "nothing, because history does not repeat itself!"

I agree with him. Perhaps they will not assassinate the king as they tried to do numerous times in the distant past, but his stable door is starting to burn.

You can see it with your own eyes and on television. About a year ago, there were "food riots" in Jordan. Those who carried out the riots were the Bedouins, faithful to the king, who had stood by him like an armed fortress in 1970-71 against the organizations of Palestinian terrorists and against the invading Syrian army. The cause of the riots was a lack of food and standard of living. The Jordanian Palestinians were quiet then. The riots ceased but the basic problem has remained -a disastrous economic situation, almost without remedy.

The Jordanian territory has a political and strategic importance of the first magnitude. For Saudi Arabia, it is a "security strip" against Syria. For Syria, it is their patrimony, and for Iraq the outlet to the Red Sea, an area for sounding the alarm against Israel and for outflanking Syria from the south. For the Arab countries as a whole, Jordan is a platform for attacking Israel from the "eastern front." And for specific groups in Israel, it is the birthplace of the Palestinian state.

The trouble is that this mountainous and desert-like stretch of land has no independent economic potential. It is dependent on Saudi Arabia for regular supplies of oil and money. It depends on Syria for its water supply and on the Persian Gulf countries for employment. Half of Jordanian exports (including tomatoes from the territories for example) is directed there. It was only a few years ago that Jordan had a surplus of about a billion dollars in foreign currency. Now it is only somewhere from \$30-50 million. Husayn is now in the midst of a frenzy of scraping together money from everywhere, from hand to mouth, from one day to the next.

This week, Jordanian citizens witnessed a mass march across Allenby Bridge. A long line of tens of thousands of Palestinians [demonstrated], carrying signs and slogans in favor of the "return," in favor of the intifadah, and against Israel and the U.S. and so on and so forth. Husayn, who had come to an agreement with 'Arafat about a month ago about setting up the march, thought that only a few thousand would take part, let off some steam, and return home satisfied. Some of them went home peacefully, and some returned by way of the hospital, as sounds of machine gun fire from the tanks of the Jordanian army probably echoed in their ears.

Whoever has eyes to see, and a bit of imagination cannot help but be afraid, remembering the intifadah in its first year and ask themselves, "Is Husayn losing control? Is the level of daring of the Palestinians who challenge the king rising bit by bit, and is the level of opposition on the part of the king starting to drop a little at a time?" After all, last year, between the food riots and the march to the Jordan River of the wild-eyed masses, Husayn took two amazing steps. He allowed the Jordanian parliament to

hold free elections and accepted 30 percent of the delegates who belonged to extremist religious Moslem organizations. He allowed organizations of Palestinian terrorists to return to Jordan starting with 'Arafat's Fatah by way of George Habash's organization, and ending with Jibril's organization.

There are those who interpret these moves as indicating democratization, a Jordanian openness of the magnitude of eastern Europe, the wisdom of an old king striving to buy peace and to let off steam. It reminds me of the story about the man who wanted to train his horse to go without food, and each day he would reduce the portion of food until one day the horse died. Who tries to let off steam in a stable that is starting to burn? Only someone who feels weak, only someone whose spirit is broken, someone who is perhaps losing his stubborn will to continue and survive as he has done for 20-30 years.

Iraq is now the most arrogant and threatening force in the Arab world in relation to Israel. Jordan is now the weak link in this world. And the weakest link is always the most dangerous. It is beginning to become worn down and the main question is how quickly it will wear out, and when it will break.

To my mind, this is one of the central basic tenets which must guide the policy of any new government in Israel. And as for luck, which has smiled on Husayn so much in the past, it is beyond the realm of human consideration and political thought.

KUWAIT

Planning Ministry Profiles New Projects 90AE0107A Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 10 Jun 90 p 10

[Article by Jamal Amin]

[Text] Dr 'Abd-al-Hadi al-'Awadi, the undersecretary at the Ministry of Planning and the general co-ordinator of Kuwait Development Plan was quoted as saying that government expenditure allocated for construction projects during the next five years is estimated at 6 billion Kuwaiti dinars.

In an interview with the daily AL-SIYASAH, the official disclosed that the long-term plan for the years 1990-2015 had been finalized recently and referred to the Higher Planning Council for endorsement.

He added that the plan had concentrated on several major issues dealing with the future of the economic situation in the country, the population and the workforce balance in addition to several issues.

Meanwhile, the official said that the Ministry of Planning had prepared the general framework of the next five year plan 1990/91-1994/95, clarifying that the plan was based on the long-term development strategy and the economic and social studies.

He added that the plan focused on preparing the Kuwaiti citizen in the light of relevant economic and social development.

He added that the plan has included the Ministry of Planning conceptions over the objectivity of the next five years plan together with the investment and expenditure volumes which had been based on the expected gross national product (GNP) of the country in addition to the country's investment revenues and the oil and non-oil returns expected.

He added that the general framework of the plan covered the total investment distribution between the public and private sectors and the nature of investment activities and activities of the government and joint sector.

On the other hand Dr al-'Awadi said that the Ministry of Planning will soon define the allotment of the first year of the five-year plan and had finalized the development plan relating to the fiscal year 1990/91 and the report had been referred to the Higher Planning Council for endorsement.

Speaking of the future plan of the workforce in the public sector, al-'Awadi said that the Ministry of Planning had finalized the necessary studies over this issue which had been designed to cover the next five years. In this respect government sector requirements had been classified and occupations are being divided into 227 categories among 48 governmental authorities.

The objective is to determine exact needs of each profession and to link such requirements with the educational institutions' graduates particularly the Kuwait University and the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training. Additionally, it will enable the Civil Service Commission and the Civil Service Council to officially rely on statistical data in connection with organising pertinent training courses.

He added that the plan concentrated on skill, workforce and the necessary specialisation which should be kept abreast with the developmental plan in addition to minimising the dependence of unproductive manpower.

In conclusion, the undersecretary said that the relevant procedures for issuing the decreed law for five years plan 1990/91-1994/95 will be completed in due course.

Kuwait Municipality has meanwhile completed studies concerning the allocation of new project locations on the structural map for Kuwait City. The plan is aimed at resolving the problem of land scarcity in the Capital for the National Housing Authority's future plans.

A local daily stated that the municipality had completed the allocation of these areas on the map to be sent to officials at the National Housing Authority.

The new projects area consist of scattered areas like north and northeast of Andalus [as published], northwest Jahra, south of al-Sulaybikhat centre, the Central Prison area, west al-Fahr, west of al-Da'iyah, west of Sabahiyah, northeast of al-Sawabir, south al-Shuwaykh and Khiran.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Planning has completed the preparation of a comprehensive guide for all occupations and professions in Kuwait.

Divulging this information to a local daily, a source at the ministry said that the guide includes 320 different occupations, which indicates the actual manpower, its nature and location. It underscores the shortage in expertise in some specialities and the hiring of expatriate manpower will be based on this criteria of indications.

The guide is the first to be published in Kuwait, the source said.

SUDAN

Military Officers Formally Repudiate Government, NIF

90P40083A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 10 Jun 90 p 6

[Text] The National Alliance charter, which was signed by the party and trade union political forces, has stressed the importance of the Sudanese Armed Forces' [SAF] representation in the next democratic government. believing in it because of the large role it has played in siding with the Sudanese people in their revolutions. This was clear in the April revolution, which was announced to achieve major principles finding visual expression in the elimination of remnants of the May regime. Furthermore, the armed forces aligned with the people by issuing the well-known warning given to al-Sadio al-Mahdi, announcing its alliance with the people and its consent to the peace agreement which was signed by the Democratic Unionist Party. Thus, the SAF's position is clearly differentiated from that of the National Islamic Front's [NIF] party which carried out the 30 June coup. This is what has compelled numerous detachments within the army to work toward overthrowing the al-Bashir regime, as demonstrated in three coups announced by the government during its year of rule.

The al-Ashiqqa' [Brothers] column has received a communique from the Organization of Democratic Nationalist Officers, which now is working to side with the masses' demands for peace and development. The SAF, with all of its detachments, has now come to hold a historic responsibility, which they will be asked about by generations to come, to preserve [Sudan's] unity and and cohesion and not to leave the people's fate in the hands of a group of fools. Here is the text of the communique.

Brother Officers, NCO's, and Soldiers: The Salvation Revolution was set up on 30 June, and its leader promised us in his first speech that we were his parliament and founding assembly, to which he would turn every time for advice, and to "conduct their affairs by mutual consultation." [Koran: Sura XLII, Verse 38]

Since the rise of the revolution, its leader has avoided meeting with the [military] units' leaders for their advice and receiving ideas from officers and soldiers and has denied his promises of public leadership to the soldiers and officers. His first meeting with the leaders was after 43 whole days and they advised him in this meeting to turn to them and consult with them, but he did not.

All of this is occurring while resolutions, conferences, and readymade recommendations keep coming to us on the radio and television, and with them, continued denial of the regime's association with the NIF.

All of the resolutions, recommendations, and conferences were known by every officer and soldier to be among the NIF's programs and prepared before the coming of the revolution.

Indeed, the Salvation Council came, planned, and implemented in the interest of the NIF and disregarded the unit leaders and officers. This not being enough, its salvation began painfully attacking the SAF with dismissals, retirements, detentions, and torture. All of that not being enough either, it executed 28 officers and imprisoned about the same number.

Brother Officers and Soldiers: Your leaders individually and collectively offered advice to the chairman and members of the Revolutionary Council to commend them for implementing certain political party programs, while they disregarded the SAF, which is known for its nationalism among the Sudanese people, with its ready service to any political agency. Still, they have not listened. We have observed their meetings in the districts [of the capital] and in the Republican Palace with NIF leaders and the use of their advice and programs instead of the counsel of their brother commanders.

Officers, NCO's and Soldiers: The Revolutionary Council's chairman and members have trampled on all of the values, standards, and morals inherited by the SAF and held dear by all of the Sudanese people. The revolution has begun eliminating its armed forces by dismissing, executing, and jailing officers, and by executing NCO's and enlisted men without trial and enlisting substitutes for them from among NIF elements in Khartoum and the regions.

Brothers: The Council's trust is not in its [military] leaders. In the 40-man council, the majority of which is formed from NIF elements and which is implementing their directives and programs, you have seen enough in witnessing the execution of 28 officers within four hours of the thwarting of their coup.

The Revolutionary Council is arresting and torturing our brother doctors, university professors, lawyers, workers, students, and all of the Sudanese people in the name of the SAF, and the SAF is innocent.

Brother Officers and Soldiers: The Sudanese people cry out to you, by all that they have recognized of your manhood and strength, to put an end to this foolishness which is occurring in the name of our armed forces.

Brother Officers, Brother NCO's, and Soldiers: The tears of children and orphans cry out to you. The hearts of widows which have been torn apart and the sorrows of mothers cry out to you to rid these people of those murderous fools who carry out the NIF's scheme to remove your army, to attack it, and to mobilize the NIF's army as a substitute.

Brave Sudanese People: We truthfully swear to you that the SAF is innocent of all that is happening in its name and that our armed forces are still persisting and will not be daunted by execution, dismissal, or torture. We promise you that it will not be long before punishment is exacted for you from the criminal henchmen of the non-Islamic front, and that those in it will know that anyone who overthrows can be overthrown.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

Foreign Minister on Political, Diplomatic Issues 90AE0085A Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 3 Jun 90 p 38

[Interview with Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani; place and date not specified]

[Text]

[AL-HURRIYAH] We congratulate you on your new difficult position as foreign minister. We know that you have not yet assumed your responsibilities, but we would like to ask you, as a veteran politician, about your conception of united Yemen's policy. The division that prevailed between the two parts for many years has resulted in a difference between their respective foreign policies. Is this difference a source of unity or difficulty?

[Al-Iryani] True, the split created some difference between the foreign policies of each half. If we disregard the differences, there are common denominators in policy that can serve as a basis for united Yemen's policy, especially regarding positions on national and regional issues. There are common denominators in international relations, the foremost being relations with the Soviet Union. Each of the two former republics had warm relations with the Soviet Union. These common denominators will continue to exist. There are also the united Yemeni state's relations with the Western states, and a decision will be implemented this year to establish relations with such states as Australia, Austria, Denmark, and Indonesia, with which the two former republics have not had diplomatic relations.

Setting aside the details, the general approach of Yemeni policy will focus on a commitment to the nonaligned movement, which has now become the sole rostrum through which any Third World country can have an influence on international decisions.

The new republic, with its new importance and thrust, will accord greater concern to the national cause, the cause of Palestine, and to Arab solidarity. God willing, it will be more able to have an effect on these two issues.

[AL-HURRIYAH] You have spoken of the collapse of international political axes as opening the field for a new policy regarding Yemen and the Arab world. Do you consider this collapse a source of weakness or strength?

[Al-Iryani] Actually, the Democratic Republic of Yemen had channels of influence through international axes, and likewise, the Arab Yemeni Republic. Regrettably, and perhaps fortunately, the Arab Yemeni Republic was established after these axes closed their accesses to the Third World. Therefore, the nonaligned movement will be a primary dais for the new state of Yemen, which will influence, and be influenced by, it.

Perhaps the collapse of international axes creates a new field of action for the Arabs to defend their rights, which compels them to seek to form a national concept regarding security, development, science, and technology. These changes have become subject to a national concept, and the republic will have its role in this field.

[AL-HURRIYAH] When you go to the Arab summit, a basic issue on the summit agenda will be the problem of Soviet Jewish immigration. How do you view the possibility of the Arab position having an influence on this matter?

[Al-Iryani] First, the possibility of Arab influence must be based on a unified Arab position. Without unity and solidarity, secretly and publicly, the Arab position will not have the desired effect. The Arab nation's human and material capabilities and strategic position make it difficult for any state or power in the world to ignore it; these factors give the Arab nation its true weight. This weight can only be effective through a unified position. Secondly, this unified position forms a denominator of a solidary, Arab position.

[AL-HURRIYAH] How must this Arab position pressure international society to solve this problem?

[Al-Iryani] I believe that political discourse alone is insufficient. However, it is possible to measure and weigh the relations of the Arab nation—not just one Arab country—with each country in the United Nations and its clear, unambiguous position on this immigration. There are states with greater influence. I mean the permanent [Security Council] member countries. It is not enough to pressure for the promulgation of a resolution rejecting Israel. The measure of other countries' positions must target their positions in practice and effect. It is not enough for a country to vote for a resolution of condemnation and be exonerated before us. I repeat, the seriousness of the international position and any state's position depends on the effectiveness of a unified Arab position.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Both the United States and the Soviet Union are directly relevant to this issue. On which of these two countries should the Arab position apply pressure?

[Al-Iryani] I cannot get ahead of events, and I do not have enough information about whether some position has been formed through an international bilateral meeting. However, I believe that we are making a mistake if we transform the matter into a confrontation between the Arab nation and the United States and the Soviet Union, while the rest of international society merely observes this conflict, as if they had no connection to it, because, in the framework of international society, there are states that have their role and special characteristics in the United Nations. The five states are still the first to be responsible for any violation or crime regarding international treaties. What is currently happening in Palestine is an international crime no less than the crimes that led to WWII or that were perpetrated during it. There is no need for us to enter into the vortex of pressuring one or the other country. If there is a pressuring Arab position, the Security Council can stay in session for days and weeks until it formulates a solution to the problem. The United States and the Soviet Union each have their role. However, international society must bear its responsibility regarding a war crime or a crime that caused a war. Again, I emphasize that the measure of success is a unified Arab position.

AFGHANISTAN

High Commission Created To Combat Narcotics Smuggling

90AS0179B Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 3 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by Bakhtar]

[Text] The office of the president reports that the honorable decree of Najibullah, the president of Afghanistan, concerning the creation of a high commission to combat the production and use of narcotics was issued as follows.

The decree of the president concerning the creation of a high commission to combat production, smuggling, and use of narcotics:

Today's human society, more than at any other time, feels the unpleasant social and economic effects of the production, smuggling, and use of narcotics, which are not confined to one country or region. The production and smuggling of narcotics, especially in the areas under the control of the opponents, has increased in recent years, causing serious anxiety on the part of the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the international community.

The government of the Republic of Afghanistan, realizing that the production, smuggling, and use of narcotics go against the sacred religion of Islam, the laws of the Republic of Afghanistan, and all human standards, in observing the international treaty concerning opium signed on 13 January 1911, the international treaty concerning the production and processing of narcotics signed on 11 June 1935, and the single agreement concerning narcotics signed on 16 March 1963, considers it its duty to use all of its resources to fight this phenomenon and is prepared to cooperate completely with all the countries in the region and related international agencies to eliminate this problem.

In order to escalate the fight against the cultivation, processing, distribution, transportation, and use of narcotics, the following resolutions are made.

Article One: Combating the production, smuggling, and use of narcotics in order to strengthen the economy and morality of the society is considered a legal and Islamic fight in the Republic of Afghanistan.

Article Two: The ratification of the Council of Ministers dated 4/2/69 [24 April 1990] concerning the prevention of the production, smuggling, and use of narcotics and decisions made to treat addicts is endorsed, and the related organization shall take the necessary steps to implement it fully.

Article Three: In order to better regulate the fight against narcotics, a government high commission headed by General Muhammad Rafi', the vice president, shall be created as follows:

- Chief Justice
- Chief Prosecutor
- Deputy Prime Minister
- Minister of Interior
- Minister of Justice
- · Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform
- Minister of Education
- Minister of Public Health
- Minister of Information and Culture
- · Minister of Islamic Affairs and Endowment
- Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Deputy Minister of National Defense
- Deputy Minister of State Security

Article Four: The Commission is responsible:

- For planning and preparing a national agenda to fight narcotics.
- For creating the necessary coordination in the work and activities of the related organizations.
- For obtaining the resources and cooperation of social agencies in the Republic of Afghanistan in this area.
- For securing and delegating the help of international agencies and interested countries.
- For regulating the implementation of the resolution of the commission.

Article Five: In order to regulate the work of the commission, secondary committees and a secretariat committee shall be created.

Najibullah, President of Afghanistan

Bakhtar

Report Alleges Refugee Women Sold, Abused 90AS0179A Kabul ANIS in Dari 18 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] In the history of Afghanistan, the people of this land have never suffered a tragedy of such magnitude. This is an unmatched and unprecedented tragedy. Although we have been drenched in a river of blood and fire for 11 years, disunity is still rooted among us, and the futile thoughts of money, power, government, monarchy, and baseless presidency have put futile ideas in some people's minds. Despite utter misery, we have not yet learned our lesson, complaining about ourselves and calling the actions of others tragic. But another black tragedy and a stain of shame has been imposed on us and our homeland. That is, the Afghan women, who had never in this magnificent history of Afghanistan and at no time in the history of courage and in no struggle had been so humiliated, even in the war against Genghis and the battle against England, have suffered in this destructive war. Afghan refugee girls, to the same degree that they have played great and magnificent roles, have been insulted due to the weakness and unmanliness of dishonorable men. Our men have been deceived and have given their lives in the path of Islam and freedom in the bloody

trenches of the war, and dishonorable men have made deals over the wives of the martyrs. The dealers on the front have built houses and engaged in pleasure, making the poor widows and refugee orphans of the martyrs the tools for their trade. History bears witness that in the war against England, the Afghans protected not only their own women but even the women of the British. The memoirs of Mrs. [Sill], the wife of the British officer General [Sill], proves this claim. The British Lady [Sill] was a beautiful, fair-skinned woman who was captured by the Afghans. However, not only did the Afghans not assault their captive, but kept her with honor and chastity until the end of the war, when they returned her to her relatives respectfully, like a trust. But in Pakistan, how were the homeless refugee women of the martyrs treated? They were sold to the Wahabi Arabs and Pakistani soldiers, and their honor was violated. In the course of history, this is the greatest and most shameless tragedy that has occurred. This is a stain of shame and a mark of infamy in our history that can only be removed through peace and the return of the Afghans to their homeland. We hope to bring the voice of the Afghan refugee women to the ears of the people of the world in order for them to provide the necessary cooperation to make the leaders of the "Jihad" refuse to allow more young people to be martyred, increasing the number of widows and orphans, and to return the refugees honorably to their country. The refugee women, like any other of our refugee compatriots, need peace and need to live in their homeland. They hunger for peace, and living in the land of their ancestors will bring peace of mind and conscience. Let the Afghans begin life anew most happily and proudly in a climate of peace and security.

INDIA

Prime Minister Interviewed on Terms for Pakistan

INDIA TODAY Interview

46001662A Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 30 May 90 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, May 29 (UNI)—The Prime Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, has no objection to meeting the Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, over the Kashmir issue provided a congenial atmosphere is created first.

There must be some indication that Pakistan has actually ceased helping terrorists. "I cannot accept a situation in which the other side shakes hands with us over the table, but kicks our shins from below," he said in an interview to INDIA TODAY.

Mr Singh reiterated that India did not want war with Pakistan.

"We need resources for our development, but we cannot jeopardise our security.

"We do not believe today that China has any ill designs of fanning secessionism and terrorism within our country. But Pakistan has such designs. Its ultimate goal is severance of part of our country."

Replying to a question, Mr Singh said Pakistan had missed a very good chance of enhancing peace in the region. His government had created good relations with Sri Lanka by withdrawing the IPKF [Indian Peace-keeping Force] was trying to normalise relations with Nepal and removing irritants with Bangladesh. [sentence as published] It had positive exchanges with China.

Good relations, said Mr Singh, were built not by smart arguments, but by acts of good faith. "If Pakistan shows just one act of good faith on the issue, I will go two steps forward. But if they go on aiming at secession and destabilisation, overt or covert, that is the path of confrontation and one does not know where it will end. After all if someone keeps throwing bricks into your courtyard, you will have to pick them up and throw them back at some stage."

Asked whether the US delegation which visited India recently offered to mediate, Mr Singh said, "Mediation is unacceptable to us and they did not push it. In fact they went out of their way to make it clear that they did not come for mediation. I did not even have to mention it."

Asked about the Soviet Union, Mr Singh said the Soviets had been India's consistent friends.

Asked whether the US delegation accepted India's version of Pakistan's complicity, Mr Singh said: "I do believe that the US has exerted pressure on Pakistan to avoid the adventurist and confrontationist path."

ASIA WEEK Interview

46001662B New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Jun 90 p 8

[Text] Hong Kong, May 31 (UNI, ANI)—Prime Minister V. P. Singh has called upon Pakistan to abandon the "path of confrontation" and said, "Let Pakistan show one act of good faith and we will reciprocate with two".

In an interview to ASIA WEEK magazine, the Prime Minister spoke about Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and said that "we have hard information, which Pakistan cannot refute. India is a very vast country and nothing can wipe it out".

Mr Singh said the National Front Government came with a very clear commitment to improve relations with neighbours and added that the Pakistan government missed a very good chance to mend fences with India.

Mr Singh said that after the Simla agreement there was a period of lessening tension. But now Pakistan has been provoking insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir which has soured relations between the countries.

Drawing a comparison Mr Singh said India had a war with China and has a territorial dispute. But then, China is not fanning any insurgency in this country and "we are able to improve relations with Beijing".

He said there is sincerity on the part of China and "we expect to work more closely with Beijing on South-South and North-North issues". He said India was eager to expand trade with China and have more technology exchanges. Talking of Pakistan's attitude, he said, "You can't be shaking hands over the table and kicking our shins underneath".

This attitude has forced India to increase its defence budget, said Mr Singh, adding "the Indian defence budget is made not in Delhi but in Islamabad".

Mr Singh said, "We sincerely believe that China is not playing underhand role".

Answering a question about his Government's policy, Mr Singh said, "We are clear in our direction. We have gone firmly ahead. No government has taken as many decisions as quickly as ours had".

Mr Singh went on to say, "When you want real change a few governments have to be put into the political crucible and melted to act as catalysts of change". He said to uphold the nation "we should be ready to sacrifice the government. The journey does not end here. It goes back to the people and if there is stagnation here, you better go back".

Prime Minister Stresses Industrial Competitiveness

46001626 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 19 Jun 90 pp 1, 22

[Excerpt] New Delhi, June 18. The Prime Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, today called for the creation of an industrial climate which promotes competition, efficiency, entrepreneurship and innovation through lesser bureaucratic controls, so as to make Indian goods competitive in the world markets.

"We must give priority to exports in the years ahead" to deal with the country's balance of payments problem, the Prime Minister said while inaugurating the meeting of the National Development Council (NDC).

The 41st meeting of the NDC has been convened to give its stamp of approval to the approach paper to the Eighth Plan, which makes a strategic shift from the previous plans in terms of both the objectives and the instrumentalies of planning.

The Prime Minister, who covered in his hour-long speech nearly all the important aspects of the Indian economy, pointed out that the time had come for India to look outward. He took note of the changing global environment and said if India still chose to remain insulated, there was a danger of the country being overtaken not only by the developed countries, but even some countries of south-east Asia.

Mr V. P. Singh wanted India to be "open to technology", but avoided the word "foreign", although he implied it. He also wanted a change in the present system of bureaucratic controls, which "bred corruption, protected existing monopolies and generated delays in decision-making."

The Prime Minister listed both the positive and negative features of the economy, the deterioration in the fiscal situation, the shortfalls in resource generation in the public sector and said the Eighth Plan must chart a course "which reverses these trends. It must build on the underlying strengths of the economy, must correct the weaknesses to equip the country to face the challenges of the nineties."

Stressing the need to revamp the country's agricultural sector, Mr V. P. Singh attached equal importance to decentralised planning and land reforms. Describing land reforms as "a necessary precondition to greater agricultural productivity", he said. "It is not a coincidence that most of the areas that have not yet benefitted fully from the Green Revolution are precisely those in which absentee-land ownership is rife and tenants have no security of tenure."

The Prime Minister referred to the steps taken by his government to ensure a remunerative price to the farmer for his produce. He said the government's debt-relief scheme was a desirable "once-for-all step to remove the crippling burden of debt on innumerable small farmers, and give them a fresh start as viable productive farm units".

"It should be our objective in the Eighth Plan to ensure that Indian agriculture is firmly set on a path of rapid growth, with diversification into higher value crops and ultimately into agro-processing." These issues would be spelt out more fully in the Agricultural Policy Resolution to be presented in Parliament.

While agricultural growth and modernisation would give a strong impetus to industrial development by providing rising demand for industrial production, there were several other challenges facing the Indian industry, Mr Singh said.

The Prime Minister said the world economy was rapidly becoming more integrated, with the socialist countries taking more steps to integrate with the world economy. "We have to consider these developments carefully and their implications for our industrial and trade policy."

Referring to the resource problem, Mr Singh said the government would have to take "hard decisions". In this connection, he noted the growing annual deficits of the state electricity boards and said if this trend continued, the governments might soon reach a point of no return where "the lack of resources make it impossible for them to implement any more power projects".

He said while the government had already decided to allow the private sector to invest in power, participation in other infrastructure areas could also be considered. The Prime Minister called for a "spirit of austerity" to generate the savings needed for nation-building. Fiscal incentives should be tailored to give maximum incentive to savings.

While private savings must be encouraged to flow into productive investment through banks and the capital market, fiscal tools should be used to discourage the use of savings to amass unproductive wealth.

"It is in this context that I mentioned, when we met the other day, that we should consider a limit on personal unproductive wealth," Mr Singh told the chief ministers at the meeting. He said he had called for a public debate on these issues and would welcome their views.

The Prime Minister concluded his speech, saying that the task of steering the economy at a crucial point of its development and putting it on a new growth path was both challenging and exciting. It was a task that would require "the full and co-operative effort of both the Centre and the states." [passages omitted]

Papers Report on Aspects of Indo-Soviet Relations

Cooperation in Farming

46001655A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 30 May 90 p 10

[Text] India and the Soviet Union are to extend the scope of cooperation in agriculture to the areas of plant breeding, especially sorghum and rice and sun-flower cultivation, reports UNI.

This emerged from the talks which Mr S. K. Mishra, Secretary Agriculture and Cooperation, had with the head of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, an official release said on Tuesday.

Mr Mishra is currently in Moscow to discuss the implementation of the Long-Term Programme of Cooperation (LTP) in the field of agriculture.

The two sides have agreed that cross fertilisation of techniques and experience through exchange of scientists and farmers would be particularly beneficial.

Mr Mishra acquainted the Head of the Department of the Central Committee with the Indian Government's new economic policy, especially in terms of redeployment of investments, pricing policies, research and organisational matters.

The head of the Central Committee, agricultural department told Mr Mishra that the present agricultural strategy of the Soviet Union continued to be based on the policy enunciated in March, 1989. The release quoted him as saying that the collective and state farms remained though a gradual transformation was being brought about through greater use of principles inherent in the present economic reforms in the Soviet Union.

The discussions which lasted one and a half hours stressed the need for strengthening old and time-tested friendship between India and the Soviet Union, especially in the present international situation.

The two sides felt a visit to the Soviet Union by Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister Devi Lal would not only help in the process but also acquaint him with Soviet agriculture which was undergoing economic reforms.

The programme of cooperation between the two countries signed in 1987 envisages cooperation for establishment of 100 per cent export oriented units, joint ventures.

Soviet Economist on Trade

46001655B Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 29 May 90 p 10

[Text] Moscow, May 28 (APN)—Indo-Soviet trade must be thoroughly overhauled in order to act not merely as a way of commodity exchange and a source of investment, but as an incentive for market development so that it would suit the needs of "perestroika" and contemporary world economic situation, Ms Yelena Arefyeva, leading Soviet economist, said here.

The Soviet expert, who not long ago had raised a hornet's nest by demanding a stoppage of credits on easy terms by the USSR to Third World countries—India, Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia and Ethiopia in particular—strongly felt that future commercial relations and pattern of investments between the Soviet Union and India must become more dependent on world market prices. It is most likely that the major exports of the USSR to India will be technological knowhow and some minerals while it would buy high-tech and labour-intensive consumer products, food and raw materials for industry, she opined.

Ms Arefyeva told APN that in the remodelled structure private enterprises and joint ventures, cooperatives and independent enterprises will play a major and crucial role. The USSR will also be looking forward to establishing consortia within whose framework large groups of exporters and investors will operate, she said.

Demanding cardinal changes in the existing patterns, she stressed that perfection of Indo-Soviet economic relations would make them, what she termed, "independent from ideological doctrines and foreign-policy fluctuations of Moscow and New Delhi."

Ms Arefyeva pointed out that Soviet easy-term credits have not been effective for a long time. Moreover, the current financial crunch in the USSR has made continuation of such credits to India far more difficult.

Explaining the present difficulties of Indo-Soviet trade, she noted that the recent economic reforms in the USSR have made it unprofitable for Soviet enterprises to fill only the state orders, i.e. fulfilment of contracted supplies to India and other countries. While Soviet enterprises under the new system of autonomy and self-accounting are trying hard to opt for only profitable or hard-currency markets through commercial channels, stipulated deliveries to India are threatened with dislocation.

Furthermore, supplies against state credits are sporadical because they are determined after the credit is fixed. As a result, the Soviet enterprises though deriving short-term gains lose on a longer perspective mainly due to the reason that they continue to manufacture outdated products preserving the old sectoral production structure. This deals a serious blow to the endeavours for achieving world standards, Ms Arefyeva observed.

Small Industries' Cooperation

46001655C New Delhi PATRIOT in English 3 Jun 90 p 9

[Article by Prakash Mandotia: "USSR Ideal Workplace for Indian SSI"]

[Text] Today,, "perestroika" or restructuring of the traditional socialist political establishments and policies has brought about significant and radical changes in the trade and economic concepts and approaches of the USSR. In this process, there has been a gradual move away from traditional conservative economic policies towards decentralization, flexibility, recognition of the importance of the private initiative and motivation—an overall openness in the matter of trade and economic links with the domestic and international market. This remarkable change has brought about a high degree of pragmatism and professionalism in the area of foreign trade which gives a lot of scope to India for new forms of cooperation.

Indo-USSR trade has been moving up in its own momentum for quite some time. There is a call now that the trade pattern between the two countries should undergo a qualitative change in favour of value-added items for greater cooperation in the service sector, that is, the area of construction, hotel management, banking, transportation, engineering services and consultancies.

Within the ongoing restructuring process in the economy, a Union of Small Enterprises has been set up recently in the USSR with the objective to meet the growing consumer need. And what is important from India's point of view is that the enterprises of USSR has recently concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC), a Government of India undertaking. It was agreed that both would share each other's experience and expertise in the schematic and planned development of small scale industries, and training of personnel to run the projects. Accordingly they will establish a system for exchange of information in the area of small scale industries and organising seminars and workshops for the purpose.

Indian experts will not only specialize in consultation, but also would take part in organizational work in helping small enterprises to develop further.

A spokesman of the National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC) was of the opinion that India with its excellent base in the small scale sector should not face much difficulty in consolidating its foothold in the USSR and Eastern Europe. According to him India could easily explore the possibilities in food processing, leather goods manufacturing, consumer durables and disposables.

In the field of consumer products, Indian small scale sector is making headway in exporting such goods to all over the world. In addition to this, Indian small entrepreneurs are achieving success by way of selling small plants and machinery to the African nations. Last year, in an industrial exhibition held in Nigeria, all the machinery put on display by the Indian was sold out.

Thus we are acquiring precious expertise in making our products in such a way that they seem attractive to the overseas buyers. According to the spokesman, this surely would act as a springboard for our entry in the similar market in the USSR.

The Soviet delegation showed special interest to learn from the experiences of Indian small scale sector, which is playing a vital role in solving India's economic problem and wished to have such a model in their own country.

On the other hand the Indian counterparts assured the Soviet delegation that WASME [World Assembly of Small and Medium Enterprises] would provide the infrastructure to further develop the small enterprises in order to fight the scarcity of consumer goods in the Soviet Union.

In an interview, Mr Chakardhari Agrawal, the Secretary General of WASME, did, rightly, emphasize the factor of first generation, dynamic, young Soviet people coming forward as entrepreneurs who can get valuable insight into the working of small industries from the Indian example. India's 25 percent worth of exports are from the small scale sector.

Thus, according to Mr Agarwal [as published] WASME could lend a helping hand to the people of the USSR by locating cost effective sources of their requirements first from India/or other countries which are the members of the assembly.

In addition India has acquired a fair amount of knowledge of the financial outlay planning of industrial projects, which can be of immense help in identifying and planning new ventures. Mr Agarwal seemed confident that India could, also do the fault-finding with the sick and unproductive units in the USSR, provided all the required data is supplied.

A market of immense potential is opening up in the USSR and the procedures of the whole world is looking

at it with great hopes of promise. In addition to this, the vast natural and manpower resources inherent to the USSR make it an ideal partner in joint ventures too. The entry of giant firms in this field has already taken place on the international canvas. This should encourage the small scale sector in India to take a few quick steps forward to establish permanent cooperative ties in those areas which have been traditionally and functionally occupied by this sector. An environment of rapid change with an open mind is now the characteristic of the present-day USSR. This healthy attitude and an economic developmental atmosphere in flux makes the Soviet Union an ideal work place for our small scale sector, as an expedient impact on the Soviet industrial scenario will help make the now forming Soviet industrial policies more favourable to this sector of ours.

Soviet-Indian cooperation has been a unique example a model of new forms of international economic relations between countries of different social system. By all accounts, it has been mutually beneficial. And there is no reason why these exercises at the level of small scale industries will not meet similar success.

Papers Report India's Policy on Events in Fiji

Statement in Lok Sabha

90AS0221A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 25 May 90 p 26

[Excerpt] New Delhi, 24 May (PTI)—India today expressed its firm resolve to continue its support for the democratic movement in Fiji and urged the world community to raise its voice against the abhorrent policy of racial discrimination being pursued by the illegal regime there.

Making a suo moto statement in the Lok Sabha on the closure of India's diplomatic mission in Fiji, the external affairs minister, Mr I.K. Gujral, said it seemed that the illegal regime there was now disturbed by the strength of the democratic movement and "our support to it."

Mr Gujral said the government was in touch with some friendly governments to look after the interests of the majority ethnic Indian community there but would not like to reveal the names at this stage.

Mr Gujral strongly rejected the Fiji authorities' charge that the Indian mission was interfering in the internal affairs of the South Pacific island nation.

India had launched an international campaign against Fiji and banned trade with it after an illegal regime seized power in a military coup that removed the democratically elected government, led by the late Dr Timoci Bayadra.

"Racial discrimination is on the retreat even in South Africa, it cannot survive in Fiji for long," he stressed. The illegal regime hoped to stay in power through a policy of divide and rule. "It is our support for this multi-racial democratic movement which explains the motivation of the illegal regime to insist on the closure of our mission," he said.

India would continue to mobilise world opinion and sustain its support for the democratic movement of the valiant people of Fiji. [passage omitted]

UN Delegate's Address

90AS0221B Madras THE HINDU in English 9 Jun 90 p 6

[Text] United Nations, 7 Jun (UNI)—India's former Ambassador to Fiji has called for a United Nations study on the "dangerous," racist situation in Fiji.

Addressing a UN panel yesterday, the Indian delegate, Mr Thettalil Sreenivasan, described the situation emerging in Fiji, where an elected Government was overthrown by a "illegal" army regime which, he said, is trying to impose a racist constitution on the country.

Mr Sreenivasan, who at present looks after the UN division in India's External Affairs Ministry, is currently in New York to take part in proceedings of the Committee of Programme and Coordination.

The committee, under a project on elimination and prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, proposes to undertake studies of new and emerging forms of discrimination.

Hailing the idea, the Indian delegate suggested that it undertake a study to focus on the situation in Fiji. The new constitution sought to be imposed in Fiji would have different racial groups elect their respective delegates to a parliament in which a predominant number of seats would in any case be reserved for a certain racial group, relegating other communities to second-class citizenry, Mr Sreenivasan said.

He said that even before such a constitution takes effect, the authorities in Fiji were already putting into practice racially discriminatory policies in such fields as education, employment and business.

Mr Sreenivasan said this new form of racism, no less repugnant than apartheid in South Africa, militates against the UN member-governments' commitment to human dignity, equality and non-discrimination.

Newsmen Told of Proposed Electoral Reforms

90AS0225A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 31 May 90 p 6

[Text] The Government proposes to arm the Elections Commission with more statutory powers to ensure smooth conduct of elections, put an end to the electoral extravaganza of contesting elections from more than one constituency and modify rule regarding countermanding of election in case of death of an independent candidate.

The other electoral reforms proposed by the Government include state funding of elections, setting up of an independent secretariat for the Election Commission, fresh delimination of boundaries, rotation of reserved seats, statutory teeth to the model code of conduct and enhancing the maximum limit of election expenses.

Briefing newsmen about the three bills, two to amend the Constitution and one to amend the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951 introduced in the Rajya Sabha on Wednesday, Law and Justice Minister Dinesh Goswami said it has been proposed "to enable the Election Commission to nominate observers to watch the conduct of elections with the power to direct the returning officer to stop the counting of votes or not to declare the results in certain contingencies like booth capturing."

Similar powers, he said, would be conferred on the Regional Commissioners or supervisory officers of the Commission. The amendments, he said also propose to disqualify a person convicted of an offence punishable under the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act 1971, from contesting election for a period of three years.

The Election Commission, the Minister said, would be provided with an independent secretariat for ensuring "independent and effective conduct of elections."

Speaking about the proposed amendment with regard to the mode of appointment of the election commissioners, the Minister said the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the leader of the Opposition in the Lower House, would be consulted before the Chief Election Commissioner was appointed by the President. In case of the appointment of the Election Commissioners, Mr Goswami said, the Chief Election Commissioner would also be consulted.

The Minister said that the Election Commission had been asking for some teeth with respect to the model code of conduct. In view of the demand, Mr Goswami said that it has been proposed to make contravention of the model code of conduct as "illegal and punishable."

Certain amendments, he said, have been proposed to ensure peaceful conduct of elections by reducing the influence of money and muscle power. It is proposed to prohibit carrying of arms on the polling day.

Regarding the countermanding of elections in case of a death of a candidate, it is proposed that such countermanding should be done 'only' on death of a candidate set up by a recognised political party. In order to tackle the problem of growing number of non-serious candidates, the Minister said, the security deposit would be increased to discourage such candidates.

Pointing out the contesting of elections from various constituencies leads to by-elections and involves more expenditure on the conduct of elections, the Minister said that it was proposed that a candidate could contest from only one category of constituency.

Regarding delimitation of boundaries, Mr Goswami said that it would be done on the basis of the 1981 census. The demand for rotation of the reserved seats relating to Scheduled Castes has been included in the proposed amendments. However, the total number of seats allotted to the states would remain the same.

Elaborating upon the state funding of elections, the Minister said such facilities would only cover candidates belonging to recognised political parties. It is envisaged that certain items like supply of copies of electoral rolls, certain quantity of diesel or petrol for specific number of vehicles and payment for hire charges for microphones etc would be provided to candidates.

Pointing out that the maximum limits of elections expense fixed by the government were totally unrealistic compared to the present day inflationary conditions, Mr Goswami said that it has been proposed to empower the Election Commission to fix such limits.

CPI-M Leader's Article Advocates Secularism

46001657A Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 24 May 90 p 6

[Article by E. M. S. Namboodiripad: "A Call to All Secular Forces in India; Combat Majority Chauvinism and Minority Separatism"]

[Text] The V. P. Singh government deserves credit for holding the first meeting of the reconstituted National Integration Council on April 11. It unanimously adopted a resolution, reiterating "its resolve to mobilise all nationalist, democratic and secular forces to meet the challenge of violence, secessionism, communalism and fundamentalism."

Consisting of all the major political forces in the country—the Congress, BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party], the Left parties and the Janata Dal-National Front—this unanimously adopted resolution should raise the morale of all those interested in the struggle for national unity and integration.

But will this resolve be earnestly carried out by those who unanimously adopted the resolution? (This applies not only to such participants as the Mann group but to others as well.) The stand taken by the BJP leaders at the council meeting raises doubts.

The BJP president, Mr L. K. Advani, demanded "a full-fledged debate on secularism" as if this is a point in dispute. Any serious student of politics can well understand that secularism is nothing other than complete separation of state and religion, and that the theory that "India is a Hindu nation, just as the European nations are Christian and the West Asian ones are Islamic," on which the RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh], spiritual mentor of the BJP, is based, is chauvinistic and

wrong. The question, in fact, is not to define secularism but whether the BJP will break with the pernicious theory of Hindu Rashtra or Hindutva.

One is struck by the loud denunciation made by all the BJP leaders of what they call "minorityism." This obviously means that it is against the spirit of Indian nationalism to assert that the Indian people are divided into a Hindu majority and non-Hindu minority communities. Defending the minorities against the attacks launched on them by the fanatical organisations of the majority community is, according to this definition, "minorityism."

The BJP demand that the Minority Commission should be wound up is a pertinent indicator. Winding up this mechanism would mean allowing chauvinists to organise their Bhagalpurs, Kanpurs, Ahmedabads and so on, with no danger of their being exposed.

Let it be made very clear that the secular forces in general and the Left in particular do not dismiss the fact that there are separatist elements in the minority communities. No quarter should or is being given to them any more than to majority chauvinism. The secular forces remind the masses belonging to the minority communities that their security and protection lie in the politics of secularism pursued by the Left and democratic forces.

They point out to the minorities that by separating themselves from the democratic elements in the majority community under the belief that they are defending themselves, they are in fact creating a political environment in which the chauvinists in the majority community can launch attacks on the minorities. The fact, however, remains that the separatism of sections of the minority communities is the product of aggressive majority communities which cost Mahatma Gandhi his life.

Illustrative of the chauvinistic position adopted by the BJP is the country-wide campaign unleashed by it against Urdu. The same is the case with its demand that Article 370 should be annulled. Those who are familiar with the history of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and of the Indian Constitution remember the history of this particular Article. It was pointed out to the framers of the Constitution that, while the people of the state were interested in being part of secular India rather than theocratic Pakistan, they did not want the national identity of the Kashmiri people to be submerged in the socio-political set up of the rest of the country.

Four decades later, today, the terrorists and secessionists of Jammu and Kashmir, actively assisted by the Pakistani and American rulers, are trying to force the state into Pakistan or at least to separate it from the Indian Union. This cannot be fought back by political-administrative action alone but only in combination with such political initiatives as will convince the Kashmiris that their national identity is safer in the Indian

Union than in Pakistan. The demand for the annulment of Article 370 would only strengthen the secessionists and terrorists.

Still another issue raised by the BJP and other Hindu chauvinist organisations is the question of restoring the Hindu temples allegedly "converted into Islamic mosques" by former Muslim rulers of India. The matter has come to a head in three places in Uttar Pradesh—Ayodhya, Mathura and Varanasi where it has been proposed that mosques be demolished to construct temples in their place. Every non-BJP speaker at the National Integration Council meeting expressed concern at this development, hoping that the collective will of secular-minded persons and groups will prevail, making the organisers of this campaign desist from this ill-advised move.

On every one of the issues mentioned at the meeting, the BJP spokesman took an open anti-unity, anti-integration stand. The agreement of the BJP to the unanimous resolution adopted by the National Integration Council therefore has no credibility.

This discussion, however, cannot be concluded without a reference to Mr Rajiv Gandhi who, in his speech, rightly stressed the secular values of the Indian nation and the absolute necessity of defending them. He ended his speech with a plea to all secular and nationalist forces to sink their differences and come together in a spirit of defence of secularism in the face of the tremendous challenge it was facing because of resurgent fundamentalism.

However, his party has a long-standing electoral alliance with the Muslim League in Kerala and also in Tamil Nadu. In a third state, Tripura, that party has, for a few years, been an electoral ally of the separatist TUJS [Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti] and the TNV [Tripura National Volunteers].

Let us not forget that it was when the Congress was in power at the Centre and even controlling the state of Punjab under President's rule that the state came under the thumb of the imperialist-backed Khalistani terrorists. In Jammu and Kashmir too, the Congress party and its Central government were pursuing policies which politically strengthen the forces of terrorism and secessionism. Above all, on the question of Ram Janmabhoomi, it was the central and state government's policy of appeasement of the majority as well as minority communalists that helped the situation to grow from bad to worse. In every one of these cases, the Congress has put its own narrow electoral interests above the need for resolving complicated problems.

Mr Gandhi's appeal to the secular and nationalist forces to sink the differences will have some credibility if his party breaks with these policies. This is why the Left parties have decided to mobilise independently the people in united action with all secular forces, including those individual Congressmen who have shown in action that they are prepared to fight communalism.

Muslim Organizations Reported Against Government

46001665A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 21 May 90 p 1

[Article by Abhay Sinha]

[Text] Various Muslim organisations which had supported and campaigned for the National Front and Janata Dal against the Congress during the last Lok Sabha and Assembly elections are rising in revolt against the V. P. Singh Government.

Resentment has been brewing up for some time among the leadership of the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AIBMAC), the Muslim Majlis, the Qaumi Morcha, the All India Muslim Youth Convention (AIMYC), the Muslim League, the Imarati Shariya, the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Musalmeen and the Assam Minority Front, against the non-fulfilment of promises made by the National Front.

They are likely to give a call for protest against the Government on the issues of communal riots, Kashmir policy, the Ayodhya dispute, Urdu, employment and the like.

Individual Muslim religious leaders of various theological schools and sections of Muslims intelligentsia are also joining hands with these organisations. Shahi Imam of the Jama Masjid Abdullah Bukhari, who had dithered for some time but eventually given a call for support to the National Front has also started openly attacking the Government.

It is worth mentioning that despite electoral adjustments of the Janata Dal with the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), the Muslim organisations had extended their support to it on the eve of the elections following hectic negotiations between Muslim leaders including Imam Bukhari, and Prime Minister V. P. Singh.

Congress leaders H. K. L. Bhagat and Ghulam Nabi Azad had tried hard to persuade the Imam and other Muslim leaders to win over by visiting them frequently, but after the Congress played the Hindu card over the Ayodhya issue, they not only supported the National Front but even worked for its victory in electioneering.

The true face of the resentment came to the fore when a month ago leaders of six of the above organisations pulled up the AIBMAC leadership in an informal chat for maintaining a low key on the question of Muslim problems. This took place following a meeting of the AIBMAC. It was decided there that these organisations would launch a formal protest against the Government as soon as it completes six months in office, that is, in the beginning of June.

Similarly, at the meeting of its working committee in early May in Lucknow, the Muslim Majlis flayed the Government for not keeping its promise made by the National Front. The Majlis has decided to hold a convention on June 10 in the Capital to discuss and work out its course of action in this connection.

Around the same time, the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Musalmeen attacked the Government at its silver jubilee celebration in Hyderabad.

Indian leaders have been of the opinion that following the Lok Sabha elections, the communal situation in the country and particularly in Kashmir has failed to improve and the Government has been giving the impression that it is "completely sold out" to the BJP. After seeking the support of Muslim organisations, Mr V. P. Singh had shown the confidence of refusing to participate in joint campaigns with the BJP from the same platform. But things changed after the elections, they say.

The Government sought their support once again on the eve of the February Assembly elections and though they were becoming critical of it, they again worked for the National Front. They had appreciated that the Government had got the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) plan of the Ram temple construction at Ayodhya by giving the hope that the dispute would be resolved amicably through talks with both sides.

However, two allege, it was found not much interested in resolving the dispute. Within the stipulated four months time, which is about to expire now, the committee set up for the purpose has been able to meet Muslim religious leaders only once and that too to seek their opinion "if they would agree to the shifting of the Babri Masjid from its existing site".

What hurt Muslim leaders most was the statement by Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed in Parliament that the Ram Shilanyas by the VHP in November was carried out on an undisputed land. "If this is the approach of the Government, how is it different from the previous one? After all, who is being fooled?" asks a senior Muslim leader who played a crucial role in bringing various Muslim organisations close to Mr V. P. Singh.

Muslim leaders feel there is no communication channel between the Government and them to express their grievances.

Left Holds Meet To Discuss Communalism, Separatism

Report on Speeches

90AS0224A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 25 May 90 p 25

[Text] Major national political parties on Thursday resolved to launch a countrywide movement against communalism, religious fanaticism, separatism and secessionism plaguing the nation, and deal firmly with those who ignite communal passions. Prominent leaders from various parties and academicians who participated in the day-long National Convention on 'Communalism and Separatism', were particularly vehement against 'communal' organisations like VHP [Vishwa Hindu Parishad], Jamaat-i-Islami and the 'pro-Khalistani' Akali factions. They appealed for the isolation of these 'forces', so as to bring tranquility in the land which had glorious tradition of tolerance and brotherhood.

Janata Dal leader Chandra Shekhar who moved the draft resolution felt the need for realignment of all secular forces. The misuse of religion, whether in the name of Ram Janambhoomi, Khalistan or the separatist uprising in Kashmir, is a very unhealthy trend and should be liquidated.

He called for linking the fight against communalism. People living in poverty become easy prey to communal and separatist forces, he said.

CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist] general secretary E. M. S. Namboodiripad said that the VHP plan to demolish the Babri Masjid for erecting the proposed Sri Rama temple would inevitably result in a "mass scale communal holocaust" and that could be prevented only by a "united will" of the people.

The real meaning of secularism is "complete separation of religion and politics from each other," according to Mr Namboodiripad, who was commenting upon the contention of the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] that secularism in India meant 'minorityism' and real communalism was protecting the minorities. BJP president L. K. Advani had raised this point calling for a national debate to find the 'actual meaning' of secularism, during the National Integration Council Meeting.

Mr Namboodiripad said the BJP was trying to "prove the unprovable" by propagating that Hindu chauvinism and its revivalism were genuine nationalism.

Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, who was hailed by many for his move to detain the Dwarka Shankaracharya and foil an attempt to lay shilanyas, reiterated that "no religious leader is above law" and any person trying to "instigate" communal elements will be taken to task.

Saying that the "country is more important than a Shankaracharya," Mr Yadav dwelt upon the need to check communalism to prevent national disintegration.

CPI [Communist Party of India] general secretary Inderjit Gupta said that the idea of Hindu Rashtra will never keep the nation united as religion cannot be considered as a unifying factor. To prove his point, he cited the example of East and West Pakistan. Besides, if the national majority community raised this slogan the other religious groups, enjoying majority in various States, will consider the possibility of seceding from the Union on the grounds of religion.

Unfortunate

He considered BJP stand of not accepting the court verdict in the temple-mosque issue, as 'unfortunate.' The sense of alienation in the Sikh community caused by the Operation Bluestar, would be repeated with regard to Muslims if the Babri Masjid was demolished. Hence he pleaded with the Hindu forces to show restraint and a clear sense of perception on the larger problem—national unity.

Code of Conduct

Former Union Minister and Congress MP [Member of Parliament], Margaret Alva called for the evolving of a code of conduct for political parties and persons, which should carry provisions to punish those who are found responsible for mixing religion and politics. No blood should be allowed to shed in the name of religion.

CPI-M politbureau member Harkishen Singh Surjeet, the man behind the show, said that the present communal and separatist issues being faced by the nation cannot be solved by means of exerting administrative pressure or police force.

Call for Mass Movement

The vexed issue of communalism can only be solved by a mass movement, without which grappling with this "menace" would become impossible, said Mr Surjeet.

Dwelling upon the theme of the discussions, Jan Morcha leader Ram Dhan blamed the formation of state on the basis of linguistic divisions. The recurring border dispute between Karnataka and Maharashtra, over Belgaum, was a direct result of this policy.

CPI Executive Committee member M. Farooqui termed that path of theocracy adopted by the pro-Hindu Rashtra forces, as destructive. The VHP and other like-minded forces wanted to use Hinduism, known for its liberal principles, a rigid one to use it for their ultimate objective of a Hindu theocratic state.

Iyer's Call

Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer called for the eradication of the "chromosomes of communalism from the Indian political body," and went on to add that Hindu communalism was more vicious, by virtue of its majority community status. When all the defence mechanisms of the nation's polity fail, it becomes devoid of any power to fight the flare-ups of the 'hydra-headed communal monster', which is now threatening to take even more devilish proportions.

Other prominent speakers include former Union Minister Mohsina Kidwai, Dinesh Singh, Dr Gopal Singh, Surender Mohan of the Janata Dal, Forward Bloc general secretary Chitta Basu, DUTA president M. M. P. Singh, Congress(S) joint secretary Pitambaran Master, among the many others.

Draft Resolution

90AS0224B Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 1 Jun 90 p 6

[Text] This is the draft resolution that was placed before the Left-sponsored National Convention Against Communalism and Separatism on 24 May.

This National Convention Against Communalism And Separatism feels deeply concerned at the growing threats to national unity and integrity posed by separatist, divisive and communal forces in different parts of the country.

The situation in Kashmir has become very critical. The secessionist forces brazenly backed by Pakistani rulers are making all efforts to detach Kashmir from India. They are forcing people belonging to the minority community to leave Kashmir. They are trying to paralyse completely the administrative apparatus and are attempting to impose their own will on the people of Kashmir. To demand the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution in such a situation amounts to helping the pro-Pakistani secessionist forces.

In Punjab, the pro-Khalistani terrorists have intensified their activities. They are trying to disrupt communal amity by killing innocent people using sophisticated weapons at random. In both states, the Pakistani rulers are directly interfering by organising training camps for the extremists and supply of weapons.

Since last year the disruptive activities of ULFA [United Liberation Front of Assam] in Assam have posed a serious threat to our country's unity with the potential danger of destabilising the northeastern region. The divisive forces are also active in various other parts of the country under different garbs.

This convention pays homage to the memory of those martyrs who have laid down their lives in the struggle against separatism, fundamentalism and communal forces to defend national unity.

At a time when the country is faced with such serious challenges, communal forces have become very active. By launching poisonous propaganda these forces consciously plan to disturb communal harmony and to inflame communal riots.

They are making full use of the Ram Janmabhoomi/Babri Masjid controversy for their nefarious designs. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad's insistence to build a temple at the disputed site by demolishing the mosque is creating a dangerous communal polarisation which can lead to incalculable consequences. It is unfortunate that even the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] has endorsed the plan of the VHP and neither of them is prepared to either resolve the issue through dialogue or to adhere to the court verdict. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad [VHP] has already begun another campaign and has announced that it will start the construction of the temple at the disputed site after 8 June. The Shankaracharya of

Dwarka has entered the field with the same slogan of constructing a temple, thus further complicating matters.

The majority community, which is the mainstay of Indian secularism, is sought to be poisoned against the minority community by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. As against the secular foundations of the Indian state which alone provides the basis for Indian unity, the concept of a theocratic state like Hindu Rashtra and Khalistan is being advocated. Wall writings and other modes of propaganda are being used for these provocative slogans. Efforts are made to activise different forces which can help in creating communal polarisation. The communal organisations belonging to the minority communities whether Muslim or Sikh are adding fuel to the fire.

These activities of communal forces have started vitiating the atmosphere in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and other states leading to riots which broke out in Ranchi, Nawadah and Bhagalpur in Bihar, communal incidents in Kanpur and Mathura in Uttar Pradesh and riots in Ahmedabad and Baroda in Gujarat. These riots highlight the impending danger. Never before since Independence has the threat to the secular democratic fabric of the country been so grave. The forces which are working to disturb communal amity, if allowed to be successful, will endanger the hard won Independence and unity of the country.

The meeting of the newly reconstituted National Integration Council which comprises all shades of opinion in the country made a fervent appeal for communal peace and harmony. But the communal and divisive forces refused to heed to it. In fact they have intensified their activities through the VHP. The Jamaat-i-Islami is fanning secessionism in Kashmir. Extremist organisations under the name of Bajrang Dal, Adam Sena, Khalistan Commando Force, Babbar Khalsa, and the like, are being set up. If these forces are not given a strong rebuff they will be able to permanently damage the secular edifice of the Indian polity and society.

It was a right step that the Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth was prevented from proceeding with his plan of shilanyas. It is also right to declare that the communal peace shall not be allowed to be disturbed in the name of the construction of the temple. These efforts require a strong backing of all the democratic and secular forces in the country.

It is the view of this convention that the time has come for all the secular and patriotic forces of the country to unite and resist this onslaught. Those who disrupt unity have to be exposed. National unity and integrity has to be preserved at all costs. There is no dearth of patriotic-minded people in the country who are capable of rebuffing such diabolical forces and maintain the people's natural urge for communal amity. The fine traditions of the anti-imperialist freedom struggle should inspire such a united endeavour.

In this respect, the convention asks the government to make full use of the media to propagate the ideas of secularism. The traditions of the national movement in forging unity against the foreign rule must be highlighted. The media should help educate the people about the disastrous consequences that can follow from poisonous communal propaganda. This convention feels that along with administrative measures, the government must take steps to find a political solution to the problems of Kashmir and Punjab in order to restore peace there.

This convention considers that the Ram Janmabhoomi/Babri Masjid dispute is a sensitive issue which affects the religious sentiments of millions of people. Both the majority and minority communities will have to see to it that either an amicable solution is arrived at through negotiations or both sides should abide by the verdict of the court.

This convention calls upon all sections of the people to denounce the communal forces and to rally behind the reasonable and just approach on the Babri Majid/Ramjanmabhoomi issue and avoid communal violence which will cause untold sufferings to countless innocent families.

This National Convention decides to set up a National Campaign Committee to organise broadbased campaigns for holding conventions, rallies, seminars and public meetings to mobilise all men and women of goodwill to this urgent task of preserving communal amity and national unity.

Communist Parties Issue Statements on Farooq Murder

46001659A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 23 May 90 p 6

[Text] CPI [Communist Party of India] and CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist] have condemned the killing of Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq in Srinagar on Monday.

In a statement issued on Tuesday, CPI said the assassination of Mirwaiz was the handiwork of Jamaat-I-Islami's main killer gang and was part of the sinister plan by Pakistan government's notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to eliminate all political personalities and activists as well as religious and social figures who could help the process of political revival in Jammu and Kashmir.

A similar plan is being executed in Punjab with the help of Khalistani terrorists. The idea in Kashmir is to create a political vacuum, to be filled by Jamaat-I-Islami. That plan has to be defeated, the statement added.

The CPI-M statement said the sinister murder fully exposes the activities of secessionist forces actively aided and abetted by Pakistani rulers and imperialism.

Condemning the murder as a dastardly one, CPI-M called upon the authorities to spare no effort at immediately apprehending the culprits.

Insaf Party president Syed Shahbuddin said the nation had been deprived of an eminent personality who had the potential to play a constructive role in revival of secular democracy in the State. Mohammad Shafi Khan, an ex MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly], urged Prime Minister V. P. Singh to intervene and order an inquiry into Mirwaiz's assassination adds UNI.

Superconductivity Research in India Scored

46001668A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Jun 90 p 5

[Text] Superconductivity, known as an important physical phenomenon for almost 80 years, became a hot subject only three years ago when high temperature superconductors were discovered in the beginning of 1987. As a result, any laboratory which had liquid air machines could begin experimental work. Also, the preparation of these new superconductors (oxides of yttrium, barium, copper) were easy to prepare. At least four research laboratories in India announced within a month of reports of the discovery, reproduction of the original results of superconductivity at 90 K (minus 183°C) reported in the USA in March, 1987. These laboratories had the advantage of liquid helium machines and carried out several studies, including traditional superconductivity, at 4 K.

The importance of this scientific breakthrough and its technological potential was immediately recognised by the Indian scientific community and a note was sent to the then Prime Minister in May 1987, through informal channels. In August that year, the government announced its commitment and support to research in this field by constituting a cabinet committee under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The government also set up a project management board, under the chairmanship of Professor CNR Rao, Director of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore and assured them of all financial help; initially a figure of Rs 30 crore which was mentioned in the Prime Minister's office.

The board constituted two separate committees to prepare plans for basic research under Dr R. Vija-yaraghavan of TIFR [Tata Institute of Fundamental Research], and for applied research under Dr P. K. Iyengar of BARC [Bhabha Atomic Research Center], to prepare plans of work and requirement of resources. These committees prepared a plan which required Rs 18 crore in the first year.

The basic approach of the plan was to let the research institutions do work of their choice and develop capabilities in this new field. The main laboratories were the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, TIFR, Bombay, IIT [Indian Institute of Technology], Madras, BARC, Bombay and the NPL, New Delhi. Almost 80 percent of the funds finally used (Rs 10 crore) were cornered by these laboratories, mainly to import equipment. The remaining funds went to some universities and the other IITs.

The group of scientists, who had sent the first note to the Prime Minister, were very disappointed with this approach. Through their contacts abroad, they were aware how national programmes were planned in the USA and Japan. One of these scientists visited the USA and, on his return, prepared a draft plan for India which was application-oriented and time-targeted. This group was able to convince one member of the project management board of the revised approach, but internal tussles within the board led to the chairman shooting down the application-oriented (device/machine development) approach.

The work done in 1988 and the first half of 1989 therefore, merely reproduced research results reported from abroad and placed orders for expensive equipment to be imported. By this time, the world had moved far ahead: new superconductors operating at minus 163°C and minus 148°C were discovered and small lengths of superconducting tapes and wires made. Unfortunately, apart from reproducing these newer materials with higher temperatures for superconductivity, some scientists in these favoured laboratories made false or premature claims, which did more harm than good to Indian science as a whole.

The original group of scientists who were enthusiastic about making devices and machines from high temperature superconductors, once again sought the intervention of the Prime Minister through informal channels. This time the results proved positive and the project management board was asked to move in this direction. In October 1989, the board called a meeting in which scientists from industries such as BHEL [Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited], Hindustan Cables and the National Minerals Development Corporation were involved.

Plans were prepared to fabricate wire and tape with high current carrying capacity from these materials and to make a simple low current device, the SQUID (superconducting quantum interference device) for measuring very low magnetic fields, using thin films of these materials. The basic studies and search for materials with still higher temperatures for superconductivity was to continue. About Rs 11 crore were sent from government funds in 1989-90 on research.

Again in April 1990, exaggerated claims of making SQUIDs were made by one of the laboratories, while no progress worth mentioning has been made on this national project. This is one of the very few examples where the government opened up its coffers and continuously goaded scientists to come up to international levels in a new field of research. But the scientists, in the eyes of the public, so far remain petty-minded, in filling up their laboratories with the latest imported equipment and avoiding any work for which they may be held accountable at a targeted date.

Commission Releases Approach Paper to Eighth Plan

Summary of Contents

46001656A Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 29 May 90 p 10

[Text] New Delhi, May 28 (PTI)—The Planning Commission has ruled out a return to the regime of direct, indiscriminate and detailed controls in industry in the Eighth Plan.

In its just published approach paper to the Eighth Plan (1990-95), the commission contended that past experience conclusively showed that such a control system was not effective in achieving the desired objectives, besides contributing to wide abuse, corruption, delays and inefficiency.

The commission said it firmly believed that it was essential to review and determine the minimum set of social objectives and prioritus which should be safeguarded and to devise relatively simple, strategic and non-discretionary control mechanisms to achieve rapid and sustainable industrialisation.

A crucial lesson to be drawn from the past, the paper said, was that the growth of labour-intensive industry could not be ensured without an integrated application of industrial policies.

The paper said devices such as differential debt-equity ratio and other ways of influencing investment might not only help to channel private investment into areas of mass demand and labour-intensive production but also to contain the concentration of economic power.

It also called for substantial cost reduction in the intermediate and capital goods industries which would have a powerful effect on costs and competitiveness in all segments of Indian industry.

Stating that import of knowhow should be accompanied by measures to build up and utilise indigenous capability for design and engineering as well as technological improvement, the paper said the formulation of a long term action programme with this perspective should hold a high priority.

Another task was to explore and exploit systematically the potential both for conserving the use of scarce, capital-intensive intermediate inputs (especially energy, fertilisers and metals) for reducing the amount of additional investment needed.

The paper unequivocally suggested that programmes and policies needed to exploit the potential for better economy and efficiency must be given precedence over launching of new projects. It contended that the thrust on employment and poverty alleviation would generate additional demand for mass consumption goods, the supply of which must expand.

While many consumer goods like cotton cloth, processed food and beverages could be produced economically using labour-intensive techniques and with savings in energy and capital, the paper said in some cases it might even be apt to provide selective subsidy to those using labour-intensive techniques.

The paper said the displacement of traditional industries on a large scale could not be accepted, since unemployment was a major problem and would continue to be so.

It specifically pleaded for a review of the policy of liberal support from financial institutions and the government to enterprises using energy and capital-intensive techniques for manufacturing products of low social priority.

Policy on Agriculture

46001656B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 25 May 90 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, May 24 (PTI)—The planning commission has said that incentives for the adoption of improved technology and increased production and rural capital formation are to be the essential ingredients of the agricultural price policy in the eighth five year plan (1985-90).

The approach document entitled "toward social transformation", laid in the Rajya Sabha by the minister of state for planning, Mr Bhagey Govardhan, said the price policy in particular would seek to protect farmers from wide price fluctuations and ensure that the price they received left an adequate margin over costs.

It would also be so designed to manage relative prices as would stimulate a more efficient use of resources and improve the terms of trade in favour of the farmers.

Besides, greater freedom to export would also be allowed so that the export-import policy would not be biased against the agriculture producers, it said.

The paper underlined the need to improve the delivery systems for farm inputs including credit. The agricultural credit system had to be strengthened and streamlined to extend timely and adequate credit to the farmer at reasonable rates of interest.

These measures, coupled with the more effective transfer of technology and improved rural infrastructure would continue to be the key elements of agricultural strategy.

It pointed out that more attention should be given to encouraging diversification of agriculture into higher value-adding and more remunerative enterprises such as market gardening, horticulture, sericulture and animal husbandry.

Greater efforts at strengthening marketing and agroprocessing facilities would be essential to support this process. The document said the industry must be encouraged to forge effective links with the large and growing agricultural economy.

It said the reorientation of rural development should help in promoting a more broad-based pattern of agricultural growth, ending the neglect of vast rain-fed and dryland areas.

The reorientation of the rural development policy provided the framework in which the local land and water development works, including water-shed development programmes could be planned and implemented more effectively.

This process could also afford excellent opportunities for creative involvement of technical and educational institutions and voluntary agencies in the area.

It said acceleration of overall growth rate of agriculture was essential for meeting the growing needs of food and fibre that the development strategy oriented to the needs of the poor and unemployed would call for.

The paper pointed out that the required expansion in farm output would need to be achieved through greater attention and resources being devoted to the development of rain-fed tracts, which constituted 70 percent of the cultivated area, making much more effective use of irrigation facilities and maintaining a continuous flow of economically viable and improved techniques.

It said more effective institutions for proper management of land and irrigation systems were crucial.

The concept of planning for agriculture in terms of homogeneous agro-climatic areas must be intensified and institutionalised in such a way that it served as a source of expert guidance for local planning and also as a framework for integration of interrelated activities.

In this regard, attention must be paid to the adequacy of various research programmes, especially in relation to rain-fed agriculture a critical assessment of the programmes for dryland farming and evolving a more effective research and action strategy for these areas.

Stating that irrigation was essential to increase cropping intensity and land productivity, the paper said the expansion and improvement of irrigation facilities would, therefore, continue to be a key ingredient of agricultural and rural development programmes.

During the eighth plan, a major effort would be made to restore and improve minor irrigation works and to encourage construction of new minor works. In the case of major and medium projects, priority would be given for speedy completion of ongoing schemes rather than for starting new ones.

The paper said conjunctive use of ground water with surface water would be encouraged. Measures to improve quality of water management including more active farmer participation would be intensified.

Real-Time Trajectory Simulation for Launch Vehicle

46001669A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 2 Jun 90 p 6

[Text] Bangalore, June 1—Real-time trajectory simulation of Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) from lift-off to satellite injection into orbit, has been realised successfully in ISRO [Indian Space Research Organization] by harnessing parallel computing technology.

The system, developed at Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Trivandrum, with the help of transputer hardware from Centre for Development of Advanced Computers (C-DAC) uses two personal computers (PCs) with eight transputers on one PC and another four-transputer addons on the second PC to establish a 20 mb/sec link between the two PCs and also to perform real-time input/output functions transputer is a chip adapted to parallel processing system design. A transputer-based system has a link organised architecture permitting various topological configurations to exploit parallelism.

The second PC has a Digital to Analog Converter (DAC cart to interface with the angular motion simulator which also forms part of total flight simulation. [parenthesis as published] The system uses Multiple Instruction Multiple-Data (MIMD) architecture with 3L-parallel Fortran in MS-Dos operating system and is used to carry out hardware-in-loop simulation of inertial guidance system.

The hardware-in-loop simulation is essential to validate the launch vehicle design using actual hardware and also to simulate various flight conditions before the design is fully frozen, says a press release of Indian Space Research Organisation.

The PSLV mission simulation assuming rigid body dynamics, using full control dynamics and a wind model, normally takes about 25 minutes using traditional serial processing computer system such as Cyber 170/180 while the mission duration is only 18 minutes.

Therefore, it is not possible to use such a computer system for real-time simulation.

Blueprints for Indian Submarines Given to South Africa

Correspondent's Report

46001666A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 18 May 90 pp 1, 9

[Article by Chitra Subramaniam: "HDW Gave All Details to S. Africa; Subs 'Almost Useless' for India"]

[Excerpts] Geneva, May 17—Apart from giving the blueprints of the Indian submarine to South Africa, the West German companies HDW and IKL transmitted to

Pretoria sensitive details about the viability and versatility during combat of the submarine, thus completely compromising the security of the Indian submarine and the nation.

This information and more is contained in the secret files of two senior executives of the State-owned companies. The files—belonging to the IKL manager, Mr Lutze Nohse, and the former HDW board member, Mr Peter Hansen-Wester—establish conclusively that complete details about the Indian submarine's sea acceptance trials (SAT tests—these tests prove the performance data of the ship as specified in the building specification provided by the client) and the most sensitive data on the Combat Information Centre (CIC), the computerized nerve centre of the submarine, are now the possession of the South African Navy.

The notes in the files of Mr Hansen-Wester, who is now an adviser to the South Africans and works informally for IKL and HDW, demonstrate that the companies transmitted information about the Indian submarine systematically after each trial test so that the South Africans were in a position to follow the progression of the boat from the drawing boards till its first sea tests. One informed source summed up the damage to India when he said, "With the SAT results and information about the CIC available to the South Africans, the Indian submarine stands totally exposed—it has become almost useless".

The contract signed between IKL and HDW and the South Africans on June 15, 1984, states under clause 2.1 that "IKL is obliged to deliver to LSM (the South African party) technical documents for the construction of submarine type 1650 (type 1500 and 1650 are one and the same—1650 is the tonnage of water, displaced by 1500) as they are presently being constructed by HDW". The full dimensions of this contractual "obligation" towards South Africa have become shockingly clear only now.

This correspondent has had direct access to the information contained in the files that were seized by the authorities in Kiel when they searched several offices and private homes earlier this year. These files demonstrate clearly that HDW and IKL lied about their South African connection.

Even more disturbing is the fact that the story trotted out by the two companies was accepted without any reflection by the West German Government, which in turn informed India that the details obtained by the South Africans were insignificant. Worse, both HDW/IKL and official West Germany tried to bury the issue—the former by saying that the shipment to South Africa stopped by the summer of 1985 and the latter by asserting that the "incident" did not amount to any "considerable disturbance" in the country's foreign relations.

In August last year, the Federal Government denied the prosecutor authorization to conduct an investigation on

the grounds that any probe would jeopardize West Germany's equation with its NATO allies. A confidential meeting between officials representing the different Ministries involved concluded that "even if formally classified documents had been supplied, this alone would not have any serious consequences and would have to be adjudged under criminal law as a relatively minor violation due to the special circumstances of the case".

The two firms, IKL/HDW, lied. And the West German Government showed a remarkable lack of commitment to the mandatory U.N. arms embargo to South Africa, besides ignoring a secrecy agreement which the West German Government concluded with India in 1981. In a resolution passed on November 22, 1989, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the Federal Republic of Germany for violating the U.N. arms embargo on South Africa. In a stand that came as a major surprise, India, one of the leaders in the struggle against apartheid, voted for the censure in the plenary but did not sign the final resolution.

From the wealth of details in the files, those that concern the Indian affair have been sifted out. It is important to stress that these notes were maintained by the companies' executives for their internal records. From India's standpoint, they demonstrate the extent to which the security of the Indian nation—insofar as it was to be assured by these submarines—stands compromised. They also establish that far from ending in the summer of 1985, the passing-on of information to South Africa went on up to the end of 1986, thus giving IKL/HDW ample time and scope to hand over sensitive information to South Africa. [passage omitted]

The stand—more accurately, the lack of a stand—taken by the previous Indian Government on so serious a matter is inexplicable. Several sources in West Germany point to what appears to be a quid pro quo between Bonn and New Delhi, according to which India reportedly agreed not to raise a stink and push for a full inquiry in return for which the West German Government would keep the lid on the question of alleged commissions paid for the deal. The present Government in New Delhi has reversed all that—the ball is now in West Germany's court.

The following is a list of information on the Indian submarine required by South Africa. As is clear from the notes in the files, the demand was met.

Information required: Overall performance and characteristics (build No. 186 as built and trailed)

- Displacement—dived –surface
- Stability values—dived —surface
- 3. Draught—normal state (ready to dive)—forward, midships, aft

- -minimum possible for docking
- 4. Sea water specific gravity range—normal—with special arrangements
- Maximum diving depth—operational —test
- 6. Speed, maximum—dived
- -surface
- -snorting
 - 7. Speed versus range tables/curves—dived (state capacity start and finish)
- —dived/snorting transit (state indiscretion rate and fuel remaining)
- 8. Turning circle—dived (state speed)
 -surface
- 9. Time to dive from surface (state speed (S))
- 10. Maximum rate of change of depth—at different speeds
- 11. Passenger carrying capacity—for different periods of time
- 12. Cargo carrying capacity—volume and weight endurance
- -with full crew
- —with full crew plus passengers
- 13. Weapon firing rate—pre-loaded in tubes only —including reserves
 - Diver lock-out performance (dives per hour out/ in)
 - 15. Noise signature data
 - 16. Magnetic signature data

Sd/ Mathers (identified as a member of the South African team).

Loss Assessed

46001666B Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 18 May 90 pp 1, 9

[Article by Sanjeev Miglani: "Sitting Ducks"]

[Text] New Delhi, May 17—For the enemy, the HDW-built submarine, Shishumar or the "shark" as the Indian Navy has christened it, has become a sitting duck. Thanks to the sensitive data in the possession of the South Africans, the shark can scarcely step into the water before it is detected. Worse, the possibility of the classified information landing in the hands of Pakistan cannot be ruled out, as intelligence agencies point out.

Documents that have surfaced now indicate that information about Shishumar was on its way to South Africa even as the submarine reached India. Operational details were passed on to South Africa barely a month after the

submarine was formally handed over to the Indian Navy. When contacted for comments, senior Defence Ministry sources expressed surprise: "Earlier, we thought only designs were given away but this is startling".

The noise signature and magnetic signature of data that HDW passed onto the South Africans gives the submarine away, at one stroke. Piecing together both the data, the enemy can not only find out about the class of the submarine, but also pin-point its location, and perhaps most damaging, its identity.

Defence experts describe the noise signature and magnetic signature as the fingerprints of a submarine. Sound and magnetic tracking are two of the three ways in which a submarine can be detected. The third method based on infra-red sensors is only used for tracking down sophisticated nuclear-powered submarines.

Giving away blueprints of the submarine is one thing, but to pass on precise classified information about the depth, speed, range and the software of the combat information centre is to render the submarine totally useless, experts say. Blueprints of the design are subject to change, and in any case, always find their way into defence journals, but information of the noise and magnetic profile of the submarine makes it vulnerable.

The information that was passed on was not just drawing-board figures, but actual operational details. On September 22, 1986, the submarine was formally handed over to the Indian Navy. Details of the final sea acceptance trials (SAT) tests were to be provided to the South Africans in October 1987. So, within a month the boat stood totally exposed.

Defence experts describe the sea acceptance trial tests as crucial to the operational performance of the submarine. If the enemy has the results of the final SAT tests in its possession, then there is little else to know, defence experts say.

The SAT tests indicate the maximum depth, speed (both dived and surface) endurance and range of the submarine. Navies the world over spend a fortune trying to find out such information on enemy submarines.

The other damaging aspect of the sordid HDW drama is that information has also been passed on to the enemy relating to the weapons on board. The software of the combat information centre (CIC), which is the computerized nerve-centre of the submarine, has, according to the HDW-South Africa contract, been also transferred. The CIC is the weapons control of the boat, controlling the torpedoes on board. With the software of the CIC in its possession, the enemy, any enemy, can easily find out the precise range and thrust of the torpedoes.

Submarines normally carry a standard range of weapons but the kind of torpedoes on board vary. Information on the torpedoes can prove useful for counter-attack. With its cover literally blown, the two HDW submarines now with the Indian Navy are simply pieces of junk. As an expert pointed out, nothing can be done now to change the noise or magnetic profile of the boat, just like finger-prints cannot be altered.

IRAN

Rafsanjani Speaks at Judicial Seminar

90AS0184A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 24 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the president, speaking yesterday morning at a national seminar for judicial officials, emphasized the independence and decisiveness of the nation's judiciary.

Praising the nation's judges, Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani discussed the changes in the judicial power. He said: There have been basic changes in the judicial procedures and the circumstances of judges, along with the political circumstances of society, and it is no easy task to find an experienced and skilled judge.

The president discussed tranquility in judicial affairs. He said: The people must be assured that there is an apparatus that will not allow their rights to be trampled and that will get their rights back from the oppressor. If the people have this peace of mind, it is most hopeful.

Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani discussed the necessity to confront political agitation and the disturbances and commotion that could obstruct judicial action. He emphasized the independence of the judiciary and the judges. He said: Our most important expectation of the judiciary is that it not become subject to agitation, factionalism, and clannishness.

The president praised Ayatollah Yazdi, the chief of the judicial power, for making changes in the nation's judiciary. He said: the more we advance in the era of the revolution, the more hope we will have for the establishment of security in the country.

The president also discussed the need to deal with influential violators, who sometimes even have connections with the nation's political, cultural, and propaganda centers. He addressed himself to the judges throughout the country, saying that they must deal with powerful oppressors and that they must not simply deal with petty thieves.

The president also stressed rapid operations in the judicial power. He said: With a skilled judicial cadre, this is not too much to expect, and in some cases we have seen the judiciary deal forcefully with crime.

The president asked the judicial power to work to eliminate the defects in the nation's judiciary, and he gave special praise to the nation's sensitive investigative apparatus.

Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani also discussed the confidence of the people in the judicial power. He said: The friendship and comradery between a city's chief executive and its judicial chief must not be such that the people feel anxiety.

The president continued his remarks, adding: The managers of the judiciary have the full support of the exalted leader of the revolution. He knows many judges, prosecutors, and judicial figures, and he has chosen them with expertise and insight. He emphasized the willingness of the government and the Majles to solve the problems of the judiciary, and concluding his remarks he praised Martyr Beheshti, "the first martyr to justice" and expressed the hope that the government would overcome with pride the recent earthquake disaster, with the help of the nation.

Seminar Continues

Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Morteza Moqtada'i, chief justice of the nation's supreme court, was the second speaker at the national seminar for judicial officials. He called for speed in the implementation of the laws and the elimination of vagueness.

He referred to the conflicting interpretations of a single law and proposed that to prevent such a thing the commission preparing a law and the legal circle involved seek the views of government insiders concerning the laws.

He also gave the necessary guidance to the judicial power with regard to current affairs. Hojjat ol-Eslam Saffuri and Hojjat ol-Eslam Qorbani, chiefs of the Esfahan and Bakhteran courts, continued the gathering with reports on judicial conditions in these provinces.

Mr. Saffuri called for greater decisiveness in the police court and for the consolidation of the financial and judicial organizations in the provinces, such as the revolutionary court, the court, and the like.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Qorbani, chief of the Bakhteran court, discussed in his report the shortages in this province's judicial organizations. He said: Currently the Province of Bakhteran is faced with a shortage of judges in its judicial organizations.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Esma'il Shushtari, minister of justice, was another speaker at this seminar. He discussed the prosecutor's budget, the procurement of judicial cadres and wages, and some of the measures taken by the Ministry of Justice.

He said: In the year 1369 [21 March 1990-20 March 1991] judicial units will be established in 100 municipalities. Shushtari also said that one of the chief problems of the judicial power is the shortage of judicial and administrative cadres, and he expressed the hope that this shortage would be overcome by hiring 400 judges per year and recruiting graduates from the colleges of judicial sciences and law and seminary students. In

conclusion, he discussed the measures taken by the Ministry of Justice to increase salaries and change judicial fundamentals.

Foreign, Domestic Investments for Building Airports

90AS0184B Tehran ABRAR in Persian 21 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] With about \$80 million in foreign exchange credits, the National Aeronautics Organization this year will equip the nation's important international airports with new and modern navigational assistance equipment and radar.

This equipment will include control towers, radar, a flight control center, a national air traffic control center, and communications, security, and fire-fighting systems. Mr. Nurian, deputy minister of roads and transport and chief of the National Aeronautics Organization, visited South Rabat to inspect Emam Khomeyni International Airport and announced the above in an interview with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY.

He said: Likewise, to facilitate control and inspection of domestic and foreign passengers, the important international airports will be equipped with non-sensitive x-ray inspection equipment and closed-circuit cameras.

Mr. Nurian then discussed the high capacity of the National Aeronautics Organization's aviation and communications electronics factories by Middle Eastern standards. He said: In the new academic year more than 1,000 new students will be admitted to the aviation electronics and communications engineering fields.

This official discussed the participation of the banks, the private sector, and public investment to build the nation's new airports, as well as the government's new policy. He noted: In this regard we have had numerous proposals from domestic and foreign banks, the private sector, and foreign companies for investments in these airports, especially Emam Khomeyni International Airport.

The deputy minister of roads and transport and the chief of the National Aeronautics Organization concluded the interview by giving 20 billion rials as the current year's development budget for the National Aeronautics Organization. He added: One third of this budget this year is allocated to the construction of Emam Khomeyni International Airport, and the rest will be used to build the other domestic airports.

Tribal Contributions to Meat Markets Discussed 90AS0162B Tehran RESALAT in Persian 14 Jun 90 p 11

[Text] News Division: Tribal contributions to meat markets can reach 10 million head of cattle annually. Dr. 'Ali Qanbari, deputy minister of Reconstruction Jihad and director of the Iranian Tribal Affairs Organization during a press and Radio-TV conference, on the occasion of the 22nd of Khordad [12 June] anniversary of the tribal communities, yesterday morning while making the above statement, also discussed further activities of the Tribal Affairs Organization and those of the Supreme Council of the Iranian Tribes as well.

In a speech he stated: In the course of our history, the tribal communities have always been in a state of combat with the oppressive regimes of the time and the only government which has been conducive to the cause of the tribes is the Islamic Republic and for this reason the leader of the revolution called this honest and courageous stratum as the guardians and hidden reserves of the revolution.

Thereafter, he presented some statistics with regard to the social and economic issues of the tribal communities and said: The tribal communities throughout the country comprise 1.2 million individuals who are in the possession of about 24 million head of cattle and who are present at well over four-fifths of the country's territory.

He further added: More than 33 million hectares of pasture-lands of the country is at the disposal of the tribal communities and this hardworking stratum, in the area of animal husbandry produce about 27.3 percent of the GNP [gross national product].

Dr. Qanbari further stated: During last year the State Meat Organization, with the cooperation of the Tribal Affairs Organization, purchased two million head of cattle from the various migratory tribes. In the current year it was noticed that the State Meat Organization does not have the capability to purchase the total available fowl and cattle from the tribes and that it did not meet the requirements of the domestic production, all at a time when we import 200,000 tons of meat annually with a price tag of two dollars per kilo, while this amount can easily be supplied by our tribes as well.

Thereafter, he added: Our tribal contribution on an annual basis consist of 10,000 tons of wool, 300,000 tons of milk, and 1,500 tons of soft wool. Here it should be mentioned that the Iranian soft wool, particularly soft wool of Ra'in is one of the best in the world.

Dr. Qanbari further pointed out the increase in qualitative revenues, transformation of the traditional stockbreeding to a semi-industrial form, enhancement of animal husbandry together with an improvement in the process of cultivation of fodder as some of the measures and plans of the Tribal Affairs Organization.

With regard to the propagation of animal husbandry in the tribal communities, he stated: For this purpose, there are about 19 unions, 365 firms, and 1,500 stationary and mobile stores which are active under the supervision of the central union, which mainly act as providers of services to the tribal communities.

He further added: Within the framework of this plan in 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] about 100,000 head of cattle have been raised by the tribal people and the

cooperative unions, which of itself is a very effective measure in the way of self-sufficiency of the country. And in case of provision of adequate fodder, in the course of the five-year plan we can make our country self-sufficient as far as meat production is concerned. I hope that by merging the Meat Organization with that of the Ministry of Reconstruction Jihad this important goal can be achieved.

The deputy minister of Reconstruction Jihad and director of the Iranian Tribal Affairs also stated: We intend to expand the cattle-related industries in the tribal-inhabited areas and along with that we also would like to provide all the social, cultural, and service possibilities so as to make it feasible for the tribes to stay at one location if they chose to do so.

In continuation, he announced: During the current year, we will carry out the comprehensive tribal expansion program in the Province of Kerman as a pilot project and thereafter we will focus our attention on other provinces such as: Fars, Ilam, Kahkiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad, and Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiyari.

He also pointed out the tribal development appropriations in the current year and stated: The tribal provincial appropriations during the current year stands at 800 million tomans which shows an increase of about 300 million tomans. This fact shows the interest of the government towards the tribal issues.

He went on to add: The current provincial credits stand at 160 million tomans which indicate a 60 percent increase, and allocation of 75 million tomans in aid to the cooperative unions for helping the tribal needs according to Note Six of the 1369 [21 March 1990-20 March 1991] budget.

Furthermore, he also mentioned the allocation of 300 million rials for the national study plan for the expansion of tribal communities and appropriation of about 13 billion rials loans without interest for the cattle-raising tribes and allocation of another 11 billion rials for the provision of fodder for the tribal cattle as well.

In conclusion, the director of the Iranian Tribal Affairs Organization stated: We mainly are focusing our efforts in the area of water supply, development, raising of cattle, and improvement of the pastures for the tribal regions. One of the significant measures which can be mentioned as a favorable transformation is the establishment of the Tribal Affairs offices in the appropriate provinces. We hope through these measures we will be able to take effective steps in alleviating the problems of the tribal people, this sincere face of the system.

Sugar Produced in Chenaran Sugar Plant

90AS0091J Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Apr 90 p 4

[Text] Mashhad—ETTELA'AT correspondent:

The Chenaran sugar factory in the holy city of Mashhad has produced 8,663 tons of sugar cubes, 3,145 tons of

sugar, 6,500 tons of dry and 350 tons of moist remnants as well as 5,073 tons of molasses by processing 93,550 tons of sugar beets during a 90 day work period.

Furthermore, during the last year the expansion project of the cooling pools and installment of water injectors have been implemented by the factory's personnel, which has led to improvement of production work. In addition, the implementation of the expansion project of sugar refinery has resulted in raising the quality of the produced sugar.

The report indicates that the initial study of the construction project for a sugar beet silo with a capacity of 60,000 tons and a sewage project as well as the purchase of an electricity turbine for the project is under way.

Orumiyeh Cement Plant Operational

90AS00911 Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Apr p 4

[Text] Orumiyeh—ETTELA'AT correspondent:

The Orumiyeh cement factory, which has a capacity of 2,300 tons, started operation yesterday in the presence of the minister of industries, Mr. Ne'matzadeh.

This grand factory is the first cement-producing unit in the country designed and constructed by committed Iranian specialists and work force since the victory of the Islamic Revolution.

The construction cost of this production unit as of beginning of production was more than 14 billion rials, of which seven billion and 40 million were provided by shareholder's equity and the rest was financed by the Industry and Mines Bank.

The Orumiyeh cement factory has been built in an area of 400 hectares 35 kilometers south west of the city on the bank of Lake Orumiyeh.

The primary materials for this factory are procured from the sources in the surrounding area of the factory and for the first time 50 percent of the machinery and equipment of the production line and half the body of the rotating furnace have been made in Iran. The construction work of the factory, which began in Farvardin 1364 [21 March-20 April 1985], was finished in two years and subsequently the machinery was installed and this phase was also completed in the second half of last year.

This factory has started operation with a daily output of 1,700 tons and it is anticipated that its final capacity will reach 2,300 tons in the middle of next summer.

The technique of producing cement in this factory is one of the most advanced techniques used in the world and the machine operation control is equipped with the most modern available systems.

The minister of industries said during the opening ceremonies of the factory: During the next four years the annual output of cement in the country will increase to 25 million tons, while at present the corresponding figure is 17.5 million tons.

Our correspondent reports: The minister of Industries and the members of his delegation attended the opening ceremony of a cooling warehouse and a tannery prior to the opening of the cement factory. Three other similar cooling warehouses in three districts of Orumiyeh became operational simultaneously.

11.5 Million Earmarked for Zanjan Lead, Zinc Project

90AS0091H Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Mar 90 p 4

[Text] Zanjan—The minister of mines and metals emphasized the need for accelerating the implementation process of the grand lead and zinc project in Zanjan.

According to the Islamic Republic News Agency, the implementation of the project and the existing problems and difficulties were discussed and analyzed in a meeting held yesterday morning which was attended by the minister of mines and metals, Mr. Mahluji, the deputy ministers of mines and metals, the executive director of Iran Lead and Zinc, representatives of the people of Zanjan in the Majles, the development assistant of Zanjan province, and a number of other officials.

During this meeting, the minister of mines and metals expressed satisfaction at the implementation process of the project and pointed to the economic role and importance of its realization and said: Considering the decisive intention of the government to carry out the lead and zinc project, efforts must be made to keep the works advancing according to the organizational plan. Mr. Mahluji stated the fact that despite the existence of large deposits of lead and zinc in the country, we have been importers of lead and zinc so far and expressed the hope that with the beginning of operation of the Zanjan lead and zinc works the needs of the country for these metals will gradually be satisfied.

The report adds: At the meeting the executive director of Lead and Zinc presented a report on the implementation of the project and said: A total cost of 49 billion rials has been envisaged for the completion of the project, of which 13 billion rials have so far been expended.

He pointed out that also this year more than 11 billion and 500 million rials will be spent on the implementation of the project and said: The led project of the plan with an annual capacity of 40,000 tons of lead bars and 12 tons of silver will begin operation in 1370 [21 March 1991-20 March 1992] and the zinc project with a capacity of 60,000 tons of zinc will be operational in the beginning of 73 [21 March 1994-20 March 1995].

The report adds that the minister of mines and metals and the accompanying officials inspected various parts of the Zanjan lead and zinc project.

75 Mines Transferred to Private Sector

90AS0091G Tehran RESALAT in Persian 13 May 90 p 11

[Text] Economic Division:

According to a report by the Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Mines and Metals, in the course of implementation of the new policy of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on expanding the utilization of mines in the country, the ministry has prepared a list of 75 mines including construction materials, coal, caolin, bentonite, iron ore, privlite, sulphur, various building stones, magnesium, industrial soils, ealite, bore, lead, salt, talc, and cillis in the provinces of Esfahan, Tehran, Khorasan, Zanjan, Kerman, Fars, Central province, Hormozgan, Samnan, Kordestan, Eastern Azarbayjan, and Hamadan which will be transferred to those in the state, cooperative, and private sectors who want to extract them.

Construction of 31 Hospitals, 60 Clinics Planned

90AS0091F Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Apr 90 p 2

[Text] At the recent meeting of the legal commission for deciding medical affairs in the Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education, the requests of a number of private and charitable medical centers and organizations were discussed.

At the meeting agreement was reached in principle on the construction of 19 general and three psychiatric hospitals and one specialized kidney hospital in Tehran; two general hospitals in Esfahan; an eye hospital and a gynacological and maternity hospital in Tabriz; one general hospital each in Mashhad, Arak, Hamadan, Bam; and 55 private and charitable clinics in the cities of Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz, Sharyar Karaj, Shahr-e Kord, Zabol, Zahedan, Karaj, Lahijan, Andabmoshk, Bostan Abad, Ilam, Rey, and Kerman; as well as four specialized clinics for ear, nose, and throat, children, orthopedics, and dental medicine in Tehran, Sari, and Gonbade-Kavyus.

Furthermore, the operation of one clinic and two centers of physiotherapy in Tehran, Yazd, and Esfahan was agreed upon and the authority of the professional directors nominated by 10 hospitals and 17 clinics and two centers of physiotherapy in Tehran, Esfahan, Yazd, Bardsir, Karaj, and Tabriz were approved.

Khorasan Cast Iron Production Units Operational

90AS0091E Tehran RESALAT in Persian 13 May 90 p 11

[Text] Mashhad-Islamic Republic News Agency:

Operation of the Khorasan Cast Iron Production and Industrial Plant was started yesterday morning in the presence of Mr. Nezhad-Hoseynian, minister of heavy industry.

Through the planning and construction of the machinery and equipment of this production unit, which has been completed by Iranian specialists with an investment of 150 million rials, a considerable amount of foreign exchange has been saved.

The production capacity of this factory, which can provide part of the raw materials required by the units producing machinery and agricultural equipment, is 2,000 tons, of which one thousand tons will be produced as ducktail and the rest as gray cast iron.

Fuel Coupons for Private Vehicles Issued

90AS0091D Tehran RESALAT in Persian 13 May 90 p 11

[Text] Tehran—Islamic Republic News Agency:

The blue gasoline coupon No. 160 for private vehicles with large tanks for liters, and the green gasoline coupon No. 127 for private vehicles with small tanks for 20 liters were announced.

According to the public relations office of the National Iranian Corporation for the Distribution of Oil Products, these coupons will be valid from 24/2/69 [14 May 1990] through the end of day on 22/4/69 [13 July 1990] and can be redeemed.

First Catalytic Reforming Device Developed

90AS0091C Tehran RESALAT in Persian 13 May 90 p 11

[Text] Economic Division:

For the first time in Iran, a catalytic reforming device for transforming gasoline with a low octane number to a gasoline with high octane number was developed by Dr. Mohammad Hasan Peyravi in cooperation with the brothers of the catalyst unit at the Center for Scientific Research and Services of the Ministry of Oil.

Announcing the above, Dr. Peyravi told our correspondent: The construction of this catalytic device has been approved by the specialists of the oil industry in our country during a seminar that was held last March at the Center for Scientific Research and Services in the Ministry of Oil and it is intended to be applied in production and thus a step towards self-sufficiency of the country's oil industry will be taken.

Dr. Peyravi, who holds a State Ph.D. in catalytic devices, pointed out: It is expected that this catalyst device will soon be used in the Bakhtaran oil refinery and when it reaches mass production, the need to import such materials, which requires a large amount of foreign exchange, will be eliminated. In conclusion, he thanked the staff of the Center for Scientific Research and Services in the Ministry of Oil for their cooperation in the development of the catalytic device and expressed the hope that through the continuation of this cooperation he will be able to carry out other projects that he has in mind.

Concern Over Migration of Farmers to Cities Detailed

90AS0162A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 27 May 90 p 3

[Text] The second two-day meeting of the general directors and responsible officials of the Rural Welfare Services Associations representing various regions of the country was held in Qamsar, Kashan [Province].

At this two-day meeting the expansion of preschool training, teaching of traditional and local vocational trades in the rural areas, support and protection of the families without a head, application of preventative measures for aborting social ills were all discussed.

Furthermore, appropriate discussions and studies with regard to the improvement of health and nutrition, creation of rehabilitation workshops, attracting people's participation in the performance of rural services, and resolution of effective measures which would enhance the quality of the rural services comprised part of the agenda for this meeting. A report by the IRNA correspondent states: At the opening session of this gathering in which the general directors of the Welfare Organization and some other local officials from Esfahan Province were present, Dr. Yarigarush, president of the State Welfare Organization in a speech stated: The neediest people live in the rural areas of the nation and the units of the Rural Services Associations are the primary fighting force against poverty and deprivation in the rural regions.

He went on to add: At present about 5,000 employees work in 1,300 Rural Services Associations throughout the country, helping the individuals who are in need of assistance.

He further stated: More than 500,000 people from among the inhabitants of the 50,000 villages of the country benefit from the services of the aforestated associations, and with due regard to the various prevalent problems in the rural areas, particularly some specific tribal regions, the number of employees of the Rural Services Associations does not seem to be adequate to meet our demands.

He went on to say: From the 250 projects envisioned in the five-year welfare plan, more than 50 percent will be carried out at the rural level.

Dr. Yarigarush further emphasized: Rural areas are well established communities for the concentration of population and if we do not provide the primary welfare services for these regions, the flood of migration more than ever before will find its way toward our cities.

He also stated: In the implementation of the strike force plan against illiteracy, through coordination procedures which has recently been carried out with the literacy reform movement, the staff of the Rural Welfare Associations will also participate on a half-time basis. According to the same report, at the opening session of this meeting, the general director of the Welfare Organization of Esfahan Province while welcoming participants, enumerated some of the activities of his organization and said: At present, there are 182 Rural Services Associations active in this province and so far about 4,500 children have benefited from the preschool training provided by the employees of the aforesaid organization.

He further added: An amount of 450.5 million rials have been allocated for the continuation of the activities of the Rural Welfare Services Associations of Esfahan Province.

1.8 Million People To Become Literate This Year

90AS0091B Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Apr 90 p 3

[Text] Social service:

The mobilization plan for literacy aimed at teaching reading, writing, and counting to individuals 10-35 years of age will be implemented in two phases during the current year in the cities and villages. This was declared by the care-taker of the literacy movement, Mr. 'Ali Vatani in a conversation with correspondents. Explaining the details and manner of implementation of the mobilization for literacy, he said: The first phase of the plan will be implemented in the cities and the second phase in the villages of the country. The educational goals of this plan include the acquaintance of individuals with the blessing of reading and writing simple texts and understanding them as well as with simple basic addition and subtraction.

Regarding the quantitative goals of the plan's realization he said: The literacy movement has created the necessary conditions for the enrollment of 1,680,000 individuals during the first phase. Of this number, 33 percent are brothers and the rest consist of illiterate sisters.

He added: To implement this plan, a labor force of 70,000 persons including teaching and administrative personnel has been anticipated, 88 percent of whom are assistants and teachers of the education system.

While pointing out that 80 percent of the 1,680,000 illiterate individuals who will be educated in the first stage of the campaign are in the age group of 10-35 years, he said about the implementation policies of the plan: Utilizing the methods of encouragement and propagation as well as creation of incentives for literate persons to teach and for illiterate persons to learn are part of the implementation policies of the plan.

About the teaching methods of the plan he said: This plan will be implemented in the three ways of holding classes, which will begin on 15 Ordibehesht [5 May], person to person teaching, and teaching through television. In this connection, he emphasized: The teaching through television will be carried out over a period of

100 days by broadcasting a series of programs on the second Seema network, the schedule of which will be announced later.

Engineer Vatani disclosed that the registration and formation of classes will take a month and illiterate individuals will have the opportunity to register and enter classes at the latest by 15 Khordad [5 June] and the end of classes is foreseen for the middle of September at the latest.

In conclusion, the care-taker of the literacy movement indicated that the places of registration for illiterate persons will be the schools, in particular the elementary schools. He added: Classes will be held in elementary and guidance schools and in areas where the necessary educational conditions are lacking, they will be held in mosques, religious centers, administrative buildings, and the homes of volunteers.

First Head of Academy of Sciences Installed

90AS0091A Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Apr 90 p 2

[Text] Social service:

As nominated by the minister of culture and higher education and by order of the president, Dr. 'Ali Shari-'atmadari was installed as president of the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

According to a report by the Public Relations Department of the ministry of Culture and Higher Education, Dr. Shari'atmadari is a member of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution and professor of education at the Teachers' Training University.

It should be mentioned that the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education has recently proposed a number of other distinguished professors and scientists for membership in the Academy to be considered and finally approved by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.

NEPAL

Political Transformation of Country Detailed

90AS0177A Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 23-24 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by special correspondent Francois Gautier: "The Nepalese Revolution: Gong Strikes a Warning in the Himalayas"; first paragraph is JOURNAL DE GENEVE introduction]

[Text] The April revolution in Nepal has thrown back into question the monarchy by divine right personified by King Birendra. Yielding to the people's pressure, the King had to agree to convene a constituent assembly to be elected before the end of the year. The Nepalese monarchy would thus become constitutional. Francois Gautier went to Nepal.

Katmandu airport. The Swiss trekkers in their hiking boots and lined parkas could not believe it: they had been told that, following the events of April, the Nepalese crown was not steady anymore; and here, facing them at the exit of the immigration office, the first thing they saw of Nepal was the framed morose faces of their majesties, which apparently are still watching over the fate of the only Hindu kingdom in the world.

Although tourism has gone down 30 percent, the brand new Katmandu airport is filled with Westerners looking for exotic sights, hashish, or the rarefied oxygen of the Himalayas. A politician in Nepalese costume—slippers, white cotton pants gathered at the ankles, tunic falling down to the knees, and multicolored skullcap—haughtily pushes his way through the crowd. Is that really the end of the old guard?

Further on, in town, few policemen are to be seen and the people, among the friendliest in Asia, are going about their daily business as if nothing had happened a few days ago. At night, though, the curfew is enforced and the crystal-clear mountain air reverberates an ominous silence troubled only by the barking of dogs...

Every morning, in the newspapers, the revolution begins anew; editorial writers write editorials: Should Nepal become a secular state and above all (crime of lesemajeste!), what part should the King and Queen play in the future in the country whose constitution is now being rewritten? Do the Nepalese, then, still love their King?

"Yes, but we think he is a weak man dominated by the Queen and his family," said Keema Capta, a 23-year-old Nepalese girl who studies at the Katmandu University. "Do you know for instance," she went on, "that all major hotels in Katmandu, many travel agencies and some industries belong to the royal family? Do you know also that all aid from industrialized countries—and God knows that we get aid—must always go through the Queen's hands?" "We don't like Aiswarya," our fiery Nepalese concluded. "When she came to the hospital to see one of my friends who had been raped by soldiers, my friend spit on her."

Halting Corruption

But do the affluent, the intelligentsia, and the manufacturers agree with Keema? Narayan Shakya manages one of the most successful businesses in the country and revolution will not bring him anything he does not already have. Yet, Mr. Shakya's sympathies are with the democratic movement because, he said: "We, manufacturers, must constantly pay huge baksheesh to the secretaries of state of the various ministries, all of whom are appointed by the King. But we know that the new interim prime minister, Mr. Battarai, is not corrupt; that is why we support his government. This king"—he went on—"has tried too hard to look like the god-king Shiva (a member of the Hindu trinity to which the Sha dynasty claims to go back); he has become too remote and lost

contact with reality. If he wants to remain in power, he will probably have to be content with a representational role."

Downtown, in the Ratna park, it was market day. On multicolored stalls, Indian and Chinese products shared the customers' favors. Itinerant barbers shaved impressive Gurkhas while occasional tailors, seated on the bare ground, patched the clothes of the poor. On a platform, a spokesman of the pro-Indian Congress party (the party that led the struggle for democracy for 30 years and is now in power, in a coalition government that includes the communists) harangued the crowd. Fifty meters farther, red flags bearing the hammer and sickle fluttered in the wind, while the leader of one of the seven pro-Chinese communist parties shouted slogans in Nepalese. On this symbolic square, India and China were thus fighting to win over small, inoffensive Nepal. Which of the two will win?

Change of Mind

"Actually," Kedar Regmi, a Nepalese journalist, told us, "it all began when our King decided to distance himself from India and draw closer to China. It wasn't really a bad idea," he went on, "because India has often proved a burdensome neighbor. Its political leaders are lecturing us; its businessmen have invaded our country; its vulgar and arrogant nouveaux riches throw away their money in our casino (Nepal owns the only casino in the entire subcontinent) and untouchables from Bihar even come here and undermine our salaries. Birendra, therefore, called on engineers and advisers from Peking and bought Chinese weapons; India was much displeased but said nothing."

"Unfortunately," Kedar Regmi went on, "the King went too far: he forced Indian residents in Nepal to apply for work permits and imposed dues on Indian goods, although Nepalese citizens and products can go to India freely. Therefore, on 23 March of last year, India did not renew the trade and transit agreements in force since 1950, which give us exceptional terms, and New Delhi started a semi-embargo so that prices rose and many of our smaller industries had to close down."

And Mr. Regmi concluded: "The discontent of the Nepalese people, aroused on this occasion, revived the movement for democracy that had been dormant for a few years. Besides, the first task that our new prime minister set out to accomplish was to renegotiate with India two transit treaties similar to the old ones, so that prices will go down and the economy will revive, not to mention the popularity he will gain."

As the night fell, the Westerners met at Durabara Square, which shades the old royal palaces, jewels made of sculpted wood, the temple of the "living goddess" and the old Katmandu and its narrow streets with delightful small houses, which nearly touch each other across the street. The crowd was dense, colorful, happy. The women were beautiful, the children shouted for joy and sherpas bent under huge loads strapped around their

foreheads. In spite of a few hippies here and there, this was Nepal alive, eternal Nepal, with the snow-covered summits of the highest mountains in the world rising in the distance.

Excessive Trekking

Precisely, are the Himalayas still unchanged in their immaculate purity? According to Werner Wirtz, head of Swiss Development in Nepal (one of the largest aid projects in the country, with 40 Swiss citizens, 400 Nepalese employees and a 1990 budget of 30 million francs): "We must limit the number of tourists allowed into Nepal every year. First, the broad mass of the Nepalese people are exposed too rapidly to modern life and an affluence that is beyond their grasp; and, second, the massive trekking that is taking place here is ecologically bad for the country."

Mr. Wirtz supervises projects ranging from large-scale potato farming to model dairy farming in the mountains. He believes "that Nepal is over aided and that we are therefore focusing more on training than on pure and simple philanthropy." The director of Swiss aid bases much hope on the intellectual reserves of Nepal that, he said, "can lead the country to modernity and democracy." But, he hurried to add, "this will depend on what the King decides." And what will happen when the King must sign the new constitution, which will probably rob him of all his powers? Well, for the moment, His Majesty still rules. All decisions of Mr. Battarai's interim government must be approved by the sovereign, and the communist ministers are getting impatient.

In spite of their apparent usual bonhomie, the people are watching. They know that democratic conquests, whether the abolition of "panchayt" or the restoration of a multiparty system, were obtained by force and paid for with innocent blood shed in the streets of the valley. They also know that the army, who fired on the crowds, has withdrawn behind its barrack walls and is waiting to see what the King will do.

Awakening

After living under a feudal system for centuries, all of Nepal is now awakening. From this immense boiling caldron will probably emerge temporary anarchy; disorganized unions asking all at once for wage increases they would never have dared demand before; political movements of all kinds and all colors, adding to the general confusion; small groups of right-wing and left-wing extremists taking advantage of the democratic wind. This is what always happens when a country goes from adolescence to the emancipation of maturity.

PAKISTAN

Resignation of PPP, IJI Governments Demanded

46000137A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 26 May 90 p 8

[Article by Dr Masoom Abidi. Words in italics as published.]

[Text] Lahore, 25 May: Allama Tahirul Qadri, Chairman of the Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT), has called upon the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] governments to immediately resign to facilitate fresh elections, preferably, on the basis of proportional representation.

Addressing a rally of his party workers at Minare-Pakistan, Lahore, he lashed out at the ruling parties and declared "jehad against them." He warned the governments of PPP and IJI that if they did not resign, the Pakistan Awami Tehrik [PAT] would launch a countrywide movement in September this year to overthrow them. He, however, failed to elaborate as to what would be the modus operandi of this "jehad" and how would it manifest in practical terms.

In his emotionally charged oratorial speech he touched upon issues such as corruption, the law and order situation, rule of Shariah, the Kashmir issue as well as the possibility of the Islamic revolution in Pakistan which he termed as "Mustafavi Inquilab."

He said, Pakistan Awami Tehrik was poised for launching a historic struggle and concerted efforts with all devotion and sincerity to build a real Pakistan and make it a citadel of Islam.

Maulana Qadri vehemently criticised the role of Western imperialists and condemned their heinous conspiracies against Islam.

He also contended that PAT was a very vitally placed third positive political force in Pakistan. Furthermore, he condensed the previously announced 30-point programme of PAT into 9 points to make it brief and more effective. The points are: Immediate enforcement of Nizam-e- Islam in the shape of Mustafavi Inquilab for which the PAT was already struggling; Pakistan Awami Tehrik will completely eradicate incidents of heinous crimes, violence and terrorists activities, improve law and order situation and restore peace, corruption, sifarish, malpractices, gambling, liquor, obscenity, adultery and other social vices would be eradicated; the supremacy of law and justice would be established; the administration will be free from political influence; 8 basic necessities of life including food, clothing, residential accommodation, employment, treatment facilities, education, justice and security of life and property would be ensured to every citizen; complete ban would be imposed on the import of luxury items and small business and industry would be promoted on the pattern of Taiwan and Korea and the country would be made

self-sufficient; increasing unlimited expenditure on the construction of posh houses and taj mahals would be banned; the existing revenue system would be changed with the consultation of the people. This system would be replaced by more effective procedures of tax collection and prevention of tax evasion. Such a system would be introduced in which the people would willingly deposit taxes.

The PAT rally which had been titled as 'Mustafvi Inqilab Conference' continued till midnight.

Federal Budget: Analyses

Editorial Analyzes Budget

46000130A Karachi DAWN in English 9 Jun 90 p 7

[Article: "The Budget"]

[Text] The Budget session of the National Assembly got off to an inauspicious start when the Government and the Opposition clashed on the question of the propriety of the Minister of State for Finance presenting the 1990-91 Budget, the Opposition's case resting on the Lahore High Court's recent censure of his conduct in a particular case. In the upshot the Opposition staged a walk-out and the Budget speech was read out only to the Treasury benches. The unpleasant episode, though, need not affect an objective appraisal of the substance of the Budget proposals one way or another. Now coming to the question of the Budget one finds an effort being made to contain the budget deficit, to bring about a marginal increase in the contribution of direct taxes and to curb inflation. On the last mentioned point, though, the official statistics suffer from a credibility gap. Broadly speaking, the correctness of the direction of the Government's policies is not to be doubted, though the style of administration of these policies remains uninspiring.

The Budget estimates a total expenditure, inclusive of ADP [Annual Development Program], of 230.185 billion rupees against total revenue receipts of 141.188 billion rupees (tax receipts 115.477 billion rupees and non-tax receipts 47.690 billion rupees). These receipts exclude the provincial share in taxes of 34.217 billion rupees. Receipts are reckoned to be 8.4 percent higher than the current year's revised estimate. The provinces' share will increase by 10.8 percent, which is a little higher than the margin by which tax revenues have gone up. The gap of 88.997 billion rupees between total revenue receipts and expenditure is proposed to be bridged by means of internal and external borrowing (25.089 billion rupees and 41.089 billion rupees respectively). This would still leave a gap of about 23 billion rupees which is proposed to be filled through new taxation measures which would yield about 10 billion rupees, price increases (electricity, cement, textiles etc.) which would yield 3 billion rupees and bank borrowing and economy measures.

The signals transmitted by the Budget proposals are that a strict surveillance would continue to be exercised on

current expenditure, a modest attempt will be made to distribute the burdens more equitably and a higher priority will be assigned to welfare sectors. Receptions at hotels will be subject to an excise duty of 25 percent. incomes of firms and individuals providing agroservices, owned mainly by feudal lords, will be taxed, CVT will be extended to commercial property of less than 250 square yards, dish antennae will be taxed. excise duty will be levied on airconditioners and deepfreezers, house rent concessions to executives will be reduced in value and measures are under consideration to increase the yield from Ushr which is now ridiculously low. These measures place the burden of taxation on those who have the capacity to pay and they need not grumble. During the last two years, collection from direct taxes has increased from 13.86 billion rupees to 16.48 billion rupees—an increase of 19 percent and a further increase of over 10 percent is expected next year. This is welcome only as a trend, for the potential offering by direct taxation is very high in view of the thriving black economy. In this connection, it may be emphasised that the lowering of the exemption limit for incomes from NIT [National Investment (Unit) Trust], ICP [Investment Corporation of Pakistan] and the listed companies from 15000 rupees to 10000 rupees seems to run counter to the avowed aim of encouraging investment by small savers. While the income from this measure may be only negligible, its effect as a depressant on the small investor may be considerable. The step is particularly inexplicable in view of the fact that there are no limits on interest (profit) income from national savings schemes and bearer bonds.

Current expenditure has remained under tight control. During the current year, the revised estimate is higher by 7.4 percent and the increase is mainly due to defence (18.6 percent), law and order (2.2 percent), debt servicing (1.5 percent) and subsidies (12.8 percent). The expenditure on general administration which was subject to a five percent economy cut registered an actual decline of 3.5 percent. The decline of 24 percent in grants to provinces and local bodies will not be considered a good gesture particularly in view of the prevailing climate of misunderstanding between the Centre and some of these administrative units. While the overall current expenditure for next year is expected to rise by 5.8 percent, general administration claims a big increase of 19.7 percent. This is partly due to a 10 percent interim relief to government employees and five percent relief to pensioners. Other main increases related to community services (9.8 percent), social services (4.1 percent), and debt servicing (13.4 percent). Subsidies are being reduced by 22.6 percent. The freeze at current year's level on already reduced grants to provinces and local bodies, though controversial, may yield a positive result. It may induce the provinces to seek access to a hitherto untapped source of revenue-higher agricultural incomes. The expenditure on defence is raised by 2.2 percent which is in actual fact less than last year's if allowance is made for inflation. Similarly, expenditure on law and order is being nominally reduced by 1.9

percent and one can only hope that the situation would improve and more resources would not be needed for this purpose.

Resource allocation for development in the form of ADP at 27 percent of the total available resources is not very satisfactory (in view of the backlog of the people's demands in the social sectors), although it is 12.5 percent higher than last year's. The rigidities of expenditure (debt servicing and defence) obviously do not allow much higher allocations. About 31 percent of the ADP is being claimed by the water and power sector as the energy crisis has become a major bottleneck to the further development of the commodity sectors—agriculture and manufacturing. The railways, the poor man's transport, is to receive an allocation which is about double that of the current year, though it is doubtful if this can help cure the sickness of the railway system.

Increases in allocations to health, population welfare, women's development, rural roads and model villages are welcome, though much will depend on how well the funds are spent. Induction of private sector in rural education and health is encouraged through an offer of 50 percent financial support in construction of schools. clinics and hospitals. The minimum wage has been increased to 1100 rupees—a measure which would be contested by the private sector as it is not linked to any increase in productivity. The wage and salary increases are generally followed by inflationary pressures which are likely to receive an accession of strength in the present environment from increases in import levies, excise duties, electricity tariffs, and withdrawal of sales tax exemption from 31 items. These increases have come on the heels of the earlier increases in the prices of POL [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants] products and in WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority] and gas tariffs. No countervailing measures are envisaged in the budget to hold down prices; reliance seems to have been placed mainly on monetary policy. Tight credit control may not prove effective in the face of powerful pressures. In addition it may act as a drag on economic expansion in a low growth rate scenario.

The Budget includes some measures which should bring cheer to segments of he private sector. Life insurance and housing finance are being opened for private enterprise; tax credit is being restored on BMR, excise duty exemption on 50 percent of production in excess of previous year's output is given to the sugar industry; the panel system for assessment of income tax is abolished thus eliminating a major irritant and the self-assessment scheme is being reintroduced for income tax assessees having an income of up to 200,000 rupees. These measures have been welcomed as was evident from the buoyant attitude of the investors in the post-Budget session of the Stock Exchange. The suspense in regard to the introduction of GST [General Services Tariff], (the law will be introduced later) and the inclusion of new items in CVT have, on the other hand, caused some

anxiety to the private sector. The opposition to documentation of transactions is difficult to appreciate in the context of business principles as universally understood.

While the burden of taxes on the urban population has been increased as in previous years, the landed aristocracy continues to enjoy almost total immunity. The atrocious discrepancy created last year in respect of evaluation of agricultural land for purposes of acquiring credit and assessment of wealth tax has not been addressed. How can one justify the valuation of land at 400 rupees per produce index unit (PIU) for the purpose of seeking credit from the banks and getting the same land evaluated at ten rupees per PIU when it comes to paying the wealth tax. As financial stringency increases, as the clamour for schools, hospitals, electricity and a piped water supply rises to a higher crescendo and as new pressures build up to bring succour to the under privileged, especially the millions of uprooted rural people now living in burgeoning urban slums all over the country, the Government has got to raise more money to be able to discharge its obligations. Notwithstanding the political clout the agrarian aristocrats enjoy in this Government as they did in all the previous ones, the continuing exemption of higher agricultural incomes from tax has become politically indefensible—that is to say, if it could ever be defended in terms of the principles of equity.

PPP Dissident's Assault on the Budget

46000130B Lahore THE NATION (Supplement) in English 13 Jun 90 p 3

[Article: "Neither the Americans Nor the Army Can Bail-Out the Government"]

[Text] This was a unique budget in the history of Pakistan as it was being presented by a person whose own financial integrity, according to the High Court, is suspect and who has allegations of corruption being levelled on his person. It was such a person who was entrusted by the government to present what is the most important, t op secret document of the government. Another first, and there are several firsts in the budget that were presented this year, is that the budget was presented to a House in which not a single member of the Opposition was present.

Again, this is for the first time, that there has been so much confusion in the budget, confusion between the official written text of the budget speech and the actual budget speech as it was delivered, confusion between the English and the Urdu versions of the budget speech, confusion between the budget speech as presented in the House and the Press Conference that came a day later from the same Minister of State for Finance.

The copy of the budget speech which was made available on the night that the budget was presented on June 7, included a number of announcements which Mr Piracha denied having made in his speech during his Press Conference on June 8. For example: Piracha denied on

June 8 that he had said on June 7 that the 15 paisa increase in the issue price of wheat would yield Rs 750 million; Piracha denied having announced the change in the Produce Index Unit (PIU) from Rs 10 to Rs 400 for assessment of Wealth Tax; Piracha's Urdu speech said that the total taxes amounted to Rs 14.11 billion, while his English text said that the total taxes amounted to Rs 12.95: May I ask whether the government has now made up its mind by now on which is the correct figure; Piracha's Urdu test said that the collection and assessment of Ushr has been entrusted to Revenue Department in the provinces, which the English version had cancelled out this line; May I ask the government whether it has been able now finally to take a decision on this.

This budget has certain unique features. It was a budget conceived by the IMF in Washington, prepared in Islamabad under a bureaucrat, Vasim Jafarey, and read out in Islamabad by the Minister of State for Finance, whose fumbling, nervous delivery showed that he had obviously neither played a role in preparing the budget nor read it prior to delivery. Perhaps, our friends in Washington and their faithful bureaucrats in Islamabad kept the budget even secret from Mr Piracha and the Peoples Government that he is so proud of representing.

There is another strange aspect: How many Finance Ministers do we really have? The Prime Minister is also Finance Minister, then we have the Minister of State for Finance, then we have an Advisor on Finance with the Cabinet rank, then we have a President who was Pakistan's longest-serving Finance Minister (for 8 years), and then we have a gentleman by the name of Happy Minwalla, who is said to be a part-time Finance Minister, or as some would say, he is 51 percent Finance Minister, with the rest 49 percent being Foreign Minister, and he too enjoys Cabinet rank like the other 60 colleagues of his who make up Pakistan's biggest-ever Cabinet, which, I am sure, is substantially responsible for eating up so much government revenues.

It seems that this budget is a very accurate reflection of the government's double-faced and dishonest approach to issues and policies: It wants one thing, it says another thing and announces something else. Take the case of the General Sales Tax (GST) which the IMF has been wanting the government to impose. Mr Piracha said that the GST is not being levied, but actually it has been introduced, almost in full in the Finance Bill presented in the National Assembly with the budget. I would urge the government to read the front-page story in DAWN in its issue of Saturday, June 9. The same story which is under the title "General Sales Tax introduced" says and I quote from it: "A senior CBR official when asked privately after the Press Conference of the Finance Minister as to why the government had dropped the name of GST when it had practically been levied, commented: 'If they object to the name, we don't want to give it that name'. This, dishonest approach, to me is similar to what the government is doing in Sindh: Karachi and Hyderabad have been virtually handed over to the Army but the government says that it has simply called in the Army "in aid of civil power".

Salient features of budget are as follows:

- There's a deficit of Rs 19.4 billion,
- Rs 14 billion additional taxes have been imposed now:
- Rs 10 billion in taxes were imposed in first 'mindbudget' in Ramazan in April;
- Rs 6 billion deficit is to be bridged through printing currency.

The government says it is trying to reduce nondevelopment expenditure and putting its priorities in the social sector. What are the facts in the budget?

There has been a 7.4 percent increase in expenditure of civil administration, maybe to accommodate the Army of Advisors and Ministers, although the increase in defence is only 2.2 percent in comparison;

And the Annual Development Plan (ADP) shows an actual reduction of 16.9 percent in education and training, and the cut in social welfare programmes is even higher, 64.9 percent.

So much for the tall talk of the government to look after the needs of the poor. This budget makes Pakistan more dependent on foreign aid and limits the country's sovereignty. For the first time in Pakistan's history, debtservicing at Rs 68.4 billion, now exceeds the defence budget even, which is Rs 62 billion.

Where is the money going then, if it's not going into education, social welfare schemes or law and order? Rs 27 billion is being given to bail-out banks, e.g., Muslim Commercial Bank is bankrupt and it is being privatised to cover up its bankruptcy. It is also trying to bail-out sick, corrupt corporations like the Cotton Export Corporation, whose subsidy will increase by 4.4 percent. Pakistan Steel's subsidy will go up by 17.5 percent.

The government is making so much propaganda about its drug eradication programme, but the budget shows that there has been a 27 percent decrease in allocation for narcotics control. And the government has been talking so much about a "threat of war", although it is quite ironical that the expenditure on civil defence shows 8.2 percent decline in the budget.

I am still unable to understand what the actual priorities of the government are since these figures show that when the government talks about priority for controlling narcotics or preparing for defence against aggression, is certainly not reflected in the budget.

All of a sudden, the government has now told the provinces to fend for themselves and the Federal Government has made it clear that it has decided to decrease its grants to the provinces to the tune of Rs 4511.1

million, a factor which is likely to increase the Centre-Provinces tussle. Does this fact tally with the government's stated objective of building better relations with the provinces of Pakistan?

It's policies seem to be designed to further confrontation between the Centre and the provinces.

After having gone through the budget presented by the government, I can only reach the following conclusions:

This budget would have made General Ziaul Haq and Dr Mahbubul Haq very proud since it is based on the ad hocism which was the one consistent policy of the previous government;

This budget will make Pakistan more dependent on the IMF, not priorities based on the national interest or the welfare of the people.

What is extremely worrisome in the budget is that it shows a slowing down of our growth rate which is now 5.2 percent, as compared to 6.5 percent in the early 1980s. The implication of this slower growth rate is that it will increase unemployment and will severely restrict the ability of the common man to face inflation. As it is, while the government says inflation is only 5.5 percent, the reality shows an increase of over 10 percent in the prices of atta, milk, including powder milk for children and meat.

I only hope and pray that the government realises the political implications of this budget as it should realise the political implications of sending in the Army into the troubled Sindh province. Knowing the demonstrated incompetence of this government, I am sure it feels that it can sill be bailed-out either by Americans, the Army or the prayers offered by Pirs at various Mazars, which the Prime Minister is now suddenly so fond of visiting.

Analysis: Kashmir Crisis Bound To Explode 46000124A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 26 May 90 p 5

[Text] The horrible massacre of Kashmiris resulting in the death of one hundred and the wounding of three hundred following the assassination of Moulvi Farooq by three well-dressed Hindu lads, has exceeded everything the Indians have done by way of killings in the valley. The frenzied discharge of bullets did not spare the funeral cortege which fell down from the mourners' shoulders and the martyred Moulvi's dead body riddled with holes. The pathetic scene of the corpse picked up by mourners and rushed down a narrow lane safe from machine-gun fire, to give it a proper burial, will long be remembered as a gruesome epoch.

Bathing his government's hands everyday in the blood of the Kashmir innocents, VP Singh thinks he is averting a large blood bath of Muslims by Hindus of India. So long as the thirst of the Chankyans is satiated with the daily ritualistic offerings of Muslim blood to the goddess Kali, all will be well. To VP Singh it is a lot better that Muslim blood is spilt behind the privacy of high mountains, than near the Ganga and Jamna from where the foreign press cannot be kept out like it has been from occupied Kashmir. The Indian press does not use the word, "militants" for Hindus who go for Muslims in India, nor even "Hindu fundamentalists" when these two appellations are familiarly applied to "Kashmiri thugs." Said Amanullah, the Kashmiri leader, "If Kashmiris want to steal their freedom let them be called "thugs." But, then, so many illustrious Hindus who struggled against the British were super thugs."

The Indian TELEGRAPH reports, "Afghan Mujahideen do not conceal that they train thugs from Kashmir." It quotes Boris Ban, a news analyst of the Soviet media as saying, "Emergence of the Afghan hand in Kashmir is a logical sequence to the training that Mujahideen have received and the skills they have acquired in fighting against army units. Now, this experience is being shared with the Kashmiris."

Let it be remembered that Afghan freedom fighters battled against a superpower whose army, if fully used, is three times larger than India's. And the Mujahideen threw the superpower out.

Yet with a deceptive complacence, Indian commentators, posing as fair analysts and rational thinkers, while blaming the Indian government for bringing a misfortune on itself in Kashmir, have no doubt whatever that nothing can take Kashmir away from India. Wanting to regain the 'Paradise Lost,' Darshan Singh writing in the TRIBUNE has inextricably sealed Kashmir's destiny as bound with India's Says he: "Kashmir's destiny is sealed, sealed with India and sealed in trust."

He has apparently, no comments on his own community's demand, aired by Mr Mann, the Akali Dal leader, in April, demanding a plebiscite for the creation of a Sikh state. Darshan Singh then returns to the familiar theme always flaunted at Pakistan: "It does not require a crystal gazer to see that should Kashmir be lost to India—a very remote possibility—Hindu backlash is bound to result in untold miseries for India Muslims and a repeat of the 1947 exodus is likely to drown Pakistan in a sea of human misery and leave behind no civil state (Pakistan) as such, Hindu fascism—will then be calling all the shots."

Darshan Sindh may be right about Hindu reaction but India, as a "secular" state and Hindu "Dharm" as well as, as many Hindus as Muslims, will die with the latter. Darshan is wrong in comparing the Sind situation with Kashmir's. In Kashmir, an outsider, having a different religion, arbitrarily occupied a Muslim majority area which by the ground rules of the partition plan should have gone to Pakistan. Sindh is a part of Pakistan and was the first province to vote for its merger with the latter. If Darshan Singh claims that "accession cannot be undone" with such a tongue-in-cheek ignoring of historic compulsions, he has no right to hope that ethnicity will break Pakistan apart.

There is, however, an unwitting encouragement concealed in Darshan Singh's article. He talks of 9.5 million AK-47 rifles and ammunition available with the people of Pakistan. This makes our country having the biggest regular and irregular armed force in history—outnumbering the Chinese, Russian, Indian and American armies put together. The firing capability of this missilery would be 95 billion rounds per minute.

A pleasant diversion from his bellicose articulations against Pakistan was Rajiv Gandhi's accusing the government of deliberately igniting Hindu chauvinism and fearing the fire will consume everything India has stood for, including secularism. He was particularly critical of a minority government playing with the country's fortune in order to establish itself in power which can slip away from it through constitutional parliamentary pressure building up against it. Mr Gandhi thinks the Kashmir tragedy has been provoked through incompetent handling and has, in the background, deliberate diversionary tactics on the part of the government to silence its critics demanding administrative improvement and an end to seething corruption eating into the body politic. Not only into the body politic, but also the Indian military whose corrupt practices were barred by the Bofors' scandala, touching the civil as well as the military. There was an attempt to involve Gandhi in the solution of the Kashmir problem by dispatching him to Srinagar where he was treated in a cavalier manner by Jagmohan. Rajiv came back cursing Jagmohan and predicting the Kashmiri struggle continuing indefinitely.

The U.S. President's emissary came and went without the slightest response from VP Singh. The problem is VP is landed with a crisis of inertia which does not allow him to move towards any constructive direction. He is spell-bound both by the continuing build-up of the Kashmir revolution and the audacity with which Pakistan is going ahead with its propaganda against Indian atrocities. India has moved through a friendly Arab country to get the OIC [Organization of Islamic Conference] meeting postponed, although no confirmation of this has been issued from OIC head-quarters. India hopes through such a postponement to withhold the declaration of united Arab support for Pakistan over Kashmir. Western Europe, including Britain has already expressed its neutral stance over the issue.

Such international attitudes will bring the matter back to square one, entirely to India's liking, but this will not solve anything. By twisted logic India wants Pakistan to discuss mutual problems but does not agree to talk at all about Kashmir. It regards it as an achievement that Pakistan's Foreign Minister in his meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister in New York, docilely agreed to return to Indira Gandhi's dogmatic formula that problems between the two countries should be taken up issue by issue at Secretary's level. It needs reminding that the Secretaries' several meeting have not yet reached the stage of culmination. India wants such minor discussions to continue "to improve the atmosphere."

Darshan Singh in his article has quoted the physics theory of "criticality" to assert that this must result in explosion. He couldn't be more accurate.

Article Questions Need for New Political Party 46000132B Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 8 Jun 90 p 6

[Article: "The Third Force: Or Another Farce"]

[Text] What a swank name, really, The Third Force! Makes you think of The Third World or The Third Reich. Even if it reminded you of the Third Sex it would still be interesting and make you sit up and take notice. You may take me for a Cassandra, but I can bet my last teddy paisa on the fact that, as a political party, The Third Force will be born in the newspapers and die there—probably thrown on a dung heap wrapped in the latest issue of the most widely read paper in the country.

But what good is a political party which is born with complexes? Did you notice how the midwives wavered over the word "labour"? I know it for certain that the word they wanted was "liberal", but somehow that has come to acquire an un-Islamic or irreligious connotation. In Pakistan, to be liberal means to tolerate many things which the religious establishment frowns upon. While the blasted kid is still to be born and the midwives are at it—it is not easy to give birth to a new political party; after all it is now a new Muslim League which can come into being in a trice—they are inhibited by so many considerations. For one, the word labour deceives no one these days—labour of all.

For the life of me I wasn't able to think up the names of all the political parents who are anxious to father the new baby. Nawab Bugti is there of course. He is the only one who has the proper credentials, being foreign qualified. (If you can get a certificate from Emma Duncan that you have never indulged in religion, it is far more effective than an adverse fatwa from local maulvis and is equivalent to an Oxford degree in secularism). If he can see the party through—and he is the only one who has the guts to do so—one can be reasonably sure that the brat will not be still-born. Who knows, even Mr Hanif Ramay may be tempted to join it one day.

Who else is there? Ah, the good old Air Marshal. My problem with the AM is that I have a sort of grudging respect for him. Not for his politics though, of which he has none, but for the aura of integrity which continues to stick to him despite his efforts to shake it off. I'm afraid there is no future for him in Pakistan. He is too old to be an airline pilot, and despite being kept a closely guarded secret his penchant for tyranny within the party keeps leading out. He would make a good sort of Revered Billy Graham—if you can have that sort of institution in Pakistan—but that would mean giving Islam another spokesman, and that is one thing Islam can do without.

Ladies first! Begum Abida Husain's name should have come first, and I hasten to apologise. But putting her at the top would have meant confusing her with the chief midwife, and that would ahve been resented by Mr Bugti the LHV (the Lady Health Visitor in this case). Syed Fakhar Imam of course gets in free with his spouse (after all there are some advantages in being a husband, and a political one at that). I have never had the pleasure of discussing their politics with the couple but I do happen to know that they too are sincere in having a Third Force in the country, since there is nothing new left to say in the First Two Forces. And who listens to you anyway even if you can find something novel to say, now that all the invectives too have been exhausted.

And now to come to the nub of the whole affair. Despite the inherent humour in the fact of anyone in Pakistan trying to set up a new political party in the presence of seventy-three others, there is a serious aspect to this incipient Labour Party. It seems to have a purpose, and the purpose is to keep religion out of it. Not even the Pakistan People's Party could do that; and that too at a time in 1970 when it really could if it wanted to. The Third Force midwives are all agreed to the point that its manifesto should be totally secular. The Air Marshal has already shown that this can be done. Even Professor Doctor Maulana Tahirul Oadri resisted attempts to replace Awami with Islami when he formed his PAT [Pakistan Awami Tehrik] party. In drawing rooms, in private discussions, in informal talks they are all united (may be the only point on which they are united) that religion should have nothing to do with the new party's thoughts and actions. The nub is—are they going to succeed in that? And if they indeed do, then what is it that they are going to offer to the people in place of Islam? In a way this is going to be a turning point in the history of formation of political parties in Pakistan.

They need not worry about the end when it comes. You can always catch a few strangers from near the graveyard for the funeral prayer. They don't have to be told that the dead body is that of an infidel.

Article Details JVP Insurrection 1987-'89

46000135 Colombo THE ISLAND in English 6, 8, 19 Jun 90

[Article by C.A. Chandraprema]

[6 Jun p 7]

[Text]

The Military Streamlines Operations

Maj Gen Cecil Waidyaratne was the most senior officer of the Armed services in the anti-JVP [Janata Vimukthi Peramuna] thrust. The Operations Combine which he headed had unadulterated control over the security forces in Colombo. The "Ops Combine" as it is popularly known, was started in November 1987 to take over the security of the Colombo district after the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. This new organisation was meant to co-ordinate the Army, Navy, Airforce and Police activity

in the Colombo district. The first commander of this outfit was Brig Vijaya Wimalaratne. The Ops Combine had 36 platoons assigned to it originally. In mid-1988, this was increased to 58 platoons. During this period the forces generally went slow on the JVP. One officer described it as a result of the "fall out mentality" after the cessation of hostilities in the North. "Operation Liberation" in Vadamarachchi had been halted in its tracks and the soldiers sent back to barracks after the Indo-Lanka Accord. This had resulted in quite a lot of disillusionment and lack of faith in the government's commitment, which the service personnel felt, did not match their own. Hence during the initial stages, some officers had to go from camp to camp explaining to the soldiers, why the Northern operations had to be stopped and their duties as soldiers in the new situation. As we noted earlier, this was a period when the JVP's propaganda offensive was at its zenith and they constantly harped on the way the government sent the soldiers back to barracks at the height of the northern war. Hence it was no easy task to get the soldiers round to face the new situation.

The emphasis during the initial stage had been to protect the public and keep the essential services running. After the initial spate of VIP assassinations three man teams were deployed at every junction so as to discourage gunmen from taking up positions at such places. During the elections in 1988, the Ops Combine had been mainly concerned with containment-not attack. Most of the JVP's peripheral caders had adopted the strategy of leaning against the established parties for cover and hence any operations would have created a dicy situation. During this period, the main area of JVP concentration was the Piliyandala, Homagama, Hokandara, Kahatuduwa circle. Attempts were made quite early on by the Ops Combine with Col Janaka Perera's leadership to clean up this crucial area. Based on the Matthegoda Army Camp where Col Janaka Perera was the commanding officer, a thrust was launched all over this area. A large number of suspects were held at the Tyronne Fernando Stadium in Moratuwa, but quite a number were released later in January 1989 as a goodwill measure to get the JVP to the negotiating table.

The Ops Combine operated in a series of stages. Stage Green was whom the police controlled security and the army stood by. Stage Purple was whom the Army comes out in assistance to Police. Stage Red was whom the Army was fully deployed and in charge of the situation. The period following the Presidential and Parliamentary election was "green" until July 1989. In mid 1989, there were some changes made in the Army Command structure which streamlined operations and was the key to the successes recorded towards the end of the year. The country was divided into three area commands. Area one was placed under Gen Cecil Waidyaratne which comprised the Western Province less Colombo district which was under the Ops Combine and the Southern, Sabaragamuwa and Uva Provinces. Area two comprised the North central, Central and North-Western Provinces and came under Brig Vajaya

Wimalaratne. Brig Wimalaratne relinquished duties as the commander of the Ops Combine to take up the new command. Area three comprised the Northern and Eastern Provinces and came under Maj Gen Stanley Silva.

In July, Maj Gen Cecil Waidyaratne had been asked by President Premadasa, to take over the security of Colombo. Gen Waidyaratne had requested that he be given unadulterated control over the Ops Combine without anybody being able to give direct order to the Ops Combine without his mediation. Earlier, three authorities had the power to issue orders to the Ops Combine: the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, the Operational Headquarters of the Defence Ministry (formerly known as the Joint Operations Command) and Army Headquarters. Gen Waidyaratne wanted control over the Ops Combine to be centralised under him. After some delay and exchange of letters this was achieved. And on 4 August, the Ops Combine became operational under the new command. In view of the importance of Colombo lots of facilities were placed at the disposal of the Ops Combine. One hundred platoons drawn from the Army, Navy and airforce were placed under the new Command. In addition to this, the entire RDF regiment was deployed in Colombo. Ten handpicked officers from the Army were put in charge of intelligence under Brig Algama. Col Janaka Perera was in charge of special operations. It was the RDF, Col Janaka Perera's special teams and the Ops Combine "I" section that did most of the "cleaning up" in Colombo.

In the running of the Ops Combine, Gen Waidyaratne had to work in close liaison with Mr Sirisena Cooray who had been appointed by the President as the political co-ordinating authority. At the first meeting of the new Ops Combine Command, Mr Ranjan Wijeratne had told those assembled... "You all have undertaken to do this and that... I don't know...but be careful, if you fail, your necks will get cut."

Subsequent to the capture of the JVP leadership, it was thought that the Ops Combine was responsible for everything. This was not correct. The Ops Combine controlled Colombo and all events in the country had a tendency to centre on Colombo. Thus the Ops Combine was at the centre of all happenings. But a lot of work was done by Police operatives, too. The Police captured Gunaratne Wanasinghe, Saman Piyasiri Fernando, Lalith Wijeratne and Nandatillake Galappathi in addition to numerous other lesser leaders and activists. In other areas, too, the various Police and Army teams operated successfully.

But the senior officers of the Ops Combine did their duties as soldiers and facilitated and gave encouragement to the anti-JVP thrust. And the bulk of the work was done by the Army. Thus, they ran the risk of being marked out by the JVP as their most dangerous enemies.

Raja Mahattaya, the Colombo District division two leader had been arrested by the RDF in October 1989. The young lieutenant who had mounted the operation had raided the house a few hours too early and they missed D. M. Ananda who also used to stay at the same house. The house at which Raja Mahattaya was found had been large and well

appointed with modern facilities. Raja Mahattaya had even fancier meeting places in Colombo 7 where he had frightened several rich mudalalis into giving him their houses for his clandestine meetings. He had also been frequently seen at the stately home of a certain opposition politician whose servant's quarters had been a JVP den. The JVP always had a panache for making public proclamations about their honesty, dedication and frugality of life style. In a DJV leaflet dated as late as 10 September 1989 addressed to all judicial officers, the JVP stated that "they need no mansions, they have no vehicles and have no personal luxuries. Their only hope is to completely change this inequitable social system." Two months later, the State TV showed publicly the mansions, cars and the personal luxuries including Israeli manufactured aphrodisiacs used by the top JVP leadership.

Later, through information received from Raja Mahattaya and others, the RDF was once again able to trace D. M. Ananda and arrest him in the Ratnapura area to which he had fled. Owing to the islandwide onslaught against the JVP, their hiding places had become restricted as no ordinary person would be willing to accommodate them. And they had to make do with places already available.

The JVP's grip on the masses had visibly weakened by this time. No amount of threats by the JVP could prevent the first Presidential Mobile Ministry which was held on 2 November 1989 at Rahula College, Matara. People turned up in their thousands. A few months earlier, a JVP threat would have elicited almost total compliance.

D. M. Ananda was functionally the No 1 in the JVP. The Politbureau never met in full session. They got together only in two's or three's. It was Ananda who conveyed decisions from one group to another. This when combined with his other functions as the political—cum—military leader of the Colombo/Sabaragamuwa area, the leader of the Bhikku, women's and workers' fronts and the leader of the Jathika Kamkaru Satan madyasthanaya, made him the single most powerful person in the organisation. This is not to say that Wijeweera was superseded as the charismatic leader of the movement. But Ananda's sphere of responsibility in the organisation was much larger than Wijeweera's. A hardworking man, Ananda had slaved indefatigably to build up the movement. Many of the others appear to have grown fat and lazy with the influx of money into the movement. And their grip on the organisation had also loosened thus giving rise to a kind of anarchy within their own ranks.

[8 Jun p 9]

[Text]

Collective Suicide of a Generation

About 40,000 people on both sides lost their lives during the JVP insurrection 1987-89. Some feel that the number killed was much larger. But though there were a few spectacular massacres like at Menikhinna where over 200 people were killed such occurrences were rare and the numbers killed at any single place rarely exceeded a

dozen at a time. Most of the killings by the security forces and the vigilantes were concentrated in the six months between and including August 1989 and January 1990. During this period, at least 15,000 people lost their lives. On any given month, the number of killings rarely fell below 1500.

In the preceding two years between August 1987 and July 1989, security forces activity was not very intense and nothing more than 8,000 killings were done by them in the entire two years. This in fact was one factor which went against the JVP in the end. During the period when security forces activity was lax, they became bolder and bolder and some of their activists began to work openly in their work places and villages. By the time the security forces began their activity, quite a lot of JVP cadres had exposed themselves and had nowhere to hide. Thus about 23,000 killings can be attributed to the security forces and the "vigilantes." Over the two and a half year period of the insurrection, the JVP finished off about 17,000 people. The many hundreds of people who were gunned down by the security forces during the forced marches organised by the JVP should actually be included in the JVP's lot because this was a deliberate policy to get the security forces to fire on a human buffer and thereby kill ordinary citizens and as they hoped, to build up resentment against the security forces. Such a strategy was carried out by the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] in the North against both the Sri lankan security forces and the IPKF [Indian Peacekeeping Force]. Thereby the LTTE was able to turn public opinion against their enemy. The JVP was adopting a similar method and the deaths resulting therefrom should in all fairness be attributed to them. In addition to this loss of human life, billions of rupees worth of property was destroyed during the two and a half year madness.

If one asks what drove so many young men and women to the JVP, the answer is simple—it is unemployment. For many years, the economy has not been able to absorb the yearly inflow into the labour market. Unemployment is now estimated to be well over 20 percent of the employable population. It could even be as high as 25 percent. Accurate statistics are not available. But empirical evidence speaks volumes. There was also the psychological factor. The hopes and aspirations created by the new vistas opened up by the post-77 economic policy and the envy and anger of those who could not make it. There was also the social fall out resulting from the enthronement of the English language. The loss of prestige and employment prospects resulting from this drove many into the arms of the JVP.

In his 1977 novel "Asatya Kathavak" Gunadasa Amarasekera has described the mind set of the JVP as a "suicidal mania." He characterises the revolutionary as an individual who sometimes takes to the path of violent revolution due to existential reasons which have no relation to social problems or realities. For instance, the trauma of the break up of a love affair can be the main motivation to take to the path of revolution. To an

individual at a loose end with no proper reason to go on living, the path of revolution presents new vistas. The theory of social revolution gives such youth the zest for life. The revolutionary is by definition, the supreme good personified. He lives not for himself but for the good of others. He is selfless, dedicated and the creator of history. In a disjointed world, this appears to be the only thing to latch on to. "The cause" becomes an all-consuming passion. The world is seen in black and white terms. There are only heroes and villains. The sense of history is exaggerated and one's own role overestimated. A dementia seizes the revolutionary. He attacks what he perceives to be the black and the bad with boiling hatred.

The revolutionary in other words is the epitome of the blackout despair. The JVP was on many counts more a product of despair rather than hope. It is true that they had a kind of Stalinist socialism in view for the future. But the dominant element was not hope but despair. This was why the JVP never had patience and had a marked tendency to act as if there was no tomorrow. They tendered to act more according to their psychological needs than to a nationally thought out political programme. The JVP was the nemesis of societal complacency and under development—a fatal mixture. In a situation of economic stagnation, widespread poverty and unemployment, when the privileged continue to live it up with standards of living rising ever higher, it tends to breed envy of the sickest kind. Envy which finds no mitigation and spreads in concentric circles around the individual, embracing everybody. To the JVP, even average middle class comforts were signs of social privilege. Some newspapers carried reports of sarcastic and envious comments made by members of the "deshapremi" squads that visited average middle class homes. They never considered the effort and toil expended to acquire such comforts. All they knew was that they did not have it. To the JVP even the village boutique keeper was a capitalist and the small-time village officials gramasevakas, co-operative chairmen and gramodaya mandala chairmen were members of the privileged exploiting classes. On some occasions, even those who had water or electricity supplies to their homes or could afford three meals a day were considered to be privileged.

Since they were not employed. They thought nothing of ordering week long work stoppages and the hardship caused to those who had to earn their living. They just could not care less. The JVP was actually out more for revenge than for change. The senseless slaughter they perpetrated and their lack of concern for public opinion was a reflection of this mentality. To be fair, it must be said that there was some justification for the JVP being what it was. Sinhala society got what it fully deserved. Most of those who joined the JVP were hard boiled yakko's who had adopted all the worst characteristics the system bred. Idealism and good intentions were never a part of their plan to capture power. They knew that this was a society which knew no gratitude. Hence they

wanted to capture power with the least possible danger to themselves. In the society they lived in, they knew that self-sacrificing heroism would not win them anything more than temporary popularity. Had they chosen the heroic path and failed, to capture power, they would have got no gratitude from the public. Hence they preferred to be cynical and play it safe. Looking at this phenomenon from the opposite side, the same story holds. The security forces personnel who finally finished off the JVP received no thanks today. Some sections of the public have even branded them as murderers.

The JVP knew that the memory span of the public was very short when the decision was taken to kill Vijaya Kumaratunga, they banked on this. One central committee member when asked about the wisdom of killing a man of Vijaya's stature had cynically replied "people will mourn for Vijaya for two weeks at most...then he will be forgotten." This was a correct assessment. The same assessment was also applicable to the JVP itself. Within two weeks of the killing of the JVP leaders, they had been relegated to the limbo of history. To the general public, the events of 1987-89 are now nothing but a bad dream. The vanquished and the victors are both equally irrelevant to them.

This in a sense may be a blessing. A country at war cannot afford to have a long memory. People should be able to forget, collect the pieces and continue. But when this has become a social norm in all situations, problems emerge. One reason why the JVP never considered it wrong to virtually horsewhip the public into line was because they knew that everything depended on success. If they failed, they were done for. One sees some parallels in the LTTE in the North. The LTTE is obsessed with the idea of getting themselves recognised as the only representatives of the Tamil people. And they have a policy of killing off all possible rivals. This is probably because they realise through experience that they would be conveniently forgotten the moment the goal was achieved. They know their people well enough to know that others might get crowned after they did all the fighting.

The JVP was thus an expression of a struggle by society against itself. There was a basic flaw in the post-77 policies in that it bred complacency and lack of commitment. While the civil war raged in the North and East, the carnival went on in the rest of the country. Though Sri Lanka was one of the worst scenes of conflict in the whole world, the country was not on a war footing. The country was suffering from a surfeit of liberality. By not putting the country on a war footing with the inevitable austerity measures, the UNP [United National Party] managed to retain and consolidate its popular electoral support. But at what cost to the country? It was not a case of elections being held for the people, but the people being pepped up and groomed for the elections...like in ancient Rome where voters were kept happy with free bread and circuses. One cannot in a sense blame the government for this. Mindful of their own continued political survival they balked at imposing any hardship on the public. In July 1987, the then Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel had been able to frighten the cabinet into agreeing to the Indo-Lanka accord by stating that if the accord was not signed and the war continued he would have to impose austerity measures on the country. Gunadasa Amarasekera once wrote that he realised for the first time that ours were a people who asked for food, drink and clothes above everything else only at the 1977 elections. The UNP too knew this.

The 'low intensity conflict' attitude adopted by the UNP from the beginning of the northern war was a recipe for a social disaster. In the North, patriotism had its price. Nobody could become a patriot by word of mouth. But in the south, the entire public were armchair patriots. Fat cats in Colombo held forth on the hostilities from their plush homes and the chauvinist Sinhala media created a public who were more frenzied spectators than enthusiastic participants in the 'great patriotic war.' No public opinion was created to put the country on a war footing and to finish the war.

It was only when a bomb went off in Colombo that the public was awakened to the realities of war. But such was the soul-destroying power of 'The great carnival' that whenever a bomb went off in Colombo, the scene of the blast was soon full of bounty hunters who took jewellery and other valuables off the dead and the dying. Earrings off smashed heads and rings and bangles off severed arms. Even the injured found their valuables missing by the time they were brought to hospital. After the corpses were hauled away and the debris cleared, life went back to normal and the carnival continued.

This is the same society which produced the JVP. They wanted power without commitment. It was easier to build up compliance through terror than through commitment. They knew that their earnestness would only be laughed at and soon forgotten after the work was done. Hence the 'slave driver' attitude towards the public. None of the JVP leaders seemed to be repentant of what they had done. It seemed to them the only rational course of action.

[19 Jun p 9]

[Text]

Aftermath of the Insurrection: Enthronement of 'Booty Capitalism'?

In the post 1977 period, state intervention and regulation of the economy was cut down to a minimum and things were allowed to develop on their own momentum. It was this form of economy which enabled the country to withstand continuous political instability without complete ruin. During the 1987-89 phase, when the disruption of the economy was brought to unprecedented levels, one could observe the case with which the economy bounced back to full normalcy after the periodic disruption with almost no effort on the part of the government. A controlled economy such as existed before 1977 would have been ruined many times over by

the kind of disruption experienced in the years 1987-89. This was the great strength of the post 1977 economic policy. There was also the fact that the impression of general affluence given out by the trade boom kept a large section of the public loyal to the ruling party, thus ensuring a degree of political stability never before experienced in the country. These were the strengths of the post 77 policies.

In reviewing the events of 1987-89, it is important to see what the ruling elite and the general public have learnt from the experience. After the 1971 insurgency, the United Front government which was in power at that time, made some efforts in the direction of reform through their policies on education, land and import substitution. They made attempts to change the system of education to bring it more in line with the needs of the country. They imposed a 50-acre ceiling on land ownership and acquired the great estates. They cut down on the import of certain items and allowed local industries to take over production. This was a response to a much smaller phenomenon than what had taken place in 1987-88. These efforts however, collapsed due to the inherent defects of the system.

The weakness was that the economy had distinct tendency to concentrate on the service and trade to the detriment of industries. Visions were harboured about the forming of Sri Lanka into a service economy like Singapore with the opening up of free trade zones and the development of the Colombo Port and tourism. The development of the Colombo Port was a genuine achievement. However, the country was never able to develop on the lines of a Singaporean style service economy. What happened instead was that the country developed into a classical "booty capitalism" over the years 1977 to 89. The term "booty capitalism" or 'adventurer capitalism" was used by Max Weber to describe an economy where activities related to trade predominate and are generally conducted in haphazard and ad hoc manner with a premium of shady deals. racketeering and attempts to corner markets. The government attempted to maintain the openness necessary to develop the country on the lines of a service economy. However, since the service economy never materialised as per the Singaporean model, this openness only precipitated the descent into booty capitalism. Even the few steps that were taken towards the service economy were tainted with the same problem. When President Jayewardene invited the "robber barons" in, what he got was in actual fact mostly robber barons. The free trade zone was beleagured by South East Asian entrepreneurs who only wanted to exploit the export quotas in readymade garments allocated to Sri Lanka in various international markets. It was understood that such entrepreneurs were only "passing through," with no abiding industrial interest being formented with Sri Lanka. The net foreign earnings they brought in and the number of jobs they created were negligible in view of the vast

outlay of capital which went into providing the infrastructure for the free trade zone. Thus the element of booty capitalism was dominant even in the newly opened up service sectors.

In the wake of the insurrection it appears to have dawned on the rulers that there was something fundamentally wrong with the post 77 economic liberalisation. The much vaunted "free economy" was a chimera which never existed even in the examples like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea which Sri Lanka purported to follow. The economies in these countries were heavily regulated by the state which gave leadership in the development of these countries into industrial economies in gradual stages over a number of years. While freedom and the market forces were important, such countries also believed in leadership. What Sri Lanka lacked was leadership. It was also true as some economists have pointed out that Sri Lanka embarked on the South East Asia model of development too late by a decade to be able to really reap the international benefits. But still, some headway could have been made if not for the lack of leadership. No country in South East Asia ever had the policy of ruining local industries which were doing well and were cost efficient. But in Sri Lanka, attempts were made to hand over even the most profitable industries to foreign collaborators. The fault here lies not in the whole but in the past. There has been no policy of promoting and fostering industries which were efficient and beneficial to the country. Details were overlooked in the stampede of the grand strategy. Cottage industries were destroyed wholesale. There apparently had been over 100,000 handlooms in the Southern Province alone before 1977. Today this industry is almost non-existent. In the wake of the insurrection, some sections of the government have spoken of a plan to "mini industrialize" the country. This long after most of the mini industries have been completely destroyed. The Janasaviya scheme was a clear admission on the part of the government that there was a vast section of the population that needed immediate relief. There was even an attempt to legalize the production of kasippu (moonshine liquor) as a cottage industry. Such is the need to provide employment to the unemployed.

Sri Lanka has lacked a general plan of economic development since 1977. Before 1977, it must be said that the government at least had a plan to develop the country, however unpopular they became. After 1977, the main emphasis has been to let things drift and when problems crop up to plan round the problem. The lack of state regulation has created a situation where while the carnival is kept going on a momentum of its own, more and more people dropped out of it until those outside far outnumbered those in the system. Between the years 1977 to 1989, the economy could absorb only a fraction of the yearly inflow into the labour market.

For a long time the ruling class has been plagued by the habit of looking too much to the west for solutions. One conspicuous factor appears to be the lack of confidence in local entrepreneurial ability. There are some countries with problems like this. In Indonesia for instance, the economy is run for the most part by the four million immigrant Chinese while the remaining 165 million "sons of the soil" have not been able to produce much local entrepreneurship. Sri Lanka however, has no such problem. The deep south has been the cradle of business enterprise in Sri Lanka and presents a vast reservoir of talent which needs only a minimum of attention to activate. The south was also tragically the JVP's main base in the insurrection in 1987-89. It is obvious that the tragedy of 1987-89 would have been averted if the mini-industrialisation theory which is now becoming fashionable had been applied in the southern province without allowing the widespread "lumpenisation" of southern youth which swelled the cadres of the JVP.

If the present system of booty capitalism which gives a wide leeway for the shady activities of foreign racketeers can be altered to give pride of place to the local entrepreneur, some headway can be made towards political stability and prosperity. One good example of how detrimental the present system of booty capitalism is to the country can be seen from the fate of the casino business which came into being with the post 1977 liberalisation. Leaving aside all moral considerations on gambling, one discovers that most of those who started these establishments later had to hand over their business to foreign operatives. This is true of many industries in the country. Attracting foreign investment and foreign collaboration in fields beneficial to the country is one thing. But to be dominated by foreign racketeers is a different matter. Any capitalist development which takes place in the country should be indigenous. In the absence of a kind of capitalism which takes root in the country and the consciousness of the people, there will always be attempts to replace the existing outdated system of booty capitalism with various outdated forms of socialism-Stalinist, Pol Pottist and otherwise. If the events of 1987-89 do not awaken the ruling class to this reality, nothing will. And the only solution for the larger masses may lie in a massive revolutionary upheaval.

Article Claims 'Woman Is the Enemy' for Fundamentalists

46000134C Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 7 Jun 90 pp 22-24

[Article by Zafarullah Poshni]

[Text] It is a characteristic of fascistic and totalitarian organisations to pick out some segment of society as a "hate-object" on which to direct all the pent-up venom and frustrations of the people whom they desire to lead (or mislead). This channelling of the anger and hatred of the masses in a certain direction helps the organisation to keep up its unity, tempo and dynamism, even if it is for a disagreeable or perverted cause.

For instance, the Nazis under Adolf Hitler made the Jews responsible for all the evils under the sun, including responsibility for the defeat of Germany in the First World War. That this Nazi propaganda was a tissue of lies caused no worry to the Fuhrer and his supporters. Propaganda Minister Herr Goebels had brazenly philosophised that if one repeats a lie often enough and vehemently enough, people will start believing it. The end result of the Nazi hate campaign was the mass annihilation of Jews in the camps of Belsen, Buchenwald and others. The Nazis called it the "Final Solution."

The Muslim world's present animosity (which is perfectly legitimate) against the Zionists of Israel should not blind us to the inhuman barbarities perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jewish people. These barbarities had been deliberately started on the basis of a political strategy to direct the ire of the Germans (smarting under the defeat of the First World War) against a relatively helpless minority and thus to unite them under the banner of the Nazi party. The end results were most horrific and shocking.

In the USSR, the Bolsheviks under Joseph Stalin kept on inventing "class enemies" in regular succession to justify their authoritarian, nay, totalitarian, rule. The accepted enemies were, of course, the Czarist autocracy and the bourgeoisie. But later on the Kulaks (who were not feudal lords, but just relatively affluent farmers) were designated as a "class enemy" and lakhs of them were physically destroyed. "Class enemies" were discovered amongst the intelligentsia, amongst army officers, among doctors (remember the famous doctors' plot?), in fact, any group which Stalin and his friends wanted to annihilate was dubbed as a "class enemy." The results of these hate campaigns proved highly detrimental to the development of the Soviet Union as a happy society.

In other words, while a political party may succeed in uniting the populace behind it on the basis of hatred these tactics, in the long run, give birth to a fragmented and unhappy society and can cause a lot of turmoil and distress. History is full of such examples.

Our country was fortunate initially that it had a democratic and liberal person like Mohammad Ali Jinnah as its undisputed leader. Although hatred for the Hindus had been used to a great extent as a motivating force in the struggle to achieve Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam, with his broad vision, knew that he must wipe the slate clean and start the new State with a directive of amity and tolerance. Hence, in his very first speech before the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the Quaid laid down the principle that all citizens are equal before the law irrespective of their religion. He said: "...Hindus shall cease to be Hindus, and Muslims shall cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is a private matter for every individual, but in the political sense as equal citizens of the State."

Unfortunately for Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam died within one year and after him came the deluge. Those fundamentalists who had vehemently opposed the Pakistan Movement and called Mr Jinnah "Kafir-i-Azam" became gradually, over the years, the self-proclaimed

standard-bearers of the "ideology of Pakistan." Democracy was subverted and a series of martial laws were imposed, at intervals. To give the devil his due, the first martial law ruler, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, had no truck with the fundamentalists and he introduced some progressive legislation in respect of marriage and divorce which was of benefit to women. The second martial law chief, General Yahya Khan, talked glibly about the ideology of Pakistan while getting drunk every evening in the company of fat females. He managed to secure the assistance of the fundamentalist Al-Shams and Al-Badr groups in the East Pakistan fiasco.

It, however, remained for General Ziaul Haq to truly dismantle the liberal legacy of the Quaid-i-Azam and give a gigantic boost to fanatical fundamentalism in Pakistan. The General did not believe in what he called "Western democracy," because he was quite sure that even if he lived to 90 he could never win a fair and open election under any circumstances. So, for 11 years, by cleverness and cunning, he cultivated his minority constituencies consisting of the armed forces (his captive associates), mullahs and maulanas (his ideological associates) and sundry privileged capitalist and moneyed groups, including heroin and arms dealers (his financial associates). The Quaid's exhortation that all citizens will be equal was discarded by Zia with the introduction of the Hudood Ordinances whereby not only the evidence of non-Muslims but also that of Muslim women was decreed to be inadmissible for the purposes of establishing guilt or innocence. General Ziaul Haq did a superb job in reducing the status and dignity of women in Pakistan. Perhaps that was the unique contribution to our society of his 11 years of dictatorship.

I started this article by stating that all fascists and totalitarians seek out "hate-objects" on which to project the frustrations, anger and venom of the people. In our country, the fundamentalists—who, of course, are fascist in mentality since they are devoid of tolerance—have one prime enemy and that is women! I concede that they have other enemies too-the Ahmadis are enemy for all shades of fundamentalists. The Hindus across the border continue to be a favourite target. The fundamentalist seldom calls this enemy as "Indian" (as he should); he needs must bring religion in it and call him a "Hindu." even though the Hindus of the Kingdom of Nepal are our very good friends. Amongst our most extreme Sunnis. the Shias are a very important enemy and, no doubt, the more fanatical Shias have reciprocal feelings about the Sunnis. On a less virulent scale, the Brelvis and Deobandis have a cordial dislike for each other; and I have met many Islamic zealots who certainly consider the Ismailis to be wholly beyond the pale.

But let us be assured that all these "enemies" are secondary. On and off, the fundamentalist will do a bit of target practice on one of these second-rank enemies. But the one consistent, unchangeable, eternal, always to be reviled, the enemy par excellence of the fundamentalist, is the female sex. Yes, to our staunch fundamentalist,

woman is the enemy. Of course, the fundamentalist is not so naive as to proclaim this enmity in straightforward terms. He will say that he only abhors and castigates "Westernised women," but that is only a pretence, because to him any woman who is not a zombie enclosed in a shroud is Westernised. Benazir Bhutto may cover her head meticulously, wrap a chaddar round herself, refuse to shake hands with even foreign male dignitaries, start her speeches invariably with "Bismillahir-Rehma-nir-Raheem," but to the fundamentalist she is a Westernised woman. No, there is no escape from the wrath of these fanatics for any woman who is even slightly independent and assertive. A woman is either a doormat or a 'Westernised woman.'

Deep down, the fundamentalist has hatred and contempt for the entire female population. Of course, he also has feelings and desires for the opposite sex, because he is after all a red-blooded male. But even here the female to him is not a partner; she is a lust object—and because she brings him down from his lofty, holier-than-thou pedestal by arousing his desires, she is to be hated and condemned as the source of temptation. It is easy to project one's own weaknesses and "base" desires onto the other side and condemn the woman for leading the man astray. This is the real truth behind the ostensible reasoning of every woman-hating fundamentalist.

Listen to these rabble-rousers of the JUI [Jamiati-Ulema-i-Islam], the JUP [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan], the JI [Jamaat-i-Islami] and sundry other religio-political parties as they declare that they cannot accept a woman as the leader of an Islamic State. One would seriously listen to them (even if one did not agree) if they said that Benazir Bhutto is to be opposed because she is inexperienced and inefficient or because there are corrupt people in her Cabinet and among her advisers or because her foreign policy is totally wrong or any other cogent and solid argument. But this is not the crux of the fundamentalist argument: the bottom line always is that Benazir should be removed because she is a woman. Sometimes I wonder if these fogeys are living in the concluding decade of the 20th century or in some theocracy of the medieval era.

I also wonder at these "emancipated" political women, Abida Husain and Atiya Inayatullah and many others like them, who for reasons best known to themselves, have landed in the lap of the fundamentalists and the denigrators of women. Let these good ladies by all means oppose Benazir and her Government (which leaves quite a lot to be desired), but they should not toe the antifeminist line of the fundamentalists. They should condemn Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi and Professor Ghafoor Ahmed and others of that creed who day in and day out declare to the world that a woman cannot be the head of Government in an Islamic State. An Islamic State?

Is Pakistan an Islamic State? A society where according to ex-Finance Minister Mahboobul Haq Rs 50 billion are gobbled up every year in corruption, where heroin and gun-running are a way of life, where those who are honest and clean are considered congenital idiots, where lakhs of rupees are spent on a rich man's wedding dinner while millions of poor people exist on bread and onions, where big shots who parade women naked in the streets go scot free, while a blind girl is awarded punishment of lashes for zina, where crores worth of bank loans are written off for the influential feudals and the poor blighter who steals a goat may be sentenced to the chopping off of his right hand—is this an Islamic society? In this wonderful Islamic society our great fundamentalist leaders don't worry about the very real evils which I have listed above: what they are most concerned with is problems like girls should not play tennis and hockey; that there should not be any "uryani" and "fahashi" on television (you and I may not have seen any, but these fellows have much sharper eyes); that co-education must be banned; that Mehtab Rashdi should keep her head covered with a dupatta. These and other such "monumental" problems are the ones that bother our venerable maulanas. It would be worth a good belly laugh were it not so tragic and demoralising.

The fundamentalists are playing havoc with the dignity of women in Pakistan. In our society, which is still backward and ridden with superstitions, women, as it is, do not enjoy anywhere close to an equal status with men. The effort, therefore, should be to raise them up so that they cease to be oppressed and miserable. Millions of women die of childbirth complications in our country due to lack of adequate medical facilities. I have never heard any maulana berate the Government for not providing such facilities to the country's womenfolk. No, this loss of life doesn't seem to bother him. (What the hell, if one woman dies you can always marry another.) What probably will concern him is that even if she is dying in childbirth she should not be assisted by a male gynecologist. That's the mental horizon of our fundamentalists.

If women are ever to gain freedom and realise their full potential, they will have to organise themselves for a long struggle. Freedom is never gifted; it always has to be won. The pathetic condition of the vast majority of our women—especially in the rural areas—is a blot and a shame for any country. This state of affairs must be changed if we want to have a happy society. But men will not do it. The women will have to bear the brunt of the effort.

As a start the womenfolk must be made to realise that every type of fundamentalist is a natural enemy of the female sex; therefore any political party which declares that a woman cannot be the leader of an Islamic State should not get the vote of a woman. A concentrated effort must be made by women's organisations to project this idea across to the female voters. The power of the feminine vote should not be underestimated. Once she is alone in the voting booth, a woman can vote freely against her prime enemy—the fundamentalist—and there are far more women than fundamentalists, thank God.

Even among the men the fundamentalists are a distinct minority. But thanks to the power of the pulpit and their militant cadres, they wield an influence much greater than their numbers. This pugnacious minority must not be allowed to ruin the existence of one half of the country's population. They must be countered and defeated if we want to live in a happy and contented society in the years to come.

Sheikh Sahib sey rasm-o-rah na ki, Shukr hey zindagi tabah na ki. (We made no acquaintance of the Sheikh, Thank God, we did not spoil our life).

Article Suggests Ways To Bring Sindh 'Back to Health'

46000133C Karachi DAWN in English 16 Jun p 7

[Article by Ghani Eirabi: "Nursing Sindh Back to Health"]

[Text] Currently consigned to the intensive care unit, Sindh needs to be nursed back to health with the stern compassion of a competent matron. So long as the diagnosis is accurately made and the medicine correctly administered, the precise mechanics of hospital management is not really relevant. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan perhaps is right in predicting that more complications will result from any resort to extra-constitutional "surgery" and Prime Minister Bhutto makes a lot of sense with her plea that neither the promulgation of a state of emergency nor imposition of Governor's rule will make any material difference, considering that in either case, it is essentially the permanent civil bureaucracy that will implement on the ground whatever policy or strategy is devised.

What they have failed to point out is that the provincial policy-making already is under the control of the Centre because of both the Central and provincial governments being controlled by the same political party. Any guidelines issued by Ms Benazir Bhutto as co-chairperson of the People's Party are as likely to be obeyed as any directive issued by her as Prime Minister. Additionally, all officials holding key jobs in the provincial administration, such as chief Secretary and I.G. Police, are federal nominees who cannot defy the Centre save at the risk of their civil service careers. Thus, through party apparatus and service discipline, the Centre already is in effective control of Sindh's administration.

However, it is not lack of administrative authority but of political wisdom that has contributed to Sindh's trauma. It would appear that we are extremist by temperament: either we clean drop the party system of democracy or place it on a high pedestal and worship it as a god, elevating partisan loyalty frequently above national interest; and this has been the strength and bane of the Pakistan People's Party in particular. The point is illustrated by the break-up of the ANP-PPP [Awami National Party-Pakistan People's Party] coalition in the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and MQM-PPP [Muhajir Qaumi Movement-Pakistan People's Party]

alliance in Sindh and dissolution of the Balochistan Assembly, besides alienation of the Punjab Government from the Centre. The break-up of the MQM-PPP coalition in Sindh resulting from the PPP's reluctance to share power has turned out to be a major national disaster. It has compounded the ethnic rift in the province.

It is true that ethnicity has long been brewing in Sindh. Bred by a natural clash of economic interests between the Sidhis and the Mohajirs, it has received a fillip from General Zia-ul-Haq's drastic action against the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] agitation for restoration of democracy, led by Sindhis and opposed or ignored by non-Sindhis. Political disillusionment has supplemented the Sindhis' sense of economic deprivation, resulting from their failure to win placements in top schools and professional institutions and the civil services according to their demographic entitlement. The remedial measure introduced by the ZAB government, namely a rural-versus-urban quota system has adversely hit the ethnic minorities who deplore it as repudiation of "merit". In a dramatic reversal of the situation, it is now the Mohajirs who are complaining of politico-economic deprivation. The tragedy is what began essentially as an economic grouse has degenerated into a blood-drenched communal fanaticism, ominously reminiscent of the Partition period brutalities. And exploiting the collapse of law and order are anti-social elements spearheaded by dacoits and kidnappers and ransom-seekers.

This has necessitated the re-ordering of priorities, with restoration of law and order claiming "pride of place". There has to be a ruthless crackdown on terrorists—subject only to one condition: the crackdown must be transparently impartial. Any suspicion that it is partisan in motive, conception or implementation, triggers a vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge "to even up the score". Just as justice should not only be done but also appear to have been done, impartiality should not only be observed but also appear to have been observed.

The dismal failure of the Sindh Government's May 27 clean-up operation in Hyderabad is directly attributable to the perception that the Sindh police action was vengeful and it was directed exclusively against the Mohajirs. The point is not whether the charge is right or wrong, but that it has been levelled and believed by many. No matter how erroneous the perception, the police operation was resisted and it caused a massacre in Hyderabad-killing 45, including 12 women, and injuring 250-and triggered a chain reaction of senseless slaughter in Karachi. As against this, the Pakistan Army was able to control the situation in Hyderabad and Karachi without so much as firing a shot, partly because of the soundness of its pre-planning but mostly because of the impressions that the nation's armed forces, by and large, are impartial and free of any manner of communal bias; and, in any case, too disciplined to let it influence their professional performance. Even more important, they are not viewed as susceptible to any political

pressure or external manipulation. In all fairness to the Sindh police, it must be conceded that its efforts to control the law and order situation have frequently been frustrated by undue interference by the province's political leadership and the more powerful Waderas. Sindh's omnipotent feudal lords are a grave liability, and a number of them, out of self-interest, not only fan communal passions but also provide refuge and protection to wrongdoers.

This is not intended by any means to downplay the harm done by some of the MQM leaders who, instead of advising the Mohajir to get assimilated into the rich culture of the area they have made their home, keep provoking their followers into adopting militant postures and harbouring divisive ambitions.

The intention is to stress the point that the fault lies with both sides, and the stance of militant self-righteousness adopted by old and new Sindhis has made the situation highly explosive which can only be defused by impartial implementation of a well-thought-out, closely integrated, action plan.

Contrary to common presumption that the first step in any drive to restore normality is to recover and forfeit weapons through large-scale house-to-house searches (which prompt further atrocities and clashes). It is proposed tentatively to defer general arms-recovery until the people feel secure enough to part with them almost voluntarily. The restoration of a feeling of security is the primary target, and to that end, a comprehensive action plan should be announced forthwith and publicised so that all segments of society know that it is designed to safeguard the vital interests of each.

The linchpin of the plan is massive army presence in all disturbed areas, urban or rural, Karachi and Hyderabad, Dadu and Larkana. The Army will operate in aid of civil authority and be assisted by civilian police and paramilitary Rangers, and enjoy ready access to fully mobilised civil and military intelligence services, which have failed to play any credible role so far. Scarcity of prior information about the machinations of enemy agents like RAW or the vicious designs of indigenous malefactors has been a major cause of operational failure in the past and history will repeat itself unless State agents manage to penetrate subversive organisations and keep law enforcement agencies well in the picture.

Under this plan, the Sindh police will have to be purged of corrupt, incompetent and communal-minded elements and their alleged links with criminals and political extremists snapped. During the limited period the provincial police are assigned to operate with the Army in the "disturbed" areas, they will be subject to Army's discipline and entitled to army's protection and "intercessions" by ministers and Waderas will be completely barred. There is no other way of hammering them into a clean, competent and credible law enforcement agency, ultimately capable of taking over from the Army, which they must.

The cleansing job will have to reach down to the precincts of the police station where an NCO, with his posse of army-men may have to be posted to work with the SHO, both to back him in anti-terrorist operations and make sure that no "influentials", from among politicians or criminals are able to cow him down into conniving at dare-devil dacoities, extortions and abductions. Many experts are convinced that there is a link-thread running through ethnic terrorism, political manipulation, ransom-seeking kidnappings and highway robberies.

Even presuming there is no linkage other than the common temptation to exploit the breakdown in law and order, the situation calls for a multi-pronged attack against all major manifestations of crime, especially frequent forays of dacoits from their Indus forest hideouts into populated villages. No matter how ancient the tradition, the menace has to be stamped out through a fullfledged military operation. This blatant challenge to state authority has to be crushed with ruthless use of force, including deployment of gun-ships, and in case any Waderas are found patronising the gangsters, they will have to be curbed too.

This is not an imposition on the Army. Restoration of State authority is one of its major national obligations and it cannot adequately defend the border against any external threat until it has first stamped out internal disorder. During its massive combing operation, the army is likely to get an opportunity to seize scores of enemy agents not only inciting ethnic and sectarian rift but also passing on military secrets over to the other side of the border. Now that the immediate threat of an Indian attack has receded somewhat, the Army can spare more manpower to tackle the internal threat, inter alia sealing the Sindh-Rajasthan border the way the Indians have sealed the Punjab border.

However, as pointed out by the Army Chief of Staff, Mirza Aslam Beg, while the army can restore law and order in the short term, the more abiding solution has to be devised by the political leadership. Any feasible solution will have to provide for a double-barrel politico-economic approach.

The inevitable first step in a rapprochement between the two political parties, the PPP and the MQM. Their political conflict accentuates the ethnic rift; and while a political accord between them may not eliminate the ethnic animus, it is bound to defuse the mounting tension. An MQM-PPP understanding is also dictated by realities on the ground: as a party confined to Sindh, the MQM can accomplish the most of its constituency by cooperating with Sindh's ruling party; and without fully securing its home-base, the PPP cannot feel strong enough to play an effective national role. The selfinterest of both and the over-riding requirement of national tranquillity postulate that at least for the present, the MQM suspend its national-opposition role and negotiate an understanding with the PPP Government in Sindh. Even if it cannot re-enter into a coalition with the PPP, Sindh, the MQM should operate as a neutral third party, at least until partisan passions have died down. Hopefully, the People's Party, too, has learnt its lesson and is chastened by now.

The Sindh People's Party may conceivably lose some of its extremist following by making a deal with the MOM. but it will lose a lot more, both in Sindh and nationally, if the present turmoil continues. Without the restoration of law and order, the economic amelioration, the PPP promised the Sindhis, will not be possible and economic deprivation might trigger a major explosion. Restoration of law and order through the army's non-partisan operation and reformed-police cooperation and of political tranquillity through an MQM-PPP rapprochement, should clear the way for a crash programme of economic rehabilitation. An SOS should go out to Pakistan's friends abroad, including the US, Europe and the oil-rich Gulf states to respond to the dire needs of Sindh the same way they have been bailing out Balochistan. Not only should they set up industries in Sindh but also give preference to Sindhis in overseas employment to enable them to catch up on what is left of the Middle East's oil bonanza. There can be no peace in Sindh unless the scourge of educated unemployment is first eliminated.

While educated unemployment is cited as by far the worst cause of communal conflict in Sindh, several "insiders" list the heart-burning in respect of admission to model schools and professional colleges as a significant secondary cause of tension between Sindhis and non-Sindhis. This is surprising because it is more easily tackled than unemployment. No matter how heavy the cost of setting up a chain of model schools or establishing half a dozen medical and engineering colleges, it is nothing compared to the economic ruination caused by five years of communal rioting for the incalculable damage done by mutual blood-letting to national integrity.

There is absolutely no reason why we should permit any short-sighted financial "wizards" to jeopardise Ummah unity just to save a couple of billion rupees. Similarly, no money should be stinted on creating hundreds of socially useful jobs—even if dubbed as financially unproductive by conventional economists—if that is what it takes to eliminate moral-sapping, unity-shattering educated unemployment. There is no price too high to pay to keep the nation together.

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